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Abstract 
Many social policy problems are recognised as complex and intractable, and 
hence necessitate analysts‟ having the capability to address them. 
Epistemological influences embedded in approaches to policy can impose 
constraints on the natural capacity and capability that people have to make sense 
out of particular experiences of complexity in the course of policy analysis work. 
Within the dominant policy approach adopted by policy analysts under the rubric 
of evidence-based policy, such complexity capability eschews any explicit role 
for opinion. However, the application of Q methodology by Michel van Eeten 
among others in a specific case of policy deliberation in the Netherlands, which 
had proven resistant to the standard, evidence-based policy analysis, shows that 
there could be a role for what is otherwise overlooked. Accordingly, this thesis 
examines the proposition that opinion indeed may play an important role in 
policymaking in complex and intractable situations. Q methodology is an 
established research methodology for acquiring and developing knowledge from 
a subjective standpoint. It has a growing record of successful application to 
public policy controversies, where solutions were made possible because opinion 
- and its everyday experiential rationality - were made available. Q methodology 
is also seen, however, as a marginal methodology. There has been insufficient 
explanation of why the application of Q methodology could make a positive 
difference to policy problems of a complex and intractable kind.  
The two research questions focus on the efficacy of Q methodology. Q 
methodology could make a difference in an adjunctive sense. It meets a policy 
need, namely to make opinion available as a complement to other evidence 
knowledge and thus adds to understanding of problems and solutions while 
remaining firmly within the prevailing evidence-based policy epistemology. 
Alternatively, Q methodology could make a difference of a transformative kind. 
It opens up a new epistemological space for doing policy analysis work with the 
power to create substantial policy-analytic change. 
To address these questions, the thesis develops an argument that establishes the 
linkages between pragmatism, complexity thinking and Q methodology and, in 
so doing, provides a path for understanding the role and place of opinion in 
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policy making contexts. It proceeds through several stages which together make 
an epistemological argument for the efficacy of Q methodology. First, the nature 
of the policy problem is explicated as one of the separation of opinion from 
knowledge. Secondly, the thesis turns to a counter argument drawing on Peirce‟s 
pragmatism and his attention to abduction. In the next stage, dominant practice 
ideas about the capability needed to address complexity are critically examined, 
which shows that opinion is not valued in that practice. The success of van 
Eeten‟s work leads to a detailed examination of complexity in the policy context, 
and the claim that opinion is less problematical than are the overall 
epistemological choices made in policy analysis.  
Focusing on those epistemological choices, the argument draws together, in a 
fresh look, the thinking entailed in Q methodology in respect of its abductive 
logic and its theory of knowledge. Q methodology is shown to be a kind of 
science that allows objective fact to be approached from a subjective standpoint 
under experimental conditions. Finally, therefore, Q methodology is shown to 
open up an epistemological space quite unlike others. This makes the practice 
described as “reading complexity” in a real-world policy application possible.  
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Chapter 1: The research project 
 
Introduction 
Citizens working at the interface of policy analysis and scholarship in New Zealand 
cannot but be aware of the emphasis on evidenced-based policy. The need to 
understand better the complex problems that require a policy response provides the 
impetus for evidence-based approaches to policy analysis and policy advice. New 
Zealand, like many states around the world, has an acknowledged history of 
intractable policy issues and repetitive analyses of these problems (English, 2009). 
The normal experience is that attempts to tackle difficult policy issues in areas such as 
the environment, health, justice, welfare and social security have often resulted in 
controversy, policy failure, or unintended outcomes. Rivers are still polluted, demand 
for healthcare and the costs of meeting that demand continue to grow, welfare reform 
is a hotly debated topic and jobs stay out of reach for those who want and need work. 
Every substantive intractable issue tests policy analysts‟ ways of thinking and 
understanding of the problem situations they are confronting. If we could better 
understand what contributes to the complex problem and knew various potential 
solutions would act on the problem, then we could better select among those 
solutions.  
This research makes a broad claim that prevailing epistemological influences 
embedded in evidence-based approaches to policy analysis impose constraints on a 
common human capability to reckon with complex realities, uncertainty, and things in 
flux. Further, that what is defined as “opinion”, „the untested views of individuals or 
groups‟ (Davies, 2004:3) and ruled out in evidence based policy may play a more 
important part in policy analysis than has been acknowledged by advocates of the use 
of science-based evidence as a major policy analysis strategy.  
In late 1999 in the United Kingdom, the Blair Labour Government reopened a debate 
about how to improve approaches to the analysis of policy and the quality of policy 
advice in a policy context of complexity and change. In the ensuing decade growing 
numbers of states (for example, Australia, United States, Canada, and the European 
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Union) have picked up on the ideas and principles of evidence-based policy 
popularized by the United Kingdom (Donaldson, Christie & Mark, 2009; Head, 
2010). Evidence-based policy analysis rests on a conception of rigorous and reliable 
knowledge and a rejection of opinion along with common sense-making modes of 
thinking and knowing. However, this is not to suggest that opinion is absent from 
policy decisions or that decisions are made largely on evidence.  
Of concern in this thesis are the practices normally considered the purview of the 
analysts and not the political decision maker. It is important to point out that there is a 
difference between a “successful policy” and “successful policy analysis”. Research 
processes and methods of analysis can help policy analysts provide more useful 
information to policy decision makers in the policy process, but this information may 
not have a direct impact on policy as studies into the extent knowledge is utilised in 
the policy process have found (Caplan, 1979; Knorr, 1977; Neilson, 2001;Weiss, 
1977). Policy analysis is only one influence on policymakers, who also have their 
own experience, views, and interests influencing them, which the evidence-based 
policy analysis literature recognises (Davies, 2004; Head & Alford, 2008; Nutley, 
Davies & Walter, 2003). One of the aims of evidence-based policy is to integrate the 
experience, expertise and judgment of decision-makers with the best available 
evidence from social science research (Davies, 2004). 
In rejecting opinion, the evidence-based approach puts forward a way of addressing 
complexity that makes opinion marginal and distrusted. Opinion is conflated with 
„ideological standpoints, prejudice, and speculative conjecture‟ (Davies, 2004:3). The 
account of evidence-based policy in material disseminated by the United Kingdom 
Labour Government and summarized by advocates and critics alike equates reliable 
evidential knowledge with rigorous systematic research and scientific objective 
knowledge, to the neglect of peoples‟ common capability to make sense of complex 
situations in order to act (Marston & Watts, 2003; Mulgan, 2003b; Parsons, 2002; 
Pawson, 2002; UK Cabinet Office, 1999b). 
Conception of opinion 
A standard dictionary definition of opinion is a „judgement or belief not founded on 
certainty or proof‟ (Collins Dictionary of the English Language, 1982:1031). The 
9 
 
origins of a conception of knowledge that excludes opinion can be traced back to the 
ancient Greeks. Plato identified an epistemology consisting of the “realm” of 
knowledge, and a second “realm” of opinion where humankind is without knowledge 
(Oldroyd, 1986:10-11). The distinction between these two realms described by 
ancient Greeks was further developed by the early empiricists. Rene Descartes (1596-
1650) who laid the foundation for the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity, 
described the role of „rational and objective method‟ (Hollinger, 1994:23) in creating 
knowledge. According to Descartes, „value claims cannot be proven‟ using such 
methods, „therefore, value judgements do not constitute knowledge‟ (Hollinger, 
1994:23) or have a role in science.  
Writers on philosophical concepts such as Julian Baggini and Peter Fosl (2003) point 
out that the objective/subjective distinction applies to the use of concepts like opinion 
and knowledge. They further point out that though philosophers have moved beyond 
seeing “what is objective” and “what is subjective” as a simplistic divide, the „basic 
terms of reference are still the same‟ (Baggini & Fosl, 2003:163). They give a concise 
statement of the objective/subjective distinction: „The subjective is … what pertains 
to the (individual) subject, consciousness or mind, while the objective is what stands 
outside or independently of the (individual) subject‟ (Baggini & Fosl, 2003:161). 
They explain what this distinction means applied to opinion:  
When a judgement or point of view is rooted entirely in one individual‟s 
particular perspective on the world, we often call that opinion “subjective”. In 
doing so we signal that we suspect that the judgement is partial, probably 
doesn‟t take account of all the facts, or fails to rise above the personal 
viewpoint. When, however, a judgement takes into account all the relevant 
data, disregards personal prejudice and finds agreement with other competent 
and informed people, we say a judgement is objective. By this we mean that 
the judgement is impartial, well grounded in facts, and rises above the 
personal (Baggini & Fosl, 2003:161).  
Applied to knowledge, the distinction means that objective knowledge is „freed from 
all taint of particular perspective‟ (Baggini & Fosl, 2003:162) and based on a view 
from the “outside”. Carla Willig (2001:3), a writer on qualitative research methods in 
psychology, points out that in contemporary epistemological debates „what people 
disagree about is the extent to which our understanding of the world can approach 
objective knowledge‟ (see Nagel, 1986). Different responses to this question manifest 
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in different intellectual currents and epistemological positions that range from 
positivism to postmodernism, with pragmatism being one stance among the positions. 
In this thesis, opinion is defined in Q methodological terms. Opinions are „self-
referent statements held, as the dictionary says, on grounds short of proof‟ 
(Stephenson, 1965:284). As such, opinions are viewed as „modes of behaviour largely 
involving the self‟ (Stephenson, 1965:286) and are a basic way „individuals have of 
thinking about themselves and society‟ (Stephenson, 1965:286). This Q 
methodological definition of opinion is viewed as a concept that meshes with classical 
pragmatist critique of science grounded in „the philosophies of flux‟ (Dewey, 
1958:50) and the belief that we live in „a universe which is not all closed and settled, 
which is still in some respects indeterminate and in the making‟ (Dewey, 1950:52). In 
this pragmatist view, an individual‟s own opinion relative to some topic or situation, 
which may not be agreed to by all, arises from some complex of a self, interaction, 
communication, and common sense-making. Opinions can be emergent in experience, 
in which thought is sensitive to „uncertainty, choice, hypotheses, novelties and 
possibilities‟ (Dewey, 1950:52).  
Debates that relate to the separation of opinion from knowledge will be further 
discussed in Chapter 2, with a focus on how knowledge is considered to be produced 
and justified in the world of science, and in Chapter 3, with a focus on how opinion is 
assessed in evidence-based policy. 
Aim of this research and research questions 
In this thesis my claim that opinion is undervalued in evidence-based policy analysis 
is explored through an analysis of Q methodology. The primary aim of this research is 
to provide an epistemological explanation of the efficacy of Q methodology in policy 
situations of complexity. As such, the aim of the research resolves into a research 
question of two parts: 
Does Q methodology have potential because it meets a policy need, namely to make 
opinion available as a complement to other evidence knowledge and thus adds to 
understanding of problems and solutions while remaining firmly within the prevailing 
evidence-based epistemology?  
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In other words, does Q methodology have an adjunctive power and simply adds to 
what can be determined through existing practices embedded in policy analysis in 
which case, recourse to opinion is simply a mechanism for breaking deadlocks. 
OR 
Does Q methodology have potential because it opens up a new epistemological space 
for doing policy analysis work? 
In which case, could it be claimed that Q methodology has transformative power to 
create a more sustained, substantial policy-analytic change that may enable an analyst 
to see a given issue in a new analytical perspective. 
This study is a theoretical piece of work and interdisciplinary in its scope. Rather than 
an empirical study grounded in the collection and analysis of data, this study draws on 
secondary sources and the diverse literatures on conventional policy analysis, 
complexity thinking, pragmatism, and Q methodology. Given that this study seeks to 
provide an epistemological explanation of the efficacy of Q methodology in policy 
situations of complexity, a detailed discussion of the broader contextual literature 
relating to, for example, other framings and approaches to social complexity (e.g. 
Ackoff, 1974; Schön, 1995; Snowden 2005; Ulrich, 1994) is excluded primarily on 
the basis of a need to be selective and set limits on how much to cover, and in what 
level of detail.  
The literature that relates to the postmodern critique of modernism, rationality, 
positivism, and domination (e.g., Foucault 1980, Derrida, 1976; Lyotard, 1984) is 
pertinent in many ways to questions about the policy analysis of difficult issues. This 
extensive literature, which questions the philosophical foundations of the social 
sciences and the possibility of „sound communication, objective reporting, valid 
generalisations, and theoretical knowledge‟ (Shalin, 1993:303) takes seriously the 
primacy of power relations and politics in the formation of knowledge.  
The argument of this thesis develops not by referring to an entire range of other 
approaches to subjectivity but by referring to what is likely the most prominent 
among them in the context of policy studies, viz., varieties of discourse analysis 
(Glynos, Howarth, Norval & Speed, 2009). The postmodern analysis of “epistemes”, 
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“regimes of truth” “forms of discourse” is inquiry that ventures into the „link between 
scientific discourse of truth and the political discourse of power‟ (Shalin, 1993:310-
312) and its political consequences. In this thesis, it is recognised that areas of this 
literature resonate with an interest in subjectivity as defined in Q methodological 
terms, for example, as shown in the work of John Dryzek (1988, 1990) on political 
discourse analysis and his critical scrutiny of public opinion surveys.  
The rest of this introductory chapter sets out the background and context of the 
inquiry. It discusses what motivates this inquiry and outlines the structure of my 
argument. The chapter finishes with an outline of the contents of the thesis. 
Background and context 
Epistemology of policy analysis practices 
This thesis offers the view that the dominant epistemological distinction made 
between knowledge and opinion that delineates evidence-based policy analysis in 
discourse and practice, by accepting knowledge and rejecting opinion, effectively 
precludes the possibility of coming to grips with complexity in experience, without 
which there is a reduced likelihood of the development of a good policy response 
under conditions of change and uncertainty (Hajer, 2003). To the extent that scientific 
rigorous knowledge is desirable and opinion eschewed, evidence-based policy raises 
an issue of epistemology in policy analysis practice. 
In academic terms, epistemology concerns theories of knowledge. It is the branch of 
philosophy that inquires into the possibilities of knowing about reality, complex or 
otherwise. It deals with the scope and limits of knowledge, validity and reliability of 
claims to knowledge, modes of reasoning, and how knowledge is perceived. It 
investigates, for example, ideas of perception, fact, evidence, proof, belief and 
certainty (Mautner, 2000). Discussions of epistemology are ubiquitous in research 
methodology texts and research training. In contrast, the related activities of policy 
analysis practice are often not commented on explicitly or discussed in terms of 
epistemology. Yet, epistemological assumptions used to inform the act of researching 
can and do embed themselves in the policy development process and influence policy 
outcomes. Evidence-based policy is a case in point. The inclusion of some knowledge 
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practices and capacities and rejecting others in evidence-based policy analysis is thus 
a case of epistemological interest. 
In practice, when the policy analyst offers advice to the policy decision maker, the 
analyst is operating within a prevailing epistemological influence that imposes 
constraints on what counts as knowledge (as do all epistemologies). In particular, the 
knowledge people have through common sense-making, which is a term used here in 
a non-pejorative sense, will not easily be accommodated.  
Epistemological influences percolating through the policy process affect not only 
possibilities for the gain of knowledge but also the lack of knowledge; of overlooking 
or missing elements of social reality (Brunner, 1991). In evidence-based policy 
analysis, opinion compared with knowledge is rendered second-rate and supposedly 
should be eschewed when it comes to policy analysis practice (Davies, 2004, 
Salmond, 2003). This eschewal of opinion, on the basis of low epistemological status 
as knowledge, is indicative of a specific attitude of scientific inquiry with emphasis on 
rationality, objectivity, the scientific method, and quantitative methodology as a 
preferred basis of understanding intractable and uncertain policy situations (Hajer, 
2003).  
Specifically, the eschewal of opinion reflects a positivist epistemology. The 
foundations of positivist research that came to dominate standards of analytical rigour 
and criteria for the appraisal of scientific knowledge remain prominent today (Schön, 
1983). It is not surprising, given the dominant intellectual traditions of science-based 
rationalism and the sustained emphasis on analysis of fact, hypothetico-deductive 
logic, and principles of Newtonian science such as objectivity, reductionism, 
determinism, and predictability that the best evidence should be understood to be that 
which is derived from analytic approaches role in policy analysis „relying on 
economic and social statistics‟ (Head, 2010:17).  
Evidence-based policy analysis is not ill-suited in many cases, but in this thesis 
interest centres on complex, uncertain, and intractable situations. Many policy 
problems are recognized as complex, and so policy analysts have developed ideas 
about complexity capability. By “complexity capability” I mean policy analysts‟ 
ability to conceptualise complexity and use those conceptualizations as a basis to 
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understanding how it may be possible to act and appreciating the implications for 
action in the context in which policymakers are acting. However, it appears there is a 
sort of dualism in the current policy thinking about constitutes complexity capability 
in evidence-based policy. In one aspect, the thinking seems scientistic giving attention 
to more and better use of science in policy making (Lynn, 1999). In another aspect, 
the thinking fits post positivist thought that focuses on participatory, discursive, and 
collaborative ways of working whereby problems and their solutions are socially, not 
scientifically defined (deLeon, 1997; Dryzek, 2000; Fischer, 1990; Innes & Brooker, 
1999; Wagenaar & Cook, 2003). 
Despite interest in incorporating the experience of participants the primary focus is 
the science. It appears that far from implying the importance of participatory 
processes in the development of policy, the practice idea of complexity capability 
rather implies that how citizens think about policy questions can be rejected as either 
spurious or simply not a source of credible knowledge (United Nations Educational, 
Science and Cultural Organization, 2006). This assessment of opinion in the literature 
on evidence-based policy appears to involve the assumption that common sense-
making is implicated in the reason why policies fail or lead to unintended 
consequences (Davies, 2006; Banks, 2009). 
Questions about analysts‟ abilities to comprehend complexity and a felt necessity to 
circumvent the putatively limited capability and capacity of human beings to work 
coherently with complexity and avoid dubious decisions are at issue. There is a lack 
of confidence in the common ability people have to make sense of complex situations 
and arrive at sound decisions about what to do in the circumstances in which they are 
acting. The dominant practice ideas about the needed capability to address complexity 
surrounding policy questions under the rubric of evidence-based policy are critiqued 
in Chapter 3. Discussion touches on epistemological choice as a factor in either 
limiting or extending complexity capability in policy analysis.  
Epistemology: the complexity aspect 
Complexity theorists are entertaining the notion that scientific modes of inquiry lack 
something in the face of complexity which may be found in a combination of 
favoured and eschewed abilities deployed in relatively novel and imaginative ways 
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(Dennard, Richardson & Morçöl, 2008). Thus, while efforts are underway in policy 
circles to harmonise policy-relevant research with the central tenets of evidence-based 
policy, having taken cognizance of complexity, the scientific community has engaged 
with a rethink of hard science and the criteria of analytic rigour (Emmeche, 2004; 
Heylighen, Cilliers & Gershenson, 2007; Stengers, 2004).  
For instance, Edgar Morin (2005) argues the value of research strategies predicated on 
the autonomy of the inquirer, that is, their subjectivity and independent acts of 
thinking. Since most professions require explicit, rational, objective practice and most 
professionals are used to working this way a subjective approach amounts to a 
profound change of methodology even though it may be realized that subjective 
aspects are always implicit in the practice of the profession. To the extent that 
scientific behaviour is determined by standards of objectivity and not subjectivity, any 
form of break from the tradition of objectivity in policy analysis practice can be 
considered a radical shift.  
In their respective responses to a shared view of a rapidly changing and unpredictable 
world, complexity science and evidence-based policy show signs of divergence. For 
policy, an implication of this parting of ways is that it has veered, possibly, away from 
the actual frontier of innovative practice and potential for developing complexity 
capability through other ways of knowing. As things stand, even if greater analytic 
rigour is realized in policy analysis through evidence-based policy, methodological 
problems involved in understanding complexity are preserved.  
The meaning of the word “complexity” comes from the Latin complexus. In non-
scientific discourse the designation of something as “complex” can involve three 
basic meanings, which are: opposed to simple; made up of various interconnected or 
interwoven parts, patterns or elements; or hard to understand or analyse. Since the 
1980s, complexity has emerged as a fledgling scientific paradigm. Complexity 
research has evolved from those disciplines (for example, physics, chemistry, biology, 
mathematics) that are archetypical of science and gained their footing in the classical 
or Newtonian/Cartesian scientific paradigm (the paradigm of mechanical 
explanations).  
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As given in Nigel Thrift (1999:33), instead of a single coherent body of theory - an 
integrated science - the sciences of complexity organise „an accretion of ideas‟ and 
the many analytical techniques brought to bear on complex problems. The new 
sciences of complexity such as chaos and non-linear dynamics (for example Lorenz, 
1993), the life sciences (for example Capra, 2002), complex adaptive systems (for 
example Holland, 1995), dissipative systems (for example Nicolis & Prigogine, 
1989), network theory (for example Barabasi, 2005), self-organisation and notions of 
criticality (for example Kauffman, 1996; Bak, 1996) and schools of systems thinking - 
“soft”, “hard”, and “critical” (for example Checkland, 1981; Churchman, 1971; 
Jackson, 2001) - offer a variety of specific concepts, methods, and relevant technical 
language for explanations of complexity understood in different ways.  
The thinking that binds together all complexity research is “new” thinking that 
challenges the “old” thinking of classical Newtonian science (Toffler, 1984: xi-xxvi). 
In the context of complexity research, the natural sciences have become immersed in 
a current of change; a post-modern turn (Cilliers, 1998) or new dialogue with nature 
(Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Natural science, in all aspects of thinking, skills, 
practices and knowledge, confronts an impulse of fundamental reconceptualisation 
and reconstruction. Latterly, as noted in Sandro Schlindwein and Ray Ison (2004), 
because the new thinking amounts to a displacement of the view of classical science 
and because there are different understandings and explanations of complexity in the 
science discourse attention has begun to focus on questions of epistemology. 
In the context of complexity research, the activity of knowing has become associated 
with more integrative methods of thinking (Morin, 2005). The idea of new thinking or 
complexity thinking means not only a new theoretical model or conceptual 
framework, that is, of thinking in terms of complexity ideas (for example self-
organisation, adaptive systems, non-linear dynamics, emergent behaviours), but a way 
of thinking that necessitates drawing upon the ways in which we can think; scientific 
and non-scientific. In Fritjof Capra‟s (1997) description, a complementarity is at the 
core of the new thinking. This duality comprises two opposite patterns or tendencies. 
On the one side is the „rational, analysis, reductionist, linear‟ (Capra, 1997:9) 
tendency. On the other side is the „intuitive, synthesis, holistic, non-linear‟ (Capra, 
1997:9) tendency. What is to be avoided is a method of thinking that over emphasises 
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one tendency and neglects the other. Currently, it is unclear whether complexity is 
itself a school of thought that differs from positivist, interpretative, or critical 
approaches, or is a field of inquiry open to „epistemological choices‟ (Schlindwein & 
Ison, 2004:27).  
Morin (2005:1) argues that the notion of complexity, „rejected by classical science‟, 
did not figure in the epistemic debates of the 20th century led by such scholars of 
epistemology as Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyeraband (see also 
Schlindwein & Ison, 2004). As a result, thinking about complexity was left 
marginalised. For Morin (2005:24), acceptance of the idea of complexity - for 
example, “we live in a complex world” - necessitates an „epistemological rethinking‟, 
rethinking which needs to bear not only on the organisation of knowledge into 
disciplines, paradigms, schools of thought but also on the researcher‟s „mental 
functioning‟.  
In Chapter 4, I pick up on the epistemological significance of the notion of a new 
paradigm of complexity provoking interest in new ways of thinking in order to better 
understand what complexity capability might mean in policy settings.  
Motivation for the inquiry 
This inquiry takes as starting point statements about complexity in policy. In the 
literature appear references to the complexity of policy problems, the policy 
environment, and the limits of conventional methods of policy analysis and policy 
development when it comes to tackling complex problems. For example: social 
problems have been described as inherently complex and some have been termed 
“wicked” due to their resistance to analysis and agreed solutions (Rittel & Webber, 
1973); policy analysts work in an environment „full of complexities, usually involving 
a diverse range of players, coming from different perspectives and spawning a host of 
unexpected events‟ (Edwards, 2004:7); yet, it is said that „policy analysts have great 
difficulty handling uncertain, complex, and polarized issues with conventional 
methods‟ (van Eeten, 2001:392).  
In this context, a particular intractable problem caught my attention. It was the 
specific case of the planning for a fifth runway for Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, 
which is a policy story about the deepening of public controversy over a thirty year 
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period, after planning for a fifth runway had started in the early 1970s through to 2003 
when the fifth runway was finally opened. Demonstrably intractable, the expansion 
issue proved to be “wicked” (no clear and agreed solutions). Multiple stakeholders 
who came from different levels and sectors of government, airport authorities, airline 
corporations, national environmental organizations, local citizens‟ and environmental 
groups, and commercial interest groups were involved. Unexpected events occurred 
such as planning failures, unanticipated noise regulations, unanticipated rapid growth 
in aviation demand, and a sustained low level of public acceptance (Kwakkel, Walker, 
& Marchau, 2008; van Eeten, 2001). The Schiphol Airport case study will be 
discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Having completed a Master of Public Policy, and worked in a range of public-sector 
contexts, I had begun to develop some scepticism about certain aspects of what was 
presented as standard policy analysis practice in complex problem areas. I read the 
Schiphol case, and initially, what caught my attention in particular was that it 
incorporated two clearly differentiated events of policy analysis. The first event was 
marked by conventional methods of policy analysis and the use of systems thinking 
approaches to conceptualise the policy situation and ways to respond to the 
uncertainty in analysis (Walker, 2000). The form of policy analysis was entirely 
consistent with how to practice policy analysis is taught. Basically, employ social 
science theory and empirical methods to predict consequences of alternative policies. 
In this sense, the first event is illustrative of methodological rigour in policy analysis, 
yet, ultimately, it led to decision-making reaching an impasse, underscored by 
controversy that continued to build.  
The second analytical event concerns the use of Q methodology in helping to resolve 
the “wicked” problem of airport expansion. The use of Q methodology was predicated 
on turning to stakeholders‟ points of views to improve policy analysts‟ understanding 
of the issues requiring a response and finding leads on how to proceed with the policy 
deliberation process (van Eeten, 2001). One of the things that struck me in the account 
given of the second event of policy analysis in the Schiphol case was that Q 
methodology was used, in effect, to conceptualise the complexity of the policy 
environment in a way that allowed open exploration of the question “what does the 
situation of a fifth runway for Schiphol Airport mean?” Not quite “seeing what others 
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see” or “standing in others‟ shoes”, but more along the lines of seeing how other 
understandings would conduce effective policy analysis. From this grasp of how 
others see the situation it appeared possible for the analysts to assess how 
explanations in use might be furnishing irrelevant policy responses, that is, responses 
likely to be bedside the point in terms of the basic complex of issues of human 
concern arising in peoples‟ experience.  
My sense was that Q methodology enabled understanding how to act that was 
opinion-based, with implications for the standard methodology of policy analysis 
practice. By “standard” is meant approaches to policy analysis with the presupposition 
that the world is objective and external to the individual and can be understood by a 
neutral observer (Anderson, 2006). This introduction to Q methodology, through the 
literature, led me to learn more about Q methodology, and to contribute to a small Q 
methodological study in New Zealand, the experience of which piqued my curiosity 
about Q methodology further, and I began what turned into a long and surprising 
intellectual journey.  
Q methodology and its record 
Q methodology is an established research methodology for acquiring and developing 
scientific and common knowledge from a subjective standpoint - an individual‟s 
personal point of view on any matter of personal or social importance (Brown, 1980; 
McKeown & Thomas, 1988; Stephenson, 1953). The methodology depends on the 
communicability of individual points of view and on the premise that the points of 
view are advanced from a position of self-reference. 
Contemporary commentaries have addressed Q methodology as attuned to a variety of 
approaches, including, for example, hermeneutics (McKeown, 1998), feminism 
(Kitzinger, 1986), critical theory (Stainton Rogers, 1997/1998), political discourse 
analysis (Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993), and participatory approaches (Durning, 1999). 
In the field of policy related studies, the use of Q methodology features most 
prominently as an approach to discourse analysis (Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993; 
Addams & Proops, 2000; Glynos, Howarth, Norval & Speed, 2009). Q methodology, 
as described in this thesis, derives from original work by William Stephenson (1953), 
who laid the foundation of this subjective science, which is fundamentally different 
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epistemologically from the more standard research methods that are used in policy 
(Brown, Durning, & Selden, 1999). This claim of epistemological difference, 
however, does not go unchallenged. Paul Robbins and Rob Krueger (2000:642), for 
example, suggest that „any special epistemological position for Q method‟ is 
„impossible to defend‟. 
The fact that Q methodology is an abductive and not a deductive or inductive 
methodology is vital for the argument I raise in this thesis. Abduction is the logic of 
Charles Sanders Peirce‟s method of pragmatic inquiry. The role of Peircean 
pragmatism and its logic is considered in more detail in Chapter 2. Stephenson 
incorporated abduction in Q methodology and explicitly linked the logic of Q 
methodology to Peirce (Stephenson, 1961b). In so doing, Stephenson rendered Q 
methodology a rare exemplar of Peirce‟s pragmatic scientific method. The logic of 
abduction has also been identified as the logic of grounded theory in its later form. 
According to Jo Reichertz (2007:215), Anslem Strauss (1984) and then later, Anslem 
Strauss and Juliet Corbin (1990), failed to systematise abduction. Nor did they link it 
to the considerations of Peirce. This claim by Reichertz carries the implication that 
researchers using grounded theory could be left unaware of abduction in mixed 
methods and the controversial nature of their mode of reasoning.  
Stephenson‟s (1961a) account of abduction proved useful not only for my 
understanding of Peirce‟s pragmatism, with its focus on a method of thinking in 
inquiry in contrast to the pragmatism of “what works”, but also, for shedding further 
light on the nature of the debates that underpin the use of abductive strategies in the 
world of research. The fact that abduction is the logic of Q methodology means that 
through the use of Q methodology complex problem areas can be examined 
independently of pre-existing theoretical perspectives, conceptual frameworks, and 
understandings (Brown, 1989:95).  
Q methodology has a growing record of successful application in the area of policy, 
particularly to cases of public controversy where evidence-based analysis practices 
have failed to provide policy success (Durning, 1999; Focht & Lawler, 2000; 
Steelman & Maguire, 1999; van Eeten, 2001). Yet, while applications have increased 
significantly in recent years, Q methodology is also seen as a marginal methodology 
in policy. This is likely to be because Q methodology differs in fundamental aspects 
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from the types of methodologies that are put forward as exemplars of methodological 
rigour within the evidence-based frame. There has been insufficient explanation of 
why the application of Q methodology could make a positive difference in policy 
areas of a complex and intractable kind. Discussion in Chapter 5 concentrates on the 
thinking that underscores the efficacy of Q methodology and its potential to inform a 
viable complexity and opinion-based policy analysis practice.  
Policy analysis in New Zealand: the epistemology 
In New Zealand, evidence-based policy is in prominent use. In 1999, and in a similar 
vein to the Blair Labour Government, the New Zealand State Services Commission 
opened debate on the quality of inputs to the policy advice process with a focus on the 
use of information, research, evaluation, and consultation (New Zealand State 
Services Commission, 1999). Government had expressed concern about why „a large 
and costly advice system‟ (New Zealand State Services Commission, 1999:5) 
apparently did not provide sound information for sound decisions.  
The overall message of the New Zealand State Services Commission‟s (1999) paper 
in which the concerns of government were set out, seemed to be that problems with 
the quality of policy advice were essentially to do with questions of capability for 
greater rigour throughout the policy development process, including implementation 
and evaluation. In an attempt to make some headway in policy making, to stop doing 
the things that don‟t work and improve policy the New Zealand Government was an 
early adopter of the idea of evidence-based policy initially advanced by the United 
Kingdom. Successive governments in New Zealand, since the late 1990s, have 
emphasized the need for policy to be based on evidence and for that evidence to be 
robust and plausible.  
Evidence-based policy in New Zealand has many of the key features of evidence-
based policy practice typical of evidence-based initiatives generally (see Australian 
Government Productivity Commission, 2010; United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 
1999a, 1999b). The effort is to rebuild and strengthen analytical policy research, 
policy analysis, policy advice, evaluation, and strategic policy making capacity with a 
reinvigorated pragmatic focus of learning and doing what works. The core of 
evidence-based practice is research activity using established and innovative 
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methodologies as required. Such research involves conventional models of 
academic/scientific inquiry, data collection, analysis and synthesis as well as 
evaluation, forecasting, and modelling (New Zealand Ministry of Social 
Development, 2004). Typical evidence-based schemes place research using 
qualitative methods very low in a hierarchy of methodological rigour. The objective is 
to provide a policy-relevant knowledge evidence base of sufficient quality to inform: 
policy development and advice, programme development and delivery, and public 
debate. Government officials claim that a well-developed evidence base provides a 
route to better understanding of complex social issues and innovative, creative 
solutions to the difficult problems that contemporary New Zealand society is 
confronting (New Zealand Ministry of Social Development, 2005).  
However, while there is interest in innovative methodologies the epistemology of 
evidence-based practice in New Zealand, largely assumed and not explicit, is 
positivistic. The best evidence in the area of social policy analysis and interventions, 
for example in addressing questions of poverty, welfare reform, income disparities 
between the rich and poor, is understood to be that which is derived from the data and 
tools of social measurement (New Zealand Ministry of Social Development, 2000). 
What is surprising, at least to an increasing number of policy practitioners, is that this 
is really the only admissible form of evidence (Peace, personal communication, April 
18, 2011). What was particularly surprising to me was the resistance, in policy circles, 
to the findings from other forms of research activity and in particular, resistance to Q 
methodology.  
In 2004, I was involved with a contract with the New Zealand Ministry of Social 
Development that allowed for a trial of Q methodology. The trial was incorporated 
into a larger work programme of research focused on Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ 
Benefit and concern about the growing proportion of the working age population 
claiming incapacity benefits. The aims of the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit 
research focused on identifying key factors behind the growth in Sickness Benefit and 
Invalids‟ Benefit recipients, gaining a better understanding of people‟s lives in a 
context of illness and disability, and identifying approaches and interventions that 
support wellbeing and participation in employment. The trial of Q methodology 
related to the gain of a better understanding of the question of wellbeing in relation to 
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Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit clients‟ lives. The details of this project are 
used as a case study in Chapter 5. Q method seemed not only a very straightforward 
and cost effective way to collect and analyse data but also one that could provide 
valuable insights into the kinds of complicated and often intractable policy problems 
that agencies such as the New Zealand Ministry of Social Development faced. 
Very early on reading about Q methodology (Brown, 1980, McKeown & Thomas, 
1988; Stephenson, 1953) and then attending a course on Q methodology - the 37th 
Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis and Collection, University of Essex, 
United Kingdom, run by Steven Brown (leading Q methodologist and scholar) - 
enabled me to become conversant with Q methodology as a method for undertaking 
research. It was this working knowledge of the data collection and analysis techniques 
that made me a candidate for inclusion in the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit 
study team. In 2004 there were perhaps four or five people in New Zealand who had 
the confidence or experience to offer “how to” guidance in a Q methodological study.  
During my involvement in the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit project what 
surprised me most, perhaps, was the subsequent resistance in the policy agency to 
taking the results seriously and using the insights afforded by the study in further 
policy analysis. This was despite the fact that other best practice techniques, such as 
work shopping the results with the policy analysts and disseminating the findings in a 
range of forms were deliberately followed (Peace, Wolf, Crack, Hutchinson & Rooda, 
2004). Rather than being deterred by this resistance, I began to think more about 
whether use of opinion in the context of policy analysis could be justified, with the 
example of Q methodology in mind.  
I also had the feeling that simply sharing the results of the project somehow undersold 
the efficacy of Q methodology, that there was more to be said about how to think 
about the findings and the kind of differences of practices that the application of Q 
methodology could make. I had an intuitive sense that something more might be 
going on with Q methodology than it simply being a handy method that was hard to 
persuade policy analysts to use. I came to the insight that abduction might be that 
“something more going on” and that I had some more learning to engage with since 
prior to my encounter with Q methodology, I had never encountered the notion of 
abduction as a logic of inquiry.  
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It was on the basis of these elements: The apparent insufficiencies of evidence-based 
policy analysis; the persistence of intractable and complex issues in policy domains; 
and the potential but marginal status of Q methodology that this thesis rests. 
Areas of investigation 
The argument as finally developed in this thesis proceeds from an investigation in 
more detail in the four areas of conventional policy analysis, complexity thinking, 
pragmatism, and Q methodology. Emphasis was on the theme of knowing complexity. 
These literatures, which have informed my inquiry, encompass: longstanding and 
recent debates about the practices that define policy analysis; epistemic debates in the 
philosophy of science that have shaped understandings of systematic inquiry; the new 
sciences of complexity and the discourse of a scientific revolution underway that 
challenges understandings of systematic inquiry; the writings of Peirce and William 
James in the area of epistemology; and the works of Stephenson that explicate a 
science of subjectivity.  
In the policy area I looked at the history, motivation, and ideals or aspirations of 
evidence-based policy in order to understand its prominence and claimed 
effectiveness. I looked at the idea of evidence-based policy as an idea about capability 
to address complexity, with a view to understanding the kind of policy analysis 
practices that the idea dictates. I investigated alternative thinking about complexity 
capability in the context of policy and concentrated on “wicked” social problems and 
the argument for social rationality alongside scientific rationality as a theme that can 
be distinguished in public policy literature; a theme that concerns complex social 
problems and the extent to which these problems can be tackled (or not) through 
standardized approaches of policy analysis. In the first event of policy analysis in the 
Schiphol Airport case, analysts had framed the problem of runway expansion as 
“wicked” (Walker, 2000:11). They had used systems thinking in their analysis and 
followed a standard policy analysis methodology. In the evidence-based policy 
literature, systems approaches have been promoted as cutting edge (Chapman, 2010; 
Mulgan, 2001a). This being the case, I investigated the differences between standard 
and alternative approaches to policy analysis exemplified in the case of the Schiphol 
Airport runway expansion controversy.  
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In the complexity area, I investigated the import of a paradigm of complexity in order 
to explore further the concept of complexity capability as discussed in scientific 
discourses. My concern was to identify what the claims that have been made about the 
need for new ways of thinking in policy, which are underscored by complexity theory 
and research, might entail if acted upon in policy analysis practices. Initially, I read in 
the area of complexity theory and the vocabulary of concepts that have emerged to 
describe aspects of the phenomenon of complexity. On the realization that the term 
“complexity thinking” could be interpreted as a method of thinking as distinct from 
the use of complexity theory and concepts in thinking, I turned my attention to those 
theorists who have identified problems with the philosophical basis of modern 
science, especially from an epistemological perspective and the challenge complexity 
thinking poses to Cartesian theory of knowledge (e.g., Capra, 2002; Cilliers, 1998; 
Morin, 2005; Morçöl, 2005; Stengers, 2004).  
Having read in the area of abduction, I found myself assessing the ideas of complexity 
thinkers in the light of classical pragmatist thought, in particular the thought of Peirce 
and James. As a result, I then concentrated my investigation on the epistemological 
linkages between pragmatism, complexity thinking, and Q methodology in order to 
provide a basis to understanding and interpreting the value of the application of Q 
methodology in the policy analysis of complex and intractable policy issues. 
In the Q methodology area I concentrated on Stephenson‟s thinking as evinced in his 
writings. I did this in order to gain a better understanding of the epistemological basis 
of Q methodology and its method of science, particularly in respect of its abductive 
logic and theory of knowledge. The focus of my investigation was to determine if Q 
methodology, as a way of science, may serve as a paradigmatic case of demonstrating 
complexity thinking with relevance for a policy analysis complexity practice. 
Investigation in the area of Q methodology prompted my reading in the area of 
classical pragmatism as a further substantive area of inquiry. My reading in the area 
of classical pragmatist philosophy of science led me to consider what I will call the 
ability to “read complexity” in an everyday sense as a neglected aspect of human 
capability in professional policy practice. I pick up the notion of reading complexity 
in Chapter 4. 
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Methodological approach of this study 
As I came to understand it, my inquiry was in the Peircean mode of abductive inquiry. 
In advance of the discussion of my research process in Chapter 2, abductive inquiry 
develops a proposition (a hunch or insight or theory or hypothesis) to explain facts in 
order to find an explanation for how things are. Abduction relies on the researcher‟s 
ability to see connections or a pattern that suggest something may be the case and 
posit what are often hidden continuities (Haack, 2005). In the way of all abduction, I 
started with an observation leading to a possible explanation; investigating an 
argument that took shape as the patterns and hidden continuities were progressively, 
though not sequentially, revealed. It is a research design based on observation, 
discovery, elaboration, evaluation, criticism, and insight in a quest for new 
understanding.  
Drawing on the insight of Peirce, in general terms an abductive approach to inquiry 
involves intellectual activity based on a three stepped process: 
1. Something is observed, a surprising fact, that requires an explanation; 
2. The researcher develops a proposition based on a hunch, or an initial idea, that 
functions as a plausible explanation for the surprising fact; 
3. Through the elaboration of the meaning of the proposition based on recursive 
thinking, scholarship, debate and or empirical inquiry, attention is drawn to 
conceivable differences of practice and possible practical effects. 
Subsequently, these differences and effects may be explored and developed through 
either inductive or deductive inquiries. In relation to the three steps listed above, the 
main elements of the abductive research method developed for this study are broadly 
outlined as follows: 
Step 1 was achieved through the observing that while an expensive, time consuming, 
deductive approach to resolving an intractable policy situation appeared to fail, what 
seemed to require an explanation was how and in what ways (little known) Q 
methodology was capable of conducing a policy analysis impasse to resolution that 
had otherwise proved resistant to the standard policy analytic effort.  
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Step 2 was achieved by identifying the primary research question derived from the 
observation and determining that it was insufficiently explained: “Why would the 
application of Q methodology make a difference in a policy situation of this kind?” 
Since there is no single, precise, standardized set of procedures associated with 
abductive inquiry, in the first instance a procedure was developed for this research 
that entailed: identifying some guidelines for conducting abductive inquiry (discussed 
in Chapter 2); the determination of a starting point that helps limit the scope of 
inquiry (it helps to have a broad sense of where to look for an explanation); the 
identification of what needs to be understood or explained, and the collection of 
insight (the material or data used) that support an emergent hypothesis. The goal, 
then, was to find a plausible explanation in the context of existing knowledge. 
In terms of step 3, this research elaborates a way of making opinion useful in the 
policy analytic effort that is characterized as abductory and termed “reading 
complexity”. The notion of reading complexity is a restatement of classical pragmatist 
inquiry tailored to the policy situations of complexity and intractability.  
Abductive research requires some articulation of the hunch that is underpinning the 
inquiry. I have teased out my initial hunch (that opinion has a role to play in policy 
analysis) by determining a set of nine propositions. These propositions convey an 
order and selectivity that emerged in the research. As set out in Table 1 (p.28) in 
effect the nine propositions outline the structure of the argument of this thesis. The 
table shows the chapters in which the propositions are established. 
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PROPOSITIONS CHAPTER COVERAGE 
 Ch 2 Ch 3 Ch 4 Ch 5 
1. Peircean pragmatism gives a reason to embrace opinion 
based on an articulation of abductive inquiry  
x    
2. Evidence-based policy rejects opinion in favour of 
evidence-based knowledge. 
 x   
3. Therefore complexity capability in evidence-based policy 
analysis is limited. 
 x   
4. Nevertheless, humans have complexity capability 
(reading complexity) in an everyday sense because they 
can abduct and connect individual experience with social 
rationality as they go through life.  
  x x 
5. Complex, wicked problems need what human capability 
for reading complexity offers.  
 x   
6. However, for policy to have effective access to this 
epistemological capability requires method to make 
available what is available in complexity reading.  
 x  x 
7. The epistemological basis of reading complexity is that 
of classical pragmatism. 
  x  
8. Q methodology is a way to read complexity by making 
the opinion contained in social rationality available 
because it is founded in classical pragmatism. 
   x 
9. Therefore, there is an epistemological basis to the 
adjunctive and transformative capacity of Q methodology 
in the revalorization of opinion for policy purposes. 
   x 
 
Table 1: Propositions and chapter coverage 
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Thesis outline 
The layout of this thesis reflects a cumulative argument. Taken together, Chapters 1 
and 2 comprise a detailed introduction to my research. Chapters 3 to 5 reflect the three 
areas of investigation: evidence-based policy, complexity thinking, and Q 
methodology, with epistemological thinking the dominant motif.  
Chapter 1 has commenced by identifying the focal claim of the research, that opinion 
may play an important role in policy making in complex and intractable situations on 
the strength of an observation concerning the use of Q methodology, and outlining the 
research rationale as an epistemological issue in the context of policy analysis. It has 
included a short introduction to the research strategy relating to this inquiry. The 
chapter sets out my research questions and the set of propositions arrived at that are 
used to assess the claim that opinion may matter in policy analytic work in relation to 
complex and intractable policy problems.  
Chapter 2 describes the methodology, research strategy and methods used in this 
research. This chapter expands on Peirce‟s pragmatism and abductive inquiry which 
became my research strategy for this thesis. It includes, then, the first substantive 
inquiry from the literature which is used to develop my first proposition that through 
abductive logic the use of opinion can be justified, which gives a basis in 
methodology for the embrace of opinion.  
Chapter 3 discusses a range of aspects of policy thinking. It begins with a critique of 
evidence-based policy analysis. Focus is on the concept of evidence-based policy as 
an idea about complexity capability with a discussion that includes: how evidence-
based policy approaches complex problems; the limitations of the evidence-based 
approach; and differences between evidence-based and alternative epistemological 
choices and methodologies of research. The chapter concludes with the Schiphol 
Airport runway expansion controversy used as a comparative case study of policy 
analytic approaches. Discussion of this case study introduces the use of Q 
methodology and highlights the epistemological space in which Q methodology can 
contribute to policy advice.  
In Chapter 4, discussion is grounded in some of the intellectual debates about what 
constitutes complexity thinking as it developed over the 20th century. The discussion 
30 
 
focuses on complexity thinking described in terms of classical pragmatism. This focus 
provides for a fuller description of what is implied by the term “reading complexity” 
and reveals the linkages between pragmatism, complexity thinking, and Q 
methodology as a path for understanding the role and place of opinion in policy 
analysis.  
Chapter 5 examines the thinking entailed in Q methodology. The Sickness Benefit 
and Invalids‟ Benefit project is used as a case demonstrating the use of Q method in a 
“stand-alone” way. The main focus is on how Q methodology, its manner of gaining 
knowledge, opens up a new epistemological space. 
Chapter 6 summarises the thesis through reference to the nature of the approach taken 
in this study, the two main research questions, and the discussions that stem from the 
set of propositions. The chapter concludes by highlighting “reading complexity” as 
the main contribution that this thesis makes to knowledge.  
Contribution of the research 
The research contributes to the field of policy analysis. It offers a scholarly account of 
the linkages between pragmatism, complexity thinking and Q methodology, and in so 
doing presents an epistemological reframing for the revalorizing of opinion in policy 
advice in complex and intractable situations. It offers a contribution to Q 
methodology scholarship by articulating in both adjunctive and transformative terms 
why Q methodology works in policy contexts of complexity. This research makes a 
contribution to knowledge by describing complexity thinking in terms of classical 
pragmatism, and describing “reading complexity” as a human capacity for complexity 
thinking. In addition to making a contribution to the areas of policy analysis 
methodology and Q methodology, by demonstrating an abductive process this 
research contributes to the methodology of research practice. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the methodology and research strategy relating to this inquiry. 
The first section details the research strategy drawing on the three steps in Peirce‟s 
abductive approach to inquiry introduced in Chapter 1 (p.26). I discuss my 
observations of surprising facts; my development of propositions to provide plausible 
explanations for these facts and, finally, my elaboration of the meaning of the 
propositions in terms of reading complexity in order to articulate a different policy 
analysis practice. Issues regarding adopting an abductive research strategy will be 
touched on. I follow this with more detailed explanations of Peirce‟s pragmatism and 
abductive inquiry which is used to establish my first proposition. 
My three steps 
The procedures for this research fall into three categories: project development, the 
process of investigation, and „reasoning toward meaning‟ (Shank, 1998:841). I 
categorise these as the three steps of Peirce‟s inquiry: something is observed, that is, a 
surprising fact that requires an explanation; development of propositions based on a 
hunch, or an initial idea that functions as a plausible explanation for the surprising 
fact; and, the elaboration of the meaning of the propositions. Such phasing of the 
research conveys an order that belies the process by which my research strategy, the 
ensuing propositions, and research questions were arrived at. 
Step 1: Something is observed 
This first step involved reflecting on the event of reading the Schiphol Airport runway 
expansion case. By “event” I mean what came to mind in light of Michel van Eeten‟s 
(2001) account of the application of Q methodology in this specific case of policy 
analysis. Articulating the event retrospectively, I can say only that a range of thoughts 
came to mind, simultaneously, in a bundle. First, was the thought that it was clear that 
Q methodology among other approaches to policy analysis had “worked”. Second, 
was the thought that Q methodology was a way to read complexity although, when 
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asked, I could not explain what I meant by “reading complexity”. Nevertheless, it was 
a thought that lingered. Third, was the thought that Q methodology showed that there 
could be a role for what is otherwise overlooked in evidence-based policy analysis, 
namely, opinion, and its role in the breaking of deadlocks.  
In the initial stage of the project I had the clear idea that I would need to understand Q 
methodology in detail, particularly as my thoughts converted into the question of 
“why?”: Why would Q methodology work when a combination of systems thinking 
and a standard approach to policy analysis failed to make a positive difference to the 
policy problem facing the Netherlands Government? It became obvious from an 
initial reading of some of the main texts (Addams & Proops, 2000; Brown, 1980; 
McKeown & Thomas, 1988; Stephenson, 1953) that there was a gap in the literature 
that related specifically to the question of why the application of Q methodology 
could make a positive difference in complex and intractable policy situations. 
Identifying this gap led to the development of my research strategy.  
In conversation with a senior lecturer in the School of Government, Victoria 
University of Wellington, it was drawn to my attention that addressing the question of 
“why would Q methodology work?” lent itself to an abductive research strategy. At 
this early stage, I was aware that Q methodology was an abductory methodology, but 
had little appreciation of abduction. I read a range of social science texts on research 
methodology but found few references except in Norman Blaikie‟s (2000) Designing 
Social Research.  
The research strategy 
Blaikie‟s (2000:9) use of the term “research strategy” refers to the logic of inquiry: „to 
the steps involved in answering the research questions - that is, the starting point of 
inquiry, the end-point, and the stages needed to get from the beginning to the end‟. He 
identifies four research strategies or logics of inquiry, each with different starting and 
end points, and stages in between; each entailing different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. The four strategies are: the inductive, deductive, 
retroductive and abductive (Blaikie, 2000:9-10). As taken from Blaikie (2000:10), the 
distinguishing characteristics of the research strategies are as follows: 
33 
 
The inductive strategy produces generalisations from data. 
The deductive strategy tests theories by testing hypotheses derived from them. 
The retroductive strategy proposes causal mechanisms or structures and tries 
to establish their existence. 
The abductive strategy generates social scientific accounts from everyday 
accounts. 
In starting to place my strategy in Blaikie‟s typology, I was initially drawn to the 
abductive since it was the best fit to a question that called for an account of why Q 
methodology works. Nevertheless, it was not a tight fit since my data were not 
everyday accounts. Thus, while continuing to refer to Blaikie‟s work as a touchstone 
for clarity in developing the research strategy, I needed to delve further into the 
philosophy of science. In the end, the design of this research was patterned on an 
abductive research strategy, but my interpretation of abduction differs from the 
interpretation in Blaikie and is more consistent with that of Peirce.  
Blaikie (2000:122) comments that choosing a research strategy necessitates 
understanding: 
The capabilities and the relative strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. 
The philosophies of social science and approaches to social inquiry with 
which each research strategy is associated. 
Accordingly, my task was to understand abduction with respect to the prevailing 
trends in the philosophy of science and the types of research methods that emerged 
over the course of the 20th century.  
The outcome of that research led me to appreciate why Blaikie‟s (2000) research 
strategy with respect to abduction was not an exact fit to the strategy I needed. I 
concluded that the interpretation of abduction underlying the research strategy given 
in Blaikie (2000) was only one interpretation among a number and its explication, 
was, perhaps, just a bit confusing in light of the other accounts of abduction I had read 
(e.g., Aliseda, 1997; Fann, 1970; Hanson, 1965; Shank, 1998). The point of confusion 
arose from Blaikie‟s identification of the starting point of the abductive research 
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strategy. In other accounts, the starting point of abduction is given as some 
“surprising” fact, observation, or anomaly. The task is then to determine what might 
serve to explain the surprising fact. Norwood Hanson (1965:65) describes abduction 
as „the study of the inferential moves‟ the inquirer makes from the recognition of 
something surprising to a recognition of what kind of hypothesis could explain the 
fact. Susan Haack (n.d.:6) describes abduction, a process of „positing continuities‟, as 
the means in the sciences of „bringing propositions to the test‟ (Haack, n.d.:6). Arthur 
Stewart (1997:30) describes abduction as the „pragmatic logic of events‟ - a form of 
reasoning arising in response to a problem that yields a hypothesis.  
Blaikie (2000:25) identifies the starting point of the abductive research strategy as the 
„social world of the social actors being investigated: their construction of reality, their 
way of conceptualizing and giving meaning to their social world, their tacit 
knowledge.‟ In this interpretation, the task of the researcher is to enter the world of 
the social actors and discover their motives and reasons, then, „re-describe‟ these „in 
the technical language of scientific discourse‟ (Blaikie, 2000:25). My investigation 
led me to consider instead Peirce‟s pragmatic theory of scientific method. The 
abductive research strategy I follow in this thesis is consistent with the generative or 
“logic of discovery” interpretation of abduction and incorporates the pragmatic 
maxim (see p. 48). My research strategy framework is outlined in Table 2 below: 
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START POINT
Abductive research strategy
 The surprising fact, C, is observed
Requires explanation – an effort of discovery involving non-inferential intellectual 
activity and no strict rules of procedure but some requirements
General research question of the form: What is the case in reality?
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course
Requires application of the pragmatic maxim
The meaning proposed must be given in (possible future) experience
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true
Abductive process terminates with a suggested hypothesis
Proposition is in accord with the facts, capable of verification with attention 
directed to a conceivable difference of practice and possible (to be expected) 
practical or sensible effects 
Start point
Middle point
End point
 
Table 2: Research strategy framework  
In this framework, the logic of abduction based on my reading of Peirce is expressed. 
I secured my approach by starting with the surprising fact (C) and having the hunch 
(A). In literal terms, the surprising fact (C) that “Q methodology worked in a situation 
of complexity and intractability which had proved resistant to evidenced-based policy 
analysis” had been observed. But if (A) “opinion had a role and place in policy 
analysis” were true, that Q methodology works in complex policy situations would be 
a matter of course. Hence, there would be reason to suspect that opinion could have a 
role and place in policy analysis in relation to complex and intractable policy 
situations. On the basis of this discursive outline, two main tasks were involved in my 
study. First, I had the task of developing a plausible hypothesis that might explain 
why Q methodology works as evinced in the case of the Schiphol Airport runway 
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expansion. Second, I had the task of elaboration; of articulating the meaning of the 
explanatory hypothesis in terms of both the differences between Q methodology and 
the current practices of evidence-based policy analysis and the practical effects 
deriving from recourse to Q methodology.  
In choosing this strategy, I note Blaikie‟s (2000:27) caveat: 
Unless a researcher is testing an existing hypothesis, the formulation of good 
hypotheses requires a great deal of theoretical work. The testing of personal 
hunches as hypothesis constitutes a much lower level of research activity and 
should, therefore, be avoided in good-quality research. Such hypotheses 
usually make very little contribution to the advancement of knowledge 
because they are not well connected to the current state of knowledge. 
Blaikie stresses an important point. Theoretical work in the context of formal inquiry 
is not something to launch into lightly, especially when the inquiry is open and may 
be unusual in the context of research published in one‟s field. Moreover, “open” 
inquiry does mean that the research horizon is vast – I wanted to explain the 
surprising facts of Q methodology‟s success, but I could not see all the way to the 
horizon. And there are traps. Richard Feynman, Nobel Prize winner and theoretical 
physicist, warned about how, in the process of theorising (he was talking about 
quantum mechanics), you can „go down a drain into a blind alley from which nobody 
emerges‟ (cited in Gribbin, 1996). The term “theoretical” usually denotes work 
concerned with knowledge, but not with the practical application of knowledge, or it 
means that theory is dealt with but not facts as presented by experience. Peirce‟s view 
about how to theorise, a topic he addresses in his Lowell Lecture How to Theorize 
(CP, 5.603)
1
, however, redefines the nature of theorising. His pragmatism connects 
theoretical work with facts of experience and the practical aspects of contributing to 
the advancement of knowledge.  
The abductive pattern of inquiry following Peirce will allow me, in the first instance, 
to theorise about Q methodology in a context of experience, existing knowledge, and 
the emergent thinking of those who make use of Q methodology. In the second 
instance, an abductive approach will allow me to think through the relevance of 
                                               
1 Note: citing Peirce. References for citing Peirce do not follow the author/date scheme. The following 
abbreviation is used: “CP” refers to Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce; vols. 1-
6, C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Eds.); vols. 7-8, A.W. Burks (Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. References are cited by volume and paragraph numbers. 
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abduction in the context of policy analysis. In terms of the latter, my interest is in 
opening up the possibility of a different policy practice in circumstances marked by 
intractability, genuine uncertainty, and complexity.  
Step 2: Development of propositions based on a hunch 
Although there are no strict rules of procedure associated with abduction, of crucial 
importance is to look for underlying continuities; a process of detecting information 
about particular things and events much like, for example, „a detective checking blood 
traces at a crime scene‟ (Haack, 2005:246). This led me to properly begin my research 
and set about reading Stephenson in what became a sustained process of re-reading 
and reflection. By following leads provided by Stephenson concerning key themes 
(e.g., abduction, behaviour, communication, psychology, everyday experience, 
quantum science, complexity) and references to Peirce, James, Niels Bohr, Werner 
Heisenberg, Ilya Prigogine, Harold Lasswell among others, I had an early “aha” 
moment. It appeared that early pragmatism and the new sciences had conceptual links 
that are manifest in Stephenson‟s conception of science and Q methodology. This led 
me to concentrate on the linkages between pragmatism, complexity thinking, and Q 
methodology. My initial thought was the explanation could come through a 
complexity lens. 
I began drafting ideas in 2004 and preparing presentations to supervisors, audiences 
of other PhD students, and conferences of the International Society for the Scientific 
Study of Subjectivity (ISSSS). The propositions were initially extremely fluid. But by 
the end of my third iteration of my emerging ideas, by which time I had also read 
widely in the areas of philosophy of science and the new sciences of complexity, a set 
of propositions began to emerge. While the 9 propositions presented in Chapter 1 
were finessed and refined as the thesis became clearer, the central hunch was that the 
connections between pragmatism, complexity thinking, and Q methodology were 
theoretically important in and to policy contexts. By „deliberately juxtaposing‟ 
(Shank, 1998:854) these three areas of study, and indeed, juxtaposing them further 
with evidence-based policy analysis, I was able to participate in the idea that Shank 
(1998:854) has so persuasively laid down „of treating any connection we can draw, no 
matter how arbitrarily, as a source of insight‟. But, then, in reading Peirce and James 
against complexity thinking, I came to a realisation that rather than use a complexity 
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science lens to elucidate the problem I needed to use an epistemological lens. This 
was the point at which I realised that Q methodology opened up an epistemological 
space for doing policy analysis work. 
The culmination of this abductive journey led me to seek to articulate the differences 
of practices that are made possible through use of Q methodology and to reflect 
further on the possible implications of their practical effects.  
Step 3: Elaboration of the meaning of the propositions 
Paying careful attention to a possible difference of practice that the propositions might 
entail was an integral aspect of the process of positing continuities. I was always, in 
Peircean terms „reasoning toward meaning‟ (Shank, 1998:841) of the relevance of Q 
methodology in the context of policy analysis. It was not until I was well along the 
path of my inquiry that I came to a fuller appreciation of the necessity of „hypotheses 
involving true continuity‟ (CP, 6.173; CP, 6.169). This is a necessity to develop 
continuity in experience and thought, the two always working together. I was engaged 
in developing a train of thought that would need to be continuous with the facts of the 
external world and possible future experience of everyday life.  
Clarification of the meaning of the propositions is encapsulated in the concept of 
reading complexity. It is a thought about the conduct of the policy analyst doing 
policy analysis work in a context of complexity. As an alternative and complement to 
the evidence-based approach, I have proposed a reading complexity account of an 
opinion-based policy analysis based in a rationality that is common sensist and social. 
This alternative approach acknowledges continuities - epistemological and 
methodological - between classical pragmatism, contemporary complexity thinking, 
and Q methodology. But I was increasingly dealing with my own “genuine doubt” as 
to whether reading complexity as I was beginning to describe it did serve to clarify 
the relevance of Q methodology to policy analysis. The research questions that appear 
at the beginning of this thesis (see p. 10) that emerged retrospectively were useful for 
finally encapsulating my argument, namely, that the relevance and efficacy of Q 
methodology in a context of policy analysis can be understood in both adjunctive and 
transformative terms.  
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The practical effects of my own abductive strategy in terms of the development and 
articulation of this research can be seen as a document that comprises the record of 
the study and elaboration of the proposition that opinion indeed may play an 
important role in policy analysis in complex and intractable situations and of the 
efficacy of Q methodology in policy situations of complexity. This document can be 
seen as a provisional, contextualized, time sensitive thesis that can be used as a 
starting point for further debate and inquiry in the policy context.  
Abductive research is yet to be explicated in a way that a novice researcher could pick 
it up and run with it in the way that a scientist in a laboratory might be called upon to 
test a hypothesis in the time honoured hypothetico-deductive way. Lacking a ready-
made framework made me alert to Peirce‟s insights. It is to a more detailed discussion 
of Peirce‟s theory that I now turn so that it might be drawn upon in the elaboration of 
the overall proposition that opinion could have a role in policy analysis. The 
remainder of the chapter discusses abduction in the context of Peircean pragmatism. 
This discussion draws on a review of literature reflecting on pragmatism and its place 
among rival traditions of research.  
Peirce’s pragmatism and abductive logic 
In 1905, Peirce distinguished his meaning of pragmatism from the proliferation of 
interpretations of pragmatism at the time, particularly the interpretation espoused by 
fellow pragmatist, James, that led to an emphasis on “whatever works” (McDermott, 
1997; Menand, 1997; Snider, 2000b). Peirce (CP, 5.414) rechristened his version of 
pragmatism, “pragmaticism”, to indicate more precisely that what he meant was a 
„method of thinking‟ (CP, 8.205) and „a method for ascertaining the real meaning of 
any concept, doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign‟ (CP, 5.6). The point here is 
that the pragmatism of Peirce, which has a direct bearing on experimental 
methodology and observation, emphasises that there is a way of knowing that is an 
ordinary and common activity which can engage with complexity. The process of 
engagement is embodied in experiences of cognition. These experiences include acts 
of perceiving, doubting, uncertainty, curiosity, questioning, and wondering as well as 
intuition, imagination, guessing, hypothesising, and believing. People have real and 
reliable experiences of complexity and they have real ideas or opinions resulting from 
those experiences (Buchler, 1939; Moore, 1961).  
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A practicing scientist, philosopher, mathematician, and logician, Peirce init ially 
trained as a chemist and worked in public employment as a physicist with the United 
States Coast and Geodetic Survey. Peirce wondered how scientific discoveries were 
actually made; what thinking was actually involved, believing that the advance of 
science was not down to mere chance, good luck, or deduction. Peirce disavowed a 
mechanistic view of the world and was neither enamoured with Cartesian science nor 
with the developing logical positivism of his time (Bernstein, 1997; Moore, 1961). He 
advocated in favour of a pluralistic world of living nature, manifesting a complexity 
of which human kind is a part. Having come to the view that science had taken the 
wrong path to inquiry, that is, the path of Newtonian science and of “mechanical 
explanations”, Peirce looked to nature and common sense-making for principles to 
remedy the problem of “a paradigm gone awry” (Buchler, 1939; Rooker, 2001).  
In Peircean pragmatism, the researcher‟s subjectivity, their point of view, is 
indispensable in the scientific project of discovery, understanding, and explanation of 
“truths”. Peirce‟s epistemological outlook allows the researcher to explicitly maintain 
a subjective act of inquiry. Peirce holds that a researcher is an active, lively 
participant in a „conversation with nature‟; neither with a „vacant stare‟, nor as a 
purely passive „mechanical receptor of data like a seismograph record‟, but with the 
capacity to experience with an adaptive mind (Reilly, 1970). From Peirce‟s view, a 
researcher, or any inquirer for that matter, is able to scrutinise an intelligibly 
structured world in which complexity is to be expected. As John Smith (1965:105) 
notes, Peirce contended that: 
… the human mind is neither fixed nor static; it is a most complex set of 
powers and capacities that stand related to a unified person seeking to live a 
purposeful life in an evolving universe. The mind moves between doubt and 
belief … Between doubt and belief stands inquiry. 
Peirce‟s pragmatism challenges the easy dismissal of people‟s ideas on grounds of 
opinion, whether in the course of doing science or doing policy. On this basis, his 
pragmatism supports the possibility of systematically addressing difficult policy 
issues through subjective experience and thereby bringing common sense-making 
elements back into the policy framework as it currently stands, that is, to 
epistemologically reclaim common sense-making and opinion in the context of policy 
analysis. “Common” does not mean the same unity of understanding - what is 
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common, commonly shared in this expression of the issue is the innate capability 
people have to make sense out of a complex world and accomplish their endeavours.  
Logic of the pragmatic method of inquiry 
Abduction is the defining logic of the pragmatic method of inquiry in the sense that 
Peircean pragmatic inquiry includes the classical forms of inference, viz., deduction 
and induction. In Peirce‟s method of science, knowledge for deduction and induction 
arises from abduction (Reichertz, 2007; CP, 5.171). A concise statement of Peirce‟s 
method of logical inquiry is given in Stephenson (1961a:7):  
Abduction is what one does in guessing or inventing, or proposing a theory or 
explanation or hypothesis: it is the initial proposition to explain facts. 
Deduction thereupon explicates the initial proposition, deducing the necessary 
definitions and formal hypotheses for empirical testing. Induction is then the 
empirical establishment of the hypotheses. 
The notion that something like the concept of abduction is integral to inquiry is not 
controversial. People are given to wondering about things. Curiosity drives inquiry. 
People have ideas. Thought experiments are part and parcel of the theoretical 
imagination. That said though, the incorporation of the logic of abduction renders 
Peirce‟s method of inquiry beyond “normal” science‟s understanding of what logical 
inquiry is about (Aliseda, 1997; Reichertz, 2007), a view to which I will return further 
on. His method of inquiry has yet to feature as a standard approach in the 
methodology textbooks. Abduction has yet to be incorporated into formal logic; it is 
not a standard feature in contemporary research methods literature (see Reichertz, 
2007). So the fact that Blaikie (2000) deals with abduction is unusual in itself. On the 
other hand, examples of the use of abduction in research can be found, for example in 
social research (Moser, 1999), education (Thorsen, 2008), cognitive studies (Magnani, 
2004), linguistics (Melrose, 1995), semiotics (Semetsky, 2004), law (Andreewsky & 
Bourcier, 2000), and artificial intelligence (Flach, Kakas, & Ray, 2006). 
Understanding abduction 
The concept of abduction is not new. According to Jo Reichertz (2007), the term 
“abduction” was first introduced in 1597 by Julius Pacius to translate the Aristotelian 
concept apagoge. The concept languished in obscurity until Peirce took it up to 
42 
 
denote a third type of inference distinct from deduction and induction. Peirce grouped 
deduction and induction together as types of logical conclusion and distinguished 
abduction from this group as the only knowledge-extending means of inferencing 
(Reichertz, 2007:216). The collected writings of Peirce contain various expressions of 
the concept: “presumption”, “hypothesis”, “retroduction”, and “abduction”. Their use, 
somewhat interchangeably, has contributed to a sense among Peirce scholars that 
„Peirce‟s concept of abduction is still poorly understood‟ (McKaughan, 2008:447, 
citing Chiasson, 2001). Similarly, Jaakko Hintikka (1998) has identified the 
clarification of the idea of abduction as a fundamental problem in contemporary 
epistemology.  
The logic of abduction supports open-ended inquiry. It is also illustrative of acts of 
common sense-making. The crux of abduction is that the inquirer comes to 
understand or to learn something new: „If we are ever to learn anything or to 
understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be brought about‟ 
(CP, 5.171). Otherwise, without abduction, science is effectively a closed system: 
„involved with the application of knowledge already attained, and therefore could 
scarcely be evolving discoveries‟ (Stephenson, 1961a:7, emphasis in original).  
Involved in the explication of abduction is the premise that people have the capacity 
to „originate ideas that are true‟ (CP, 5.50) when guided by experience. Experience 
provokes an inquisitive state. For Peirce (CP, 5.539), experience is both a relation 
between self and the external world and a cognitive operation. As Peirce (CP, 6.469, 
emphasis original) explains: „Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the 
observation … of some surprising phenomenon, some experience which either 
disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation of the 
inquisturus.‟ In Peirce‟s (CP, 7.198; 7.200) view, there is “the inquirer” in whom 
experience has built up a „habit of expectation or belief‟. When this belief-habit is 
broken in upon by some unexpected event or change of experience, and for which 
there is no appropriate explanation, the contrast between what was to be expected and 
the unexpected event (a cause for surprise) gives rise to doubt or wonder of some sort. 
This kind of experience, which is an embodied shift from “belief” to “doubt”, calls for 
an explanation (see Reilly, 1970:25-30). The inquisitive process is the attempt to 
explain the unexpected fact or experience and resolve wonder.  
43 
 
For Peirce, the explanation that is derived from acts of imagination has its origins in 
an instinctive process apparent in common sense-making. He describes this intuitive 
way of knowing as the human capacity to guess a correct or nearly correct hypothesis 
able to explain the fact or experience in question (Santaella, 2005). The initial 
formation of the hypothesis appears in a flash of insight by a mind in tune with nature 
- an “A-ha” effect or “eureka” moment. Involved in such moments is the free play, 
flight or leap of imagination, or musement and feeling of plausibility; not the 
controlled and critical operation of reason (CP, 5.173; CP, 5.181; CP, 5.591).  
Abduction is a means of discovery from facts, not theory, and is a means of 
generating new ideas in science (Wolf, 2005). Abduction signifies the intellectual 
activity whereby a called-for explanation of experience is arrived at (CP, 2.776, CP, 
5.145). Peirce (CP, 5.188) viewed abduction as an act of creative insight with a 
„perfectly definite logical form‟. The inference is from the observed facts, the 
combination of features for which there is no appropriate explanation, to the 
unobserved:  
Upon finding himself confronted with a phenomenon unlike what he would 
have expected under the circumstances, he looks over its features and notices 
some remarkable character or relation among them … so that a theory is 
suggested which would explain (that is, render necessary) that which is 
surprising in the phenomena (CP, 2.776). 
Peirce‟s early expression of abduction was in syllogistic form, which he used to study 
the relation between deduction, induction, and abduction and illustrate how each type 
of inference is independent and different from the others. Taking a lead from Gary 
Shank (1998:847), who provides an annotated version of Peirce‟s comparison, I offer 
a version (Table 3) that may help in seeing the differences in a quick reading. 
Standard definitions of deduction and induction in formal logic are listed. In terms of 
formal logic, abduction is an issue in on-going interpretative debates. It is not the 
intention of this thesis to engage with those debates. Nevertheless, the issues at the 
core of those debates are of interest here.  
However it is defined in terms of formal logic, abduction has the status of a 
suggestion; a suggestion that something may be the case in reality (Moore, 1961; 
Reilly, 1970). Though the abduction is made, there is „no formal necessity to form 
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such a hypothesis‟ (CP, 2.624, as cited in Reilly, 1970:33). In Peirce‟s comparison of 
the three types of inference (Table 3), abduction proceeds from a “surprising fact” by 
creating a hypothesis (These beans are from this bag) to explain a curious 
circumstance (What‟s the story with these beans?) by supposing it to be the case of a 
general rule (All the beans from this bag are white). Abduction introduces something 
new to thought in the form of a tentative, though good, plausible explanation of 
experience; one just short of proof (CP, 2.96, CP, 5.171). In Peirce‟s view, “plausible” 
connotes an explanation „suitable for being tested by experiment‟ (NEM 4, 62)2. 
 
 FORMAL LOGIC PEIRCE 
DEDUCTION A statement or theory whose truth or 
falsity is known in advance of 
experience or observation (a priori: 
prior to experience) (Hart, 1998:82). A 
valid deductive inference is: One in 
which the conclusion is a necessary 
consequence of the premises so that 
the conclusion cannot be false if all the 
premises are true (Mautner, 2000:124). 
Rule [It is true that] All the beans from 
this bag are white. 
Case [We know that] These beans are 
from this bag. 
Result [Certainly, it is true that] These 
beans are white. 
INDUCTION A statement whose truth or falsity is 
made more probable by the 
accumulation of confirming evidence 
(a posteriori: based on experience) 
(Hart, 1998:82). A sound induction is 
supported by the premises and may be 
very probable, given the premises, but 
it can be false, even if all the premises 
are true (Mautner, 2000:124). 
Case [We know that] These beans are 
from this bag. 
Result [Observed] These beans are white. 
Rule [Probably, then] All the beans from 
this bag are white. 
ABDUCTION  Rule [In reality; independent of what we 
think] All the beans from this bag are 
white. 
Result [Fact] These beans are white. 
Case [It may be the case in reality] These 
beans are from this bag.  
Table 3: Peirce’s comparison of the three types of inference  
                                               
2 Note: citing Peirce. The abbreviation “NEM” refers to Peirce, C.S., The New Elements of 
Mathematics, vols. 1-4, C. Eisele (Ed.), The Hague: Mouton, 1976). References are cited by volume 
and page numbers. 
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Peirce (CP, 5.189) next proposed a broad logical formulation for the explanatory 
function of abduction in inquiry (Reilly, 1970). According to Peirce (CP, 7.192), the 
function of an explanation is to „supply a proposition which, if it had been known to 
be true before the phenomenon presented itself, would have rendered that 
phenomenon predictable‟: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed;  
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,  
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
This formulation has proven to be a point of departure for interpretations of Peirce on 
abduction. But, how to abduct has become a matter of some controversy:  
So, which explanation should we choose? Philosophers thinking about 
abduction have developed a number of key principles of selection - though 
note that a good deal of interesting controversy surrounds them (Baggini & 
Fosl, 2003:39).  
In the literature, two standard interpretations feature. One traditional view sees 
abduction as a means of generating theoretical discoveries in the form of explanatory 
hypotheses that involve the invention of new concepts. Daniel McKaughan 
(2008:449) refers to this as the „generative‟ interpretation in which Peirce‟s 
conceptualisation of abduction involving non-inferential behaviour (creative insight, 
guessing instinct, imaginative leaps) is recognised (for example Hanson, 1958; Fann, 
1970; Davis, 1972; Santaella, 2005). A second traditional view sees abduction as 
inference to the best explanation. This so-called “justificatory” interpretation avoids 
emphasis on the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis (McKaughan, 2008). 
In the justificatory interpretation, emphasis is rather on the process of choosing an 
explanatory hypothesis (for example Harman, 1965; Rescher, 1978; Lipton, 2004). In 
this regard, Peirce gives guidance. 
For Peirce, a hypothesis must meet three criteria to be admissible: it has to be 
explanatory, testable, and economic (see Reilly, 1970). Faced with any number of 
possible plausible explanations, the economic criterion is a requirement for choosing 
which hypotheses to test. By way of addressing the question of which hypothesis to 
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test first, Peirce elaborates on the three criteria and sets out some considerations for 
selecting the hypothesis. One consideration, he suggests, is the “best hypothesis”: 
„The best hypothesis, in the sense of the one most recommending itself to the inquirer, 
is the one which can be the most readily refuted if it is false‟ (CP, 1.120, 6.528-6.530, 
as cited in Reilly, 1970). Note that this consideration underwrites hypothetico-
deductive logical inquiry - I will say more about this aspect shortly. Rather than 
falsity, the justificatory interpretation has a focus on truth. As given in McKaughin, 
inference to the best explanation requires the researcher to argue the viability of the 
explanation chosen to the extent that it is „true or approximately true or probably true 
or at least more likely to be true than any available alternative‟ (McKaughan, 
2008:451).  
A second consideration in selecting the more apt of a number of plausible hypotheses 
for an early test is the “simpler hypothesis”. The simpler hypothesis is one suggested 
by instinct, intuition, or common sense and not by controlled reason. Ordinarily, 
simplicity would indicate that the hypothesis is subject to the test of Ockham‟s razor, 
that is, on the basis of the methodological principle that the explanation of any given 
fact should appeal to the smallest number of factors required to explain the fact in 
question. Francis Reilly (1970:44) citing Peirce, (CP, 6.496) draws attention to 
Peirce‟s (1908) A Neglected Argument in which Peirce mentions that it would be a 
mistake to think of the simpler hypothesis‟ meeting the test of Ockham‟s razor. 
Instead, the simpler hypothesis is: „the more natural and facile, the one suggested by 
instinct‟. After which, the hypothesis must meet with the control and criticism of the 
verification process. This is the application of Peirce‟s principle of critical common-
sensism (see Reilly, 1970; 45-53). The Encylopaedia of Philosophy (1967, I/II:157, as 
cited in Bertilsson, 2003) describes critical common sense as the philosophical views 
which combine the greatest respect for common sense with the admission that at least 
some of its beliefs are open to critical revision. Of these two traditional interpretations 
of abduction, inference to the best explanation has tended to prevail as the received 
wisdom. The generative view, however, lends support to the notion of abduction as 
“the logic of discovery”.  
Over time the concept of abduction has been adapted to accepted principles guiding 
research in general, even though, ironically, as I will discuss below, these principles 
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have tended to consolidate around the rejection of abduction as a relevant logic of 
knowledge. The broad logical formulation of abduction makes more sense when read 
in the methodological context intended, in other words, in the context of a pragmatic 
method of science that relies on experience, for the formation of the hypothesis 
through to its empirical establishment (Moore, 1961).  
Pragmatic maxim 
Underpinning this thesis, then, is an interpretation that comes primarily from Peirce‟s 
theory of scientific method given in Reilly (1970), and also in Stephenson (1961a); in 
combination with an interpretation of Peirce‟s pragmatism in Edward Moore (1961); 
alongside my own reading of Peirce. The view common to these readings is that it is 
not enough to have an “originating” moment. Nor is it enough to merely describe the 
idea, proposition or hypothesis being raised. A hypothesis is an explanation if it 
explains the facts of experience and is scientifically useful. A hypothesis may be 
judged useful if it is in accord with the pragmatic maxim: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object (CP, 5.402). 
Peirce gave two statements of the pragmatic maxim. His original statement (above) is 
the canonical version. A later (1905) statement reads: „In order to ascertain the 
meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical 
consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; 
and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the 
conception‟ (CP, 5.9). The pragmatic maxim is essentially what Peirce (CP, 5.6). 
meant by pragmatism as „a method for ascertaining the real meaning of any concept, 
doctrine, proposition, word, or other sign‟. As Christopher Hookway (2008) points 
out, the pragmatic maxim is Peirce‟s way of ensuring that the researcher becomes: 
„reflectively clear about the contents of concepts and hypotheses‟ by identifying their 
practical considerations or consequences. In effect practical considerations are 
thoughts about conduct. They are in thought a guide for action, directing, in the words 
of Stephenson (1961a:6) „attention to conditions for observing‟, or, information 
researchers would need for „testing hypotheses and theories empirically‟ (Hookway, 
2008). For Peirce, such practical considerations or consequences are the meaning of 
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any concept. The pragmatic maxim amounts to an approach which is generalised as: 
„If I act in manner x, then I will have experiences of the sort y‟ or „If I want to 
experience y, then I will act in manner x‟ (Moore, 1961).  
In Peirce‟s view, little in the way of new knowledge or learning comes from analysing 
definitions (Hookway, 2008; Moore, 1961). The real meaning of a concept is not a 
question of logic. Peirce links the meaning of a concept to experience and his theory 
of reality. The “real” nature of any phenomenon needs to be determined or checked 
by reference to the experiences of a community of observers or inquirers. Better then 
to describe how the concept is used in practice. As given in Moore (1961:70), the real 
attributes of any phenomenon (physical, biological or social) are: 
…those attributes open to public inspection by the community of scientists. To 
say that I have discovered a new property of say, protoplasm, is to describe an 
experiment (i.e. a certain manner of acting) which, if engaged in by any 
investigator, will lead to [their] having a certain experience (that of a 
previously unobserved property).  
In Peirce‟s words (CP, 5.400): „Thus we come down to what is tangible and practical, 
as to the root of every real distinction of thought…there is no distinction so fine as to 
consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.‟  
The notion of “the logic of discovery” underlies abduction being viewed as a 
fundamental problem of contemporary epistemology. The problem involves debates 
that have shaped research dynamics and the growth of various types of research, 
roughly speaking since the mid-1930s. I conclude this section on Peircean pragmatism 
and abduction with additional contextual comments. These concern, on the one hand, 
the nature and history of some key aspects of on-going research methods discourse, 
and on the other, the neglect of Peirce‟s method. 
Logic of discovery and epistemic debates 
Epistemic debates involve the world of science in making distinctions or divisions 
between what is apposite and what is not; between science and non-science. These are 
debates often marked by old issues that are re-enlivened. One such issue concerns the 
growth or discovery (generation) of scientific knowledge and the question of whether 
there is a logic for this process. From a historical perspective, this question has been 
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addressed as a problem of the theory of scientific method. From that perspective, the 
nature of the problem has to do with the ability to critically appraise theories and 
justify science‟s claim to truths.  
Early on Hans Reichenbach distinguished between contexts of justification and 
contexts of discovery in Experience and Prediction. He held that philosophers of 
science “cannot be concerned with reasons for suggesting hypotheses, but only with 
reasons for accepting hypotheses” (Reichenbach, 1938, as cited in Hanson, 1965:43). 
Richard Braithwaite (1953) in Scientific Explanation subsequently argued: „The 
solution of these historical problems involves the individual psychology of thinking 
and the sociology of thought. None of these questions are our business here‟ 
(Braithwaite, 1953, as cited in Hanson, 1965:43). Completing this set of 
pronouncements is Karl Popper‟s (1959:31) view: „The initial stage, the act of 
conceiving or inventing a theory, seems … neither to call for logical analysis nor to be 
susceptible of it.‟ Such demarcation between contexts of discovery and justification 
not only set the stage for the dismissal of Peirce‟s method, but also helped to entrench 
many of the conditions from which emerged more contemporary dualistic debates, 
such as: objective/subjective, quantitative/qualitative, “hard”/ “soft” sciences, and 
positivist/postmodern. A brief mention of the epistemic debates that set the conditions 
for many ensuing debates follows. 
From a historical perspective, 20th century research can be viewed as a field marked 
by two major developments with one driving the other. One development was the 
contention over how knowledge is considered to be produced. This sustained 
contention then drove the expansion of types of research in the so-called “context of 
discovery” category (Howe, 2008).  
Popper (1959) expressed the terms of demarcation in a “YES-but-NO” dismissal of 
the idea that there could ever be such a thing as a “logic of discovery”: “Yes”, if what 
was meant was a systematic method of examining logically new ideas whereby the 
ideas: „may be discovered to be a discovery‟ (Popper, 1959:31). “But”, if what was 
meant involved either the act or process of conceiving a new idea, or acts of inductive 
inference, then “no”. Karl Popper‟s (1959) Logic of Discovery, which reflects his 
critical rationalism and was influential in the emergence of post-positivism, can to a 
surprising extent be read as an interpretation of Peirce, but with major fundamental 
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exceptions. Popper did not mention the influence of Peirce on his thinking until much 
later, as mentioned in Stewart (1993:21): „Karl Popper was delighted to acknowledge 
several years ago that he and Peirce arrived at some startling similar views‟. See 
further comment in Santaella (2005). So, on the one hand, the process of having a new 
idea or knowing is beyond logical analysis. That is, there is no such thing as a logical 
method of having new ideas. Nor is there a method of examining the process, or for 
that matter, techniques by which it is possible to ascertain that the experiences of any 
two observers are in fact similar (Popper, 1959:30-32). For Popper, the nature or 
process of knowing is a problem for psychology to deal with, not epistemology.  
On the other hand, induction for Popper presents a problem of justification; of having 
to rely on conclusions that may turn out not to be true: „... for any conclusion drawn in 
this way may always turn out to be false; no matter how many instances of white 
swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are 
white‟ (Popper, 1959:27). In his note, On the So-called „Logic of Induction‟ and the 
„Probability of Hypotheses‟, Popper (1959:315) reiterated the view that the procedure 
of justifying a hypothesis has nothing to do with inductive logic. Ideas of induction 
are „superfluous‟ and have „no function‟ in a context of justification. Popper‟s logic of 
discovery is the hypothetico-deductive method also referred to as “the scientific 
method”. It is the method of „hypotheses and refutations‟ (Aliseda, 1997); the testing 
of hypotheses in the attempt to refute falsehoods. The contemporary import of the 
logic of discovery debate is found in Howe (2008:100): 
Consistent with this, precise quantitative data were to be obtained and plugged 
into the inferential machinery. Testing of scientific hypotheses was reserved 
for formalized inference vis-a-vis the “context of justification”. Less 
formalized, qualitative data and inference were relegated to the “context of 
discovery”, where tentative hypotheses might be invented and mulled but not 
verified or falsified. 
In the contemporary research methods literature, the received wisdom is that research 
is diverse and pluralistic. Sotirios Sarantakos (2005:11) expresses the tenor of the 
main stream of current views: „It must be stressed that diversity is not an indicator of 
weakness of, or problems with, research procedures. All types of research have a task 
to perform, and are valuable in their own context and for their special properties‟. 
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Thus, consensus holds that the days of “one method of science to rule them all” are 
gone.  
Despite this view, the expansion of types of research in the so-called context of 
discovery category still resurrects questions about the process of knowing and what 
constitutes a rigorous qualitative research project and method of appraisal of the 
knowledge gained. This is particularly so in light of the prominence of qualitative 
research in the social sciences as outlined in Charles Ragin, Joane Nagel, and Patricia 
White (2004) (cf. Denzin, 2009). Discussions in contemporary research methods 
evince the view that in the absence of a consensus on what makes an acceptable 
qualitative analysis (what method for appraisal?), essentially, positivist criteria for 
scientific research still stand as the default position; the benchmark for rigour and 
quality. Qualitative research underpinned by alternative epistemological positions is 
thus susceptible to varying views in the area of legitimacy as indicated, for instance, 
in Leslie Henrickson and Bill McKelvey (2002). 
The background picture, then, suggests an epistemological continuum, broadly 
construed (Howe, 2008; Opfer, 2009). Figure 1 gives an indication of how current 
alternative research frameworks relate in terms of epistemological positions on the 
continuum. These positions are marked above the continuum, in relation to the poles 
of objectivity and subjective experience, and the types of research methods which are 
aligned below.  
Pragmatism has recently come to feature as a “third wave” research movement or 
paradigm. It is the philosophical partner of mixed methods research which has popped 
up ostensively to occupy the “middle area” between the two opposing traditions of 
quantitative and qualitative research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004:15). Pragmatism 
is viewed as a coherent philosophical system systematically developed by the 
classical pragmatists - for example, Peirce, James, Dewey - which over time has been 
taken in newer directions by modern neo-pragmatists (for example Rescher, 2000; 
Rorty, 2000) (see Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In mixed methods research, the 
traditional standard interpretation of pragmatism applies: “doing what works”. From 
this interpretative position, mixed methods research translates Peirce‟s pragmatic 
maxim as follows: „Choose the combination or mixture of methods and procedures 
that works best for answering your research question‟ (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
52 
 
2004:17). This translation of Peirce‟s pragmatic approach is consistent with the 
justificatory interpretation of abduction, that is, inference to the best explanation: 
Philosophically, mixed research makes use of the pragmatic method and 
system of philosophy. Its logic of inquiry includes the use of induction (or 
discovery of patterns), deduction (testing of theories and hypotheses), and 
abduction (uncovering and relying on the best of a set of explanations for 
understanding one‟s results) (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004:17, emphasis 
added).  
However, the statement appears inconsistent with the pragmatic method of inquiry 
which uses induction to test hypotheses, deduction to explicate, and abduction to 
suggest an explanation for observed yet inexplicable facts. 
 
 
Figure 1: Indicative continuum of epistemological positions 
Source: adapted from Opfer (2009). 
Part of the justification for mixed methods research given in R. Burke Johnson and 
Anthony Onwuegbuzie (2004:17), is the notion derived from Peirce that if two 
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distinct interpretations of a concept „do not make a difference in how we conduct our 
research then the distinction is, for practical purposes, not very meaningful‟. In the 
case of mixed methods research, the interpretation given of Peirce‟s pragmatic maxim 
and method is very meaningful, since it appears to be in the tradition that keeps a 
logic of discovery at bay. Thus, I am not sure whether mixed methods justify the 
moniker of a “third way” of research. In this thesis, I present a different point of view. 
In this view, I hold that a new phase of research behaviour has yet to emerge in a fully 
coherent form. But, whatever is yet to unfold into that “new way” will have a 
complexity aspect to it. 
When read from left to right, the continuum in Figure 1 indicates the evolutionary 
nature of the overall structure of contemporary research. The formation of the 
structure of contemporary research can be visualised as a progressive departure from 
positivist thought. As given in Mautner (2000:438), positive theories of knowledge 
asserted that there cannot be different kinds of knowledge. All inquiry is concerned 
with description and explanation of empirical facts. From a positivist perspective, in 
principle there could be no difference between the methods of the natural and social 
sciences. However, in the context of research in general, the 20th century was a 
period of increasing internal differentiation, growth, and development in schools of 
thought, research methods, and the social sciences.  
What is not obvious from the placement of epistemological positions shown on the 
continuum is the progressive shift in ontological perspective that has emerged within 
the natural sciences over the comparative length of time. The first seeds of this change 
were planted by quantum mechanics (Gleick, 1998; Mainzer, 1997; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984; Zukav, 2001). Quantum science challenges the classical belief in the 
certainty of scientific knowledge and science‟s claim to get at the truth of reality 
purely by objective means (see Heisenberg, 1999). A significant flow-on effect of the 
quantum experience has been the reconnection with the psychology of knowledge in 
the context of complexity research (see Capra, 1997; Emmeche, 2004). Quantum 
theory holds that the inquirer is an integral part of the system they observe, and their 
presence „seems to be the catalyst that produces clarity from an unclear situation‟ 
(Evans, 1998:237). This is an argument that indicates a failure to resolve the debates 
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in the world of science centred on positivist notions of knowledge and how scientific 
knowledge is considered to be produced and justified that occurred from the 1930s.  
Summary 
In this chapter, details of the research strategy chosen to pursue the purpose of this 
study have been outlined and discussed. The research approach adopted for this study 
can be characterised as non-positivist and abductive, consistent with Peirce‟s 
pragmatic theory of scientific method. This method of inquiry runs counter to a basic 
premise of modern science, namely, that the act of conceiving a new idea (an act or 
process involving the individual psychology of thinking) lacks method. Peirce‟s 
pragmatism and his attention to abduction as a common, everyday way of thinking 
that extends knowledge serves as a counterargument to the knowledge versus opinion 
debate and exclusive focus on justifying a hypothesis (the method of closed inquiry). 
In this chapter I have begun to elaborate the proposition of the role of opinion as a 
complement to evidence through an analysis of Peircean thinking and the connection 
between abduction and pragmatism. Peirce‟s articulation of abduction gives a basis in 
methodology for the embrace of opinion. My hunch is that Stephenson‟s ability to 
develop Q methodology was dependent on his own capacity to think abductively.  
Having examined Peircean pragmatism and Peirce‟s articulation of abduction, the 
following chapter presents a critique of evidence-based policy analysis in light of the 
knowledge versus opinion debate and the concern that has been expressed by some 
governments about a needed capability to address complexity surrounding policy 
questions. This examination of evidence-based policy analysis addresses the 
proposition that evidence-based policy analysis rejects opinion with the implication 
that complexity capability may not be fully realised in policy analysis practice. 
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Chapter 3: Policy thinking 
 
Introduction  
In this chapter I examine a range of aspects of policy thinking in order to make the 
links between policy, complexity, and Q methodology and to create the 
epistemological space for opinion that Peirce‟s logic and Stephenson‟s Q 
methodology point toward. The chapter discusses evidence-based policy in relation to 
the thinking needed for complex policy problems. It combines a review of the 
literature that broadly concerns the idea of evidence-based policy with a discussion of 
the kind of policy practices that that idea dictates. The chapter also introduces the 
differences between alternative epistemological choices and methodologies of 
research, which are exemplified in the case of the Schiphol Airport policy 
controversy. 
Complexity capability is a theme shared between two closely linked arguments in 
policy, which bear in contradictory ways on the promise of evidence-based policy 
when applied to complex policy issues. The first argument is about coping with rapid 
change in modern society. Simply stated, it is an argument for more and better use of 
science in policy analysis. The second argument, which focuses on tackling complex 
policy problems, is an argument for participatory, dialogical, and collaborative ways 
of working whereby problems and their solutions are socially, not scientifically, 
defined.  
I begin with a critique of the evidence-based policy movement in the course of which 
I look more closely at the idea of evidence that has been advocated by proponents of 
evidence-based policy, noting how “evidence” is delineated and determined. 
Particular attention is then paid to the issues of complexity capability and new 
thinking needed for complex policy problems. The chapter concludes with the 
Schiphol Airport case which is used to compare differences between two 
epistemological alternatives and their effects.  
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Evidence-based policy movement: a critical examination 
Since the last decade, evidence-based policy has become pervasive as a framework 
for thinking about policy and practice in government. This current movement in 
public policy has roots in the “Third Way”, pragmatic - in the sense of “doing what 
works” - and reformist political project of the United Kingdom Blair-led Labour 
Government (1997-2010). Launched in the late 1990s by the United Kingdom 
Government, by 2004 evidence-based policy had gained status as a movement 
(Davies, 2004). Growing numbers of Western states (for example, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, United States) embarked upon progressive reform of their respective 
policy systems in broad conformity with the ideas and practices of the evidence-based 
approach of the United Kingdom. Adherents to the approach can also be found in 
growing numbers of diverse policy communities such as research organizations, 
think-tanks, and non-governmental organizations.  
The central components of the United Kingdom approach have been published, 
updated, and widely disseminated by the United Kingdom Government as well as 
variously summarized by proponents and critics alike (for example, Denzin, 2009; 
Donaldson, Christie & Mark, 2009; Marston & Watts, 2003; Nutley, Davies & 
Walter, 2003; Parsons, 2002; Pawson, 2002; Solesbury, 2001). In the following 
section I draw in the main from the United Kingdom documents: Modernising 
Government White Paper published in March 1999; the United Kingdom Cabinet 
Office paper of September 1999, Professional Policy Making for the Twenty First 
Century; the Performance and Innovation Unit, United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 
report published in January 2000, Adding it Up - Improving Analysis and Modelling in 
Central Government; the National Audit Office report of October 2001, Modern 
Policy-making: Ensuring Policies Deliver Value for Money and Assessing Quality in 
Qualitative Evaluation: A framework for assessing research evidence produced for 
the United Kingdom Cabinet Office (Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis, & Dillon, 2003). In 
these documents it is clear that the United Kingdom Government sought a coherent 
approach to policy work that would meet a set of needs. 
These needs could be listed: the need for long-term thinking and strategic policy 
work; the need for new thinking such as systems thinking; the need for improved 
rigour in policy-relevant research, analysis, and evaluation, and the need for 
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innovation in the form of creative solutions and new ways of acting with a focus on 
so-called “wicked” or complex social and economic policy problems, that is, 
problems that are often characterized by intractability and policy failure. Meeting 
those needs in policy work gives a platform for sound decision-making and 
analytically driven solutions grounded in rigorous research and knowledge. Analytical 
rigour requires adherence to the scientific method under the rubric of “best practice” 
(a process of standardization).  
Broadly speaking, this means that policy work is open and explicit; objective and 
empirically based; consistent with existing knowledge; results are verifiable and 
reproducible; and justified. Emphasis is on the idea of interventions carried out under 
experimental and controlled conditions, systematically evaluated, leading to the 
cumulative development of reliable evidence for subsequent policy purposes. In 
addition, an emphasis on best practice in policy analysis is intended to stimulate the 
search for new approaches, better ideas, and new ways of thinking to promote 
improvements in the policy process and the successful handling of complex policy 
problems. Cutting edge economic and social modelling techniques, methodologies for 
rigorous evaluation, and the testing of polices against possible future scenarios as 
found in the United States policy community are favoured. Evidence gained in these 
ways constitutes evidence of “what works”. It also means more generally that the 
process of policy analysis itself and not just the practice of marshalling scientific 
evidence emulates the process of conventional scientific inquiry.  
Seeking better approaches to policy development has been a feature of public policy 
analysis over many decades. Clearly, the United States policy experience is a 
precursor to the current evidence-based policy movement. But reflected in the United 
States experience is the possibility that analytic capability is not equivalent to 
complexity capability.  
United States legacy: rationality project 
The policy professions came into existence because of acknowledged complexity at 
the heart of policy making (Snider, 2000a; 2000b). The United States policy 
movement throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s consolidated interest in the 
improvement of policy analysis through recourse to science and rational analysis, 
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variously described as “scientific”, “comprehensive”, “technical”, or “instrumental 
rationality”, with an emphasis on apolitical efficiency (deLeon, 1994, 1998; Fischer, 
2003; Lynn, 1999; Schon, 1983). Deborah Stone (2002) called this interest in the 
improvement of policy making the “rationality project”. The rationality project 
„extricates policy from politics‟ and leads to reasoning by calculation: „calculating to 
figure out which actions yield the best results‟ (Stone 2002:376-383). Describing this 
approach in general terms, policy analysts draw on social science theory and methods 
to predict the expected effects of alternative policies, provide evidence, and 
evaluation that supports or refutes specific policy measures as appropriate to resolve 
policy problems (Howlett, 2008; Majone, 1989; Weimer & Vining, 1999).  
Policy analysis, which was conceived as a craft that uses analytic tools wielded with 
skill, emerged in the United States during the 1960s. It was the means by which the 
knowledge of science was to be applied (Rittel & Webber, 1973). From the outset, 
emphasis was on quantitative methods and the accumulation of empirical evidence. 
Economics, statistics, cost-benefit analysis, operations research methods, and so-
called “first generation” systems analysis and the findings from program evaluations 
made up the core of approaches most widely used (Durning, 1999; Shadish, Cook & 
Leviton, 1991; Stokey & Zeckhauser, 1978).  
Mainstream or traditional policy analysis takes its due from positivism (Durning, 
1999). Positive economics, as Brunner (1991) tells us, is the form of positivism that 
has defined policy analysis, furnished definitive standards of research and practice, 
and analytical expertise within the craft of policy analysis. For government, positive 
economics was seen to offer rationality, objectivity, and empirically based causal 
knowledge (scientific facts). Brunner (1991:73) explains it as follows: 
 Rationality was served because the consequences of policy alternatives could 
be predicted with precision and accuracy, independent of the particular 
context. 
 Objectivity was served because these predictions could be independent of the 
researcher/analyst‟s subjective viewpoint. Anyone else could employ positivist 
scientific methods to replicate the results. 
 In principle, the development of causal generalisations and models with 
predictive power could reduce controversy in policy to differences over value 
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judgments. The researcher/analyst would be able to maintain a „value-neutral‟ 
position above and apart from these controversies.  
As a precedent for evidentiary policy practice, policy analysis has been subject to 
sustained critique on epistemological, methodological, and political grounds (deLeon, 
1994). Laurence Lynn (1999:411), at the Harris Graduate School of Public Policy, 
University of Chicago, described policy analysis as „conceived in controversy‟. More 
specifically, the profession of policy analysis was conceived in a milieu, on the one 
hand, of scientism - the view that any meaningful question can be answered by the 
methods of science (Longino, 2011) - and, on the other hand, of dissenting post 
positivism.  
Lynn‟s (1999) review of the discourse about the nature and usefulness of policy 
analysis, up to the period that saw the launch of evidence-based policy as a new 
initiative in the United Kingdom, identified the „scientistic‟ (Lynn, 1999:416) form of 
policy analysis as the focal point of sustained critique and controversy. Lynn‟s 
(1999:420) use of the term “scientistic” is in reference to: „the positivist penchant for 
facts, causal models, instrumental rationality, evaluation of alternatives and evidence-
based practice‟. Allied to this theme of scientism is the following strand of criticism 
of policy analysis as an outdated practice in the contemporary world (Durning, 2005).  
Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar (2003), argue that policy analysis is based on 
an outdated model of government. The old order of democracy practised in Western 
democracies over the course of the last century, which they describe as “Madisonian”, 
that is, hierarchical and elitist, is giving way to the new order of a “network society” 
(Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, as cited by Durning, 2005:689). Their claim is that 
deliberative policy analysis is required for a society in which policy is made and 
implemented in networks of interdependent public and private actors (see also 
Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997). Similarly, Goktug Morçol (2000; 2002) argues 
that because of its positivist foundations, policy analysis is also based on an outdated 
understanding of science. In the new sciences, for example, quantum mechanics and 
chaos and complexity theories, reductionist methodology is replaced by a holistic one: 
„empirical and quantitative methods are either supplemented or supplanted by other 
ways of knowing (intuitive, experiential, qualitative, or spiritual)‟ (Morçol, 2000:3). 
The new sciences require a “new mind for policy analysis” (Morçol, 2002). In Fischer 
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(1998), the argument is that policy analysis is based on an outdated view of the 
scientific method and the practice of science. 
Post positivism was conceived as a way of addressing these issues. It is broadly 
construed to include the various shifts in epistemological thinking away from that of a 
positivist understanding of science. In the social epistemology of post positivism, 
knowledge emerges from social context. Concerns and meaning are multiple and 
constructed from experience. And, the possibility of separating fact from value in 
analytic work is a contested notion (Durning, 1999:399). John Dryzek (1989, as cited 
by Durning, 2005:659) in discussing „technically sophisticated policy analysis‟ from a 
critical perspective, points out that public policy is made „the prerogative of experts‟, 
thereby diminishing the importance of public preference (see also Fischer, 2003; 
Torgerson, 1997). So, against the imperatives of scientific rationality and technique 
embodied in policy analysis, arguments for social rationality were developing. “Social 
rationality” as used in this thesis is an umbrella term that captures notions of common 
sense ways of thinking and concerns with the role of participatory, deliberative 
democracy, and social, discursive, and collaborative processes in the development of 
policy.  
The enduring policy sciences school of thought, which takes its orientation from the 
work of Harold Lasswell, has been a source of consistent alerts about „what science 
can and cannot know about society and its complex policy problems‟ (Brunner & 
Ascher, 1992:297). Lasswell, who was influenced by John Dewey‟s pragmatism, 
emphasised that science is „an altogether human and fallible enterprise‟ (Lasswell, as 
cited in Torgerson, 1992:229). Douglas Torgerson‟s discussion of Lasswell‟s 
influence iterates a core tenet of Dewey‟s pragmatism that underlies the policy 
sciences challenge to scientific rationality: 
Pragmatism does not expose science as an emperor without clothes, but does 
suggest that it should not be the emperor. In The Public and Its Problems of 
1927, Dewey indeed warned explicitly of an oligarchy of experts and 
emphasised the need for communication and participation in a democratic 
society: „The essential need…is the improvement of the methods and 
conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the 
public (Torgerson, 1992:229). 
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In the late 1990s, a series of debates on the evidentiary basis of policy analysis dealt 
with questions about the way policy analysis skills are conceived, taught, and applied 
in practice (see deLeon, 1998a; Durning, 1999; Fischer, 1998; Lynn, 1999; Weimer, 
1998). Basically, the debates were about taking stock of policy analysis, its 
usefulness, sufficiency, and the future of practice in light of the experience of the field 
where rational analysis seemingly created more problems than it solved. All of these 
debates provide evidence of the extent to which the policy literature offers a record of 
accumulating critique of the practices that defined policy analysis as an evidentiary 
practice from the outset.  
Post positivist perspectives on how to correct what is thought to be the shortcomings 
of the on-going valorization of expert-led practices in government have not been 
realised in terms of an accepted alternative model of practice (Durning, 1999; Fischer, 
2003). A number of reasons for why this may be the case have been put forward. For 
instance, it has been suggested that a lack of consensus on post positivist standards of 
research and practice has been a significant factor (Brunner, 1991:82). deLeon 
(1998:7), referring to the standing of post positivism within the policy movement, 
says it was exposed to the charge of speculative science, offering „little more than 
informed and always changing speculation‟. Rebecca Blank (2002), an economist, 
who has worked for the United States Federal government on social policy, pointed 
out that the contention is not so much that positivism and economics have 
shortcomings, but, that “on Capitol Hill” they present, rightly or wrongly, as superior 
to any other method of policy analysis available. And David Ellwood (2003), a former 
senior policy advisor in the Clinton Administration, speaking to the Social Policy 
Research and Evaluation Conference, convened by the New Zealand Ministry of 
Social Development in 2003, said: 
Economics seems to have a sizable lead in the influence category, probably in 
large part because it … offers compact ways of describing some of the forces 
that shape behaviour, and economics alone seems willing to quantitatively 
predict how responsive people will be to changed policies…. Increasingly the 
language of economics and the statistical analysis tools that economists favour 
are being applied to policy design (Ellwood, 2003:23) 
When viewed as having a heritage in the United States policy analysis tradition, 
evidence-based policy represents continuity and a default position. The idea that the 
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craft of policy analysis should have more of a scientific as against more of a social 
footing is not new. Nor can it be claimed that a scientific base has proven especially 
effective in critical areas of concern. Although proponents of evidence-based policy 
appear to want to make a break from past debates (see Oakley, 2000), the importance 
of not turning a blind eye to the epistemological contestation inherent in the United 
States policy tradition is amplified by discussions at the sciences-policy nexus and by 
new developments in scientific thinking which are provoked by an interest in 
complexity.  
As far as the development of evidence-based policy is concerned, recognition of the 
rapid and irreversible changes occurring in society is a key factor. Advocacy of this 
“forces-of-change” thesis has been advanced on a wide number of fronts through 
debates in the natural sciences, social sciences, and politically-led debates such as the 
reform of government and policy in the United Kingdom. A broad consensus appears 
to have emerged on the most appropriate means of solving the problem of complexity 
capability, evident for example in the Declaration on Science and the Use of Scientific 
Knowledge (UNESCO, 1999), the Buenos Aires Declaration calling for a new 
approach to the social science-policy nexus (UNESCO, 2006), and is manifest in 
approaches to evidence-based policy in various states. The core concepts of the 
forces-of-change argument and the general tenor of discourse about it comprise the 
next section. 
Forces of change and the need for science/evidence 
The logic of the forces-of-change argument runs, roughly, as follows. Forces of 
change call into question established political, governance, and policy analysis 
frameworks (Driver & Martell, 2000:150). To remain credible and effective 
government has to adapt and cope with the new situation of rapid change, with its 
increasing social complexity, and attendant uncertainties (see Blair, 1999; UK Cabinet 
Office, 1999b). To facilitate adaptation, the government needs to enhance its ability to 
interact with, manage, and use knowledge in systematic ways (Mulgan, 2003b).  
Defining the problem 
In February 1997, Jane Lubchenco gave the Presidential Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Association of the Advancement of Science (AAAS). 
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Lubchenco (for the published version, see Lubchenco, 1998) spoke of a new social 
contract for science. Her focus was a call for a renewed relationship between science 
and society based on the recognition that we live in a new global situation of 
complexity and rapid change in the natural and social worlds. Her overview of the 
changes occurring in biological, ecological, social, economic, and political systems 
described an imperilled world, primarily of human making: „humans have emerged as 
a new force of nature‟ (Lubchenco, 1998:492). Yet, as a new force of nature we lack 
the ability to exercise control over eventual outcomes and face runaway 
consequences. This is essentially the argument Anthony Giddens (1999) pursued in 
the BBC Reith Lecture series where he discussed the notion of a “runaway world” and 
the ideas behind his call for a political “third way” social democratic renewal 
(Giddens, 1998, 2000).  
Conventional ways of approaching pressing issues such as, for example, increasing 
poverty, inadequacies of the welfare state, economic crisis, ecological and climate 
change, seem to aggravate rather than ameliorate the problems faced. The crisis of 
this new situation comes, in part, from a lack of complexity capability in the sciences-
policy nexus. A lack of complexity capability, Lubchenco (1998:492) suggests, 
combines with inescapable uncertainty about the future: „greater uncertainty about 
responses of complex biological, ecological, social, and political systems; and more 
surprise‟. So framed, Lubchenco‟s argument recognises that there are, at the moment, 
substantive limits to scientific knowledge with implications for, on the one hand, 
traditional conceptions of scientific knowledge, and on the other hand, conventional 
ways of defining problems, identifying solutions, and implementing actions in policy 
(see also, Gallopin, Funtowicz, O‟Connor & Ravetz, 2001). 
Lubchenco (1998:495) argues that although science cannot determine the solutions, 
which is the role of policy, it can: „help frame the questions to be posed, provide 
assessments about current conditions, evaluate the likely consequences of different 
policy or management options, provide knowledge about the world, and develop new 
technologies‟. There is a contingency, however. Lubchenco (1998) suggests that for 
science, it must not be a case of “business as usual”. According to Lubchenco 
(1998:495), the scientific community has to prepare itself to meet the new situation of 
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change and complexity; a task which requires the new science „of the 1990s‟ and not 
the science „of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s‟.  
The best means of meeting the challenge 
A World Conference on Science, Science for the Twenty-First Century, held in 
Budapest in 1999, met to consider issues around this notion of a new contract between 
science and society, the results of which are embodied in the Declaration on Science 
and the Use of Scientific Knowledge (United Nations Educational, Scientific & 
Cultural Organization, 1999). Gilberto Gallopin, Silvio Funtowicz, Martin O‟Connor 
and Jerry Ravetz (2001) advance a critique of the outcomes of this conference. They 
explicitly criticise the way of thinking about, or attitude toward, the appropriate 
means of facing the forces of change, at least on the side of the sciences. In their 
assessment, the conference documents show that a fundamental point of the initial 
argument made in Lubchenco (1998), that is, that science itself may be in need of 
change, was basically ignored or overlooked. 
Gallopin et al., (2001:220) observe: 
… their [conference documents] main message is that the problems with 
science lie essentially in the way science is used, misused and, mostly 
underused, but that the model of science, and its practice, is fine as it is, for the 
new century as for the past one, … as well as for fundamental understanding 
and the resolution of practical problems. 
As they suggested, a central question for science, which the conference did not 
consider, is: 
… to what extent (and in which situations) problems with science are caused 
by the non-application (or misapplication) of the existing rules of inquiry, and 
to what extent (and in which situations) the scientific rules themselves have to 
be modified, or even replaced (Gallopin et al., 2001:220). 
According to Gallopin et al., (2001) failure to consider inadequacies of conventional 
scientific practice means default thinking prevails in this United Nations, global, 
political, knowledge context. Such thinking emphasises science as the source of 
solutions and that a world of complexity cannot be „easily captured by common 
sense‟ (Mulgan, 2001a:29). A lack of complexity capability in the sciences-policy 
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nexus can be explained by: „the imperfection in the current knowledge and/or its 
application‟ (Gallopin et al., 2001:227). The thinking advances along the lines that 
with more rigorous adherence to established scientific methods, more rigorous 
analysis, more scientific knowledge, more new technologies and instruments, and 
improved communication, uncertainties will reduce with an increased capacity to 
meet the challenges of the new situation.  
The forces-of-change argument has culminated in a belief that the most appropriate 
means to meet the challenges of change and increasing complexity is a new approach 
to the links between scientific research, the practice of government, and policy. At the 
core of this new approach as given, for example, in the Final Report, Buenos Aires 
Declaration Calling for a New Approach to the Social Science-Policy Nexus (United 
Nations Educational, Science and Cultural Organisation, 2006), is the suggestion that 
only the sciences have the analytically rigorous means necessary: „to determine why 
well-intended reforms can fail, what effects can result from proposed actions, and 
how best to achieve socially desirable objectives‟ (United Nations Educational, 
Science and Cultural Organisation, 2006:3). The most appropriate means identified 
proceed from science as the source of credible evidence, followed by more effective 
utilisation of what can count as evidence and legitimate knowledge relevant to the 
policy process.  
Focus on “the best” 
Proponents of evidence-based policy have advanced this framework, some with a 
great deal of enthusiasm as suggested, for example, by themes of “evidence-based 
everything” and the promise of an “evidence-based global society” appearing in the 
literature (Donaldson et al., 2009; Oakley, 2002). The United Kingdom Labour 
Government‟s effort to achieve better government, defined as „better policymaking, 
better responsiveness to what people want, better public services‟ (UK Cabinet 
Office, 1999a:9), embodies the forces-of-change argument:  
Social sciences should be at the heart of policy making. We need a revolution 
in relations between governments and the social research community – we 
need social scientists to help determine what works and why, and what types 
of policy initiatives are likely to be most effective (Blunkett, 2000). 
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The United Kingdom Labour Government couched its modernising agenda in 
pragmatist terms: “what counts is what works”. Sandra Nutley, Huw Davies, and 
Isabel Walter (2003) and William Solesbury (2001) point out that a pragmatist stance 
was intended to mark a shift in the nature of politics, that is, the end of ideologically 
or “conviction” driven politics, as well as herald a new age in policy making, at least 
in the United Kingdom setting. In the United Kingdom Labour Government‟s vision, 
policy making should be based on the best available evidence. In addition, policy 
development should include rational analysis of the evidence about what was proven 
to be effective in addressing social problems (Nutley et al., 2003).  
In a BBC broadcast, Geoff Mulgan (2001b) explained: 
Scientific knowledge in all its forms is now much more explicitly part of the 
governing process and there‟s a very important reason for that. We have seen a 
reducing role for ideology, the conviction politics of both the 70s and the 80s 
has gone into decline and knowledge about what works has, to some extent, 
filled that space and therefore there is more of a demand for objective and 
neutral analysis and feedback in terms of what is happening in relation to 
policies. 
Recognition that social scientific knowledge should „compete‟ (Nutley, 2003:4) with 
other forms of science, knowledge, and interests exists among proponents of 
evidence-based policy. Nevertheless, the focus of evidence-based policy remains on 
science, coupled with rigorous analysis in policy practice. The idea of evidence 
follows from this, with its use rooted in a presupposition of what constitutes the best 
scientific approach for finding out and expressing how things work. Since the 
conception of evidence appears to be the antithesis of social rationality, use of the 
concept has been taken as signifying a renascent rationality project. Wayne Parsons 
(2002:3), for example, says that:  
… despite the rhetoric of … „modernisation‟, a return to the old time religion: 
better policy making was policy making predicated on improvements to 
instrumental rationality.… In this respect EBPM [Evidence Based Policy 
Making] marks not so much a step forward as a step backwards: a return to the 
quest for a positivist yellow brick road…. 
The next section looks at the use made of the conception of evidence for policy 
purposes.  
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Use of the conception of evidence  
Central to understanding evidence-based approaches in general is the question of 
“what constitutes evidence?” There are a variety of ways to answer this question, 
ranging from general conceptions of evidence to conceptions that are highly specific. 
Common conceptions of evidence are associated with notions of proof, rationality, 
and justification. In answering the question in a general way, the term “evidence” can 
refer to that which provides a ground for a belief, theory or decision, that is, evidence 
for something. It can also refer to information bearing on the truth or falsity of 
something claimed to be the case - that is, evidence of something (Miller & 
Fredericks, 2003). In addition, as defined in the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy 
(Mautner, 2000:184) the term “evidence” can also refer to the „quality of obviousness, 
intuitive certainty‟. 
In their discussion of evidence in relation to decision-making contexts such as 
medicine and policy, Mark Dobrow, Vivek Goel, and Ross Upshur (2004) identify 
two contrasting orientations in determining what constitutes evidence. Firstly, they 
refer to a philosophical-normative stance. This orientation is about addressing: „what 
sources of evidence would be most ideal for justifying a decision‟ (Dobrow, et al., 
2004:208). A philosophical-normative stance focuses on the characteristics and 
properties of evidence, for instance, on validity and reliability in order, they argue, to: 
„establish the appropriateness and credibility of specific types of evidentiary sources 
for supporting decisions‟ (Dobrow, et al., 2004:208). From this stance, determining 
what constitutes evidence is a function of the quality of the evidence, based on the 
assumption that „higher quality evidence should lead, in turn, to higher quality 
decisions‟ (Dobrow et al., 2004:208). In their view, a philosophical-normative 
orientation restricts thinking on evidence to narrowly defined scientific evidence. 
Secondly, Dobrow et al., (2004:209) refer to a practical-operational stance. This 
stance is context based, that is, the specific decision-making context is integral to 
defining evidence. A practical-operational orientation suggests evidence can be 
subjective, have an emergent and provisional nature, and be incomplete or 
inconclusive (Dobrow et al., 2004:209). They also suggest that what constitutes 
evidence is less defined by qualities and more by „relevance, applicability or 
generalisability to a specific context‟ (Dobrow et al., 2004:209). This orientation 
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avoids a narrow determination of what constitutes evidence implying more leeway 
when thinking has to adapt to the contextual features of the action environment.  
A repudiation of opinion 
The United Kingdom Labour Government adopted the conception of evidence in use 
in medical science as the benchmark for their support of evidence-based policy. 
Evidence-based medicine is centred on the justification of decisions defined as: „… 
the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients‟ (Evidence-Based Medicine Working 
Group, 1992, cited in Dobrow et al., 2004:207). The conception of evidence 
associated with evidence-based medicine, not surprisingly, reflects the demarcation 
between knowledge and opinion. Evidence in the sense of “intuitive certainty” is 
eschewed: 
… evidence developed through systematic and methodological rigorous 
clinical research, emphasising the use of science while deemphasising the use 
of intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, patient and professional values, 
and patho-physiologic rationale (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 
1992, cited in Dobrow et al., 2004:207).  
Post 1992, the United Kingdom Labour Government introduced a working definition 
of evidence-based policy, which dominates the way evidence-based policy has been 
disseminated and understood in policy discourse. This working definition has two 
main aspects to consider. The first, as shown in Figure 2, is the aspect that defines the 
overall approach as “evidence-based”.  
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Figure 2: Evidence at the heart of policy development 
Source: United Kingdom Government Social Research
3
 
The United Kingdom Labour Government defined an evidence-based policy approach 
as: „putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of policy 
development and implementation‟ (Davies, 2004:3). Emphasis is on the integration of 
professional judgement, experience and expertise with the use of valid, reliable, 
credible, and relevant research evidence while cognisant that other factors come to 
bear when policy is determined
4
.  
What this definition means in practice is shown by the second aspect in Figure 3. 
Consistent with the determination of what passes as convincing evidence in the 
evidence-based medicine approach, the United Kingdom Labour Government‟s 
definition distinguishes between unfounded opinion and evidence. The net effect in 
principle is close to a repudiation of ways of paying attention to issues that could be 
categorised as non-scientific or not scientific enough. As Philip Davies (2006) has 
indicated, the sheer uncertainty of unscientific knowledge counts such knowledge out 
of the picture. The distinction he makes between opinion-based and evidence-based 
policy is drawn in stark terms
5
: 
                                               
3 http://www.gsr.gov.uk 
4 http://www.policyhub.gov.uk 
5 http://www.policyhub.gov.uk 
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The opinion and judgement of experts that are based upon up-to-date scientific 
research constitute high quality valid and reliable evidence. Those opinions 
that are not based upon scientific evidence, but are unsubstantiated, subjective 
and opinionated viewpoints do not constitute high quality, valid and reliable 
evidence. 
Opinion, common sense, intuition, experiential or craft knowledge, for example, are 
implicated in poor quality evidence. As well, much of the evidence provided by civil 
society groups, community leaders, individuals, citizens, indigenous peoples, for 
example, is seen to lack credibility unless their information and ideas offer: „a clear 
line of argument; tried and tested analytical methods; analytical rigour maintained 
throughout processes of data collection and analysis, and clear presentation of the 
conclusions‟ (Sutchcliffe & Court, 2005:4).  
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Figure 3: Reducing use of opinion in policy development 
Source: United Kingdom Government Social Research 
This is not saying that people‟s views are ignored. Rather people‟s views are a source 
of experiential evidence. The use of different methods for understanding different 
stakeholder perspectives and to provide evidence of how policy affects people‟s daily 
lives is a necessary and central feature of policy analysis (Davies, 2006). However, 
what is prominent is fear of the perceived downside of opinion - dubious decisions 
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based on hunches, spurious beliefs, speculation and bias, for example. This fear, it 
seems, outweighs fear of the downside of rational analysis - the production of 
ramifying effects and changes unable to be controlled, managed, or understood 
expressed in the forces-of-change argument.  
The graphic above in Figure 3 of evidence as insulating policy analysis from opinion 
is one that informs many accounts of evidence-based policy that stem from the United 
Kingdom Government‟s dissemination of its model. The rational retreat from opinion 
has been accompanied by a strand in the discourse that impugns, sometimes mocks, 
even denigrates what may fall under the rubric of “opinion”. For instance, Geoff 
Mulgan (2003a), when Director of the United Kingdom Prime Minister‟s Strategy 
Unit, rehearsed the key message of the eschewal of opinion that underscores 
evidence-based policy in a graphic at the end of a power point presentation Evidence 
and strategy: UK lessons, shown in Figure 4 below. In this particular illustration the 
type of opinion to be avoided in policy is that of spurious convictions held by 
decision-makers.  
 
- 47 -
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time”
Chamberlain,1938
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“It’s delicious…there is 
no cause for concern”
Gummer, 1990
“Anyone who thinks 
the ANC will rule South Africa 
is living in cloud cuckoo land”
Thatcher,1987
 
Figure 4: Evidence insulating policy from opinion 
Source: Mulgan (2003a) 
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This discourse is said by Rudolf Klein (2003:429) to be based on a platitude: „The 
platitude is that policy should be informed by evidence. Who could possibly 
disagree?‟ Frequently, found in the evidence-based policy literature and often used to 
explain evidence-based policy, are certain stock remarks which are used to refer to 
ways of knowing that are not scientific or scientific enough. This sceptical strand of 
discourse, moreover, purports that the reason why policies fail or have unintended 
repercussions and consequences, is due to non-scientific elements crowding out 
rigorous science from policy development (United Nations Educational, Science and 
Cultural Organisation, 2006).  
By way of example, a cull of the literature from a variety of sources includes the 
following stock remarks. 
Governments have become ravenous for information and evidence. A few may 
rely on gut instincts, astrological charts or yesterday‟s focus groups. But most 
recognise that their success … now depends on much more systematic use of 
knowledge than it did in the past (Mulgan, 2003b). 
As for the absence of analytical rigour, it leaves the field open for prejudice, 
dogma, and spurious “common sense” (United Nations Educational, Science 
and Cultural Organisation, 2005:742). 
Without evidence, policy makers must fall back on intuition, ideology, or 
conventional wisdom – or, at best, theory alone. And many policy decisions 
have indeed been made in those ways. But the resulting policies can go 
seriously astray, given the complexities and interdependencies in our society 
and economy (Banks, 2009:3).  
Data deficiencies inhibit evidence-based analysis for obvious reasons. They 
can also lead to reliance on „quick and dirty‟ surveys, or the use of focus 
groups.… They have a purpose, but I think it is a more superficial one, better 
directed at informing marketing than analysing potential policy impacts 
(Banks, 2009:11). 
[Education] is too important to allow it to be determined by unfounded 
opinion, whether of politicians, teachers, researchers or anyone else (EBE 
Network, as cited in Biesta, 2007:4). 
However, without analysis, important policy choices are based on hunches and 
guesses – sometimes with regrettable results (Walker, 2000:11). 
Social policies and strategies have often been devised and enacted without the 
benefit of systematic inquiry. Initiatives frequently go awry, or have 
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unintended consequences. This is the craft model of practice at work, based on 
intuition and guesswork, rather than inquiry (Salmond, 2003:1). 
The United Kingdom model, it seems, evokes an attitude towards the types and 
hierarchy of evidence.  
Hierarchy of evidence 
Consistent with the marginalisation of opinion in policy, a significant proportion of 
the evidence-based policy literature is devoted to questions about the rigour of 
research, what counts as credible evidence produced from research, and the need (or 
not) for standard criteria for research quality. This aspect of the literature can be 
viewed as the expression of a formal attitude towards those methodologies considered 
not capable of proof that something works, that is, methodologies that are viewed as 
not scientific enough. In the evidence frame, qualitative methodologies fit this 
category. Although, as Head (2010:17) notes, „the central agencies have recognized 
that qualitative studies are important, provided they are conducted with appropriate 
methodological rigour‟, qualitative researchers are under pressure to increase the 
reliability and validity of their findings (Morse 2006b:4; Denzin, 2009). Viewed as 
having a much greater propensity for bias (opinion creeping in) than inquiry in the 
positivist tradition, the interpretative tradition of qualitative inquiry, it seems, does not 
have the confidence of reformist evidence-based governments.  
The insistence described above on positivist approaches as the benchmark for best 
available evidence has resulted in a hierarchy of evidence, methodologies, and of 
expert opinion. Within the social sciences academic community, however, talk in 
these terms has provoked controversy, as shown by the recent phase of debates in the 
literature (Biesta, 2007; Denzin, 2009; Donaldson et al., 2009; Morse, 2006a; 
Stronach, Piper & Piper, 2004). At the top end of the putative hierarchy, the “hard” 
positivist sciences are placed, while “soft” social sciences are at the bottom end. In 
this milieu, what appears to be intractable is the degree of scepticism expressed about 
whether interpretative qualitative inquiry can deliver methodological rigour (cf. 
Morse, 2006a). Since evidence-based policy posits a fixed hierarchy for the value of 
evidence, which then reproduces the primary elements of the rationality project and a 
policy practice that is subjected to it, it is difficult to see how such best practice in 
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policy analysis, if adhered to, could orchestrate innovation and the finding of new 
solutions in the process of policy analysis problem solving.  
The above discussion has been about systematic inquiry. Within this though, it is clear 
that how citizens think about policy issues is not adequately attended to or properly 
understood – even at the stage of discussion, debate, and argument. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, this is because of the way evidence is defined; secondly, 
because methodological rigour presupposes what can count as useful evidence; 
thirdly, because of the rift between what is considered opinion and what is considered 
knowledge, and fourthly, because of lingering attitudes that impugn non-scientific 
thinking. I propose that this lacuna becomes particularly problematic when it comes to 
solving complex, intractable and “wicked” problems. But to embrace understanding 
of this kind, the problem solving process would have to be bound closely to the real 
concerns and viewpoints of citizens. From this viewpoint, complexity capability must 
be implicated in social rationality. It is in this direction that arguments about how to 
effectively address “wicked” problems point.  
“Wicked” or complex social policy problems 
In this section I concentrate on the original argument of “wicked” problems advanced 
by the system thinkers Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (1973) from the University of 
California, Berkeley, in order to develop the notions of social processes and 
rationality introduced above. According to Rittel and Webber (1973), the kind of 
knowledge at which policy makers have to aim is found in social processes and the 
rationality of stakeholders and citizens. Rittel and Webber‟s (1973) assessment of the 
difficulties with conventional professional practice in fields such as planning and 
policy analysis can be read as an exposition of what any form of rationality (scientific, 
social, personal) must contend with in the process of coming to know the particular 
complexities that may surround a policy question. The work of Rittel and Webber is 
treated as a primary resource for academics and policy practitioners presently 
exploring the characteristics of “wicked” or complex problems and the challenges 
they pose in contemporary policy making (Australian Public Service Commission, 
2007; Chapman, 2010; Head & Alford, 2008; Roberts, 2000; also Fischer, 1993; 
Innes, 1996; Mason & Mitroff, 1981).  
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The basic argument 
In their paper, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, Rittel and Webber 
(1973:155) summarised the problem of “wickedness” as follows:  
The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is 
bound to fail, because of the nature of these problems. They are “wicked” 
problems, whereas science has developed to deal with “tame” problems. 
Policy problems cannot be definitively described. Moreover, in a pluralistic 
society there is nothing like the undisputable public good; there is no objective 
definition of equity; policies that respond to social problems cannot be 
meaningfully correct or false; and it makes no sense to talk about “optimal 
solutions” to social problems unless severe qualifications are imposed first. 
Even worse, there are no “solutions‟ in the sense of definitive and objective 
answers.  
“Tame” or as Rittel and Webber imply, “tamed” problems, are straightforward insofar 
as they are amenable to standard analytical approaches used to structure the way 
problems are understood and ultimately how they are responded to. The argument of 
“wicked” problems, in contrast, starts from a view that there is a class of problems 
that are not so amenable to analysis. Problems in this class are not so „definable, 
understandable and consensual‟ (Rittel & Webber, 1973:156) because they manifest a 
combination of and sometimes all, of the following features as identified by Rittel and 
Webber (1973, 161-167). In brief: 
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem. 
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad or, more 
likely, better or worse. 
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem. 
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a „one-shot‟; because there is no 
opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly. 
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) 
set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible 
operations that may be incorporated into the plan. 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem. 
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9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be 
explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature 
of the problem‟s resolution. 
10. The planner has no right to be wrong. 
Rittel and Webber‟s argument directs attention to three focal elements: plurality, 
ethics and, as well, to the “new thinking” encompassed by the sciences „of the 1990s‟ 
mentioned by Lubchenco (1998:495) in her address to the AAAS. Each of these 
elements is discussed in more detail below to further the argument that complexity 
capability in evidence-based policy analysis is limited. 
Plurality 
The word “plurality”, as used by Rittel and Webber, has affinities with early 
pragmatist thought as well as being synonymous with contemporary usages of the 
word “complexity”. In Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking (1907) 
and A Pluralistic Universe (1909) James argued that the world is not a closed and 
finished universe but an open and evolving multiverse. The human experience is of 
disconnection and various kinds of unity and interconnectedness in a world of flux. 
Forces of pluralism involve not just numbers (“more than one” or “a multitude”) but 
also: uncertainty; novelty; ambiguity; dynamic interdependencies; and an increasing 
variety or diversity in society (see Bernstein, 1997 for an account of pluralism as a 
theme in pragmatist thought). This insight provided by plurality, namely, of the 
pervasive multitude and variety in social contexts - for example, the variety in and 
differentiation between groups, perspectives, understandings, interests, intentions, 
types of thinking, values, meanings, lifestyles and experiences of personal life - 
means, as a matter of practicality, that neither is there nothing like just one experience 
or unitary opinion or unique view, nor is there nothing like unique correct definitive 
solutions to problems in the social context (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
James‟ (1890) argument in The Importance of Individuals offers further insight to the 
pluralist line of thought. James (cited in Haack, 2010:3) observed that „the preferences 
of sentient creatures create the importance of topics‟. He also said: „the zone of the 
individual differences and of the social “twists” which … they initiate, is the zone of 
formative processes‟. Hence (and here I follow Haack, 2010:4), James points to the 
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relations between many points of view or opinions as significant since among these 
we see “wicked” problems (social twists) „in the making‟. With this view a “wicked” 
problem can be thought of as a manifestation of a particular instance of social 
complexity. Moreover, since policy analysis is a practice in this peopled context 
where complexity, the winding of diverse views about one another, is in the making, 
there are also ethical issues to consider.  
Ethics 
When Rittel and Webber (1973) coined the term “wicked problems”, they meant 
„tricky (like a leprechaun) ... vicious (like a circle) ... or aggressive (like a lion, in 
contrast to the docility of a lamb)‟ (Rittel & Webber, 1973:160). Their use of the 
word “wicked” was intended to signify both the nature of the difficulties “wicked” 
problems presented to policy makers and a moral or ethical imperative to act 
responsibly and treat “wicked” problems for what they are. They convey a key 
message through their personification of wickedness: Handling a lion requires a 
different approach from handling a lamb - „it becomes morally objectionable for the 
planner to treat a wicked problem as though it were a tame one, or to tame a wicked 
problem prematurely, or to refuse to recognise the inherent wickedness of social 
problems‟ (Rittel & Webber, 1973:161).  
Of the ten features of “wicked” problems identified by Rittel and Webber listed 
above, the tenth is a reference to the ethical component made explicit in their 
argument. Rittel and Webber point out that policy practitioners who act as „applied 
scientists‟ (Rittel & Webber, 1973:160) work under a set of constraints that differ 
from those who operate in a science context. In view of those constraints, Rittel and 
Webber argue that the ability of policy professionals to solve problems in the way 
scientists can solve their problems is called into question. As they explain: 
It is a principle of science that solutions to problems are only hypotheses 
offered for refutation … based on the insight that there are no proofs to 
hypotheses, only potential refutations. The more a hypothesis withstands 
numerous attempts at refutation, the better its „corroboration‟ is considered to 
be. Consequently, the scientific community does not blame its members for 
postulating hypotheses that are later refuted (Rittel & Webber, 1973:166-167). 
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In other words, the scientist “doing science” has the right to be wrong. Peirce (1898) 
made a similar argument in his Cambridge Conferences Lectures, Philosophy and the 
Conduct of Life in so far as he speaks of the ideal condition of the scientific man: 
Its [science] accepted propositions, therefore, are but opinions, at most; and 
the whole list is provisional. The scientific man is not in the least wedded to 
his conclusions. He risks nothing upon them. He stands ready to abandon one 
or all as soon as experience opposes them. Some of them, I grant, he is in the 
habit of calling established truths; … Still, it may be refuted tomorrow; and if 
so the scientific man will be glad to have got rid of an error (Peirce, cited in 
Stewart, 1993:135-136). 
Being “wrong” is viewed as integral to the scientific pursuit of truth. In contrast, for 
the policy professional “doing policy” the aim, as Rittel and Webber (1973:167) put 
it, is „to improve some characteristics of the world where people live‟. The fifth 
feature of “wicked” problems identified by Rittel and Webber, that is, what they refer 
to as the “one-shot”, establishes a significant constraint on the right to be wrong in 
professional policy practice: „every implemented solution is consequential. It leaves 
“traces” that cannot be undone … many people‟s lives will have been irreversibly 
influenced‟ (Rittel & Webber, 1973:163). Unintended repercussions and 
consequences of the actions that professionals generate affect people in ways that 
matter.  
Impacts of implemented policy are not dispelled by processes of refutation; they are 
irreversible. In view of this situation, Rittel and Webber contend that the professional 
policy practitioner has no tolerable right to be wrong. However, this is a nuanced 
argument. Their contention is not the same as arguing that there is no right to make 
mistakes or mistakes are intolerable, since it is from mistakes that we learn. They 
argue that when professionals are alert to “wicked” problems and know that the 
„cognitive style of science‟ (Rittel & Webber, 1973:160) has not developed to deal 
with the forces of pluralism and may not be appropriate in particular circumstances, 
then, professionals are liable for the consequences of their doing. It would be a 
mistake to recognise their argument as one against positive science per se and the 
knowledge associated with its practice. Rittel and Webber argue for a relevant 
professional practice in a social context of complexity. And one that was ethically 
aware.  
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The concept of “wicked” problems links the idea of society to the idea of a dynamic 
interacting open system subject to the forces of plurality and change (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973:156). According to Rittel and Webber (1973:169), there is little in the 
application of traditional scientific thinking that can „dispel wickedness‟ which the 
forces of pluralism in society provoke. Since this is the case in their view, Rittel and 
Webber (1973:156) describe science meant for a world of closed systems as a „weak 
strut‟ in professional policy making. 
Without doubt the process of problem-solving establishes a public policy-science 
interface, yet, any conviction that the application of science automatically means good 
sense is made of a “wicked” problem is problematical. Linkages between the sciences 
and society and the interface between the different perspectives and activities of 
scientific or systematic research, politics, and policy analysis are implicated in 
questions of complexity capability and new thinking that are part of the rationale for 
evidence-based policy. In order to understand the contexts in which present day 
policy analysis encounters complexity I will first rehearse the idea of complexity 
capability. 
Complexity capability 
Everyday definitions of “complex” are relevant in policy contexts. As mentioned 
previously, these include things which are: opposed to simple; made up of various 
interconnected or interwoven parts, patterns or elements; hard to understand or 
analyse. In her discussion exploring the concepts of reality and thinking in The Life of 
the Mind, the political scientist Hannah Arendt (1978:51), referred to a tenet of 
Peirce‟s pragmatism: „reality is there even if we can never be certain that we know it‟. 
This insight of realness, namely, of „sheer thereness‟ (Arendt, 1978:51) applies to 
complexity acknowledged to be at the heart of policy making. In so far as complexity 
is something we experience in the operation of our thinking and in the contexts in 
which we act, and as invoked in policy practice, we can say complexity exits, 
practically in reality. 
Policy makers recognise that issues surrounding social policy questions are often 
complex. The issues interconnect and encapsulate the complexity of human behaviour 
(Davies, 2006; Mulgan, 2001a). In Brunner‟s (1991, 1997) account of the policy 
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movement, he notes that there are alternative views expressed about what might 
constitute “the common problem” of policy analysis when it comes to complexity in 
policy. According to Brunner (1991) there is a view that policy analysts lack 
satisfactory concepts or theory that might resolve increasingly complex problems, or 
alternatively, and the view Brunner (1991:67) subscribes to, is:  
Typically, as an analyst simplifies a policy problem, he or she misconstrues 
some important part of the context or overlooks it altogether. But what is 
overlooked or misconstrued in the analysis nevertheless affects outcomes in 
the real world … 
In this view, the realness of complexity is often realised in policy „in retrospect‟, in 
other words „after resources have been committed and the unintended and often 
adverse results start coming in‟ (Brunner, 1991:67). 
In policy, as in other fields, it is one thing to know that issues surrounding policy 
questions are complex, and another to know about the particular complexity at issue. 
From a policy practitioner perspective, the ability to know that there is complexity is 
not at stake. Davies (2006), who wrote under the auspices of the United Kingdom 
Government, for the Chief Social Researcher‟s Office in the Prime Minister‟s 
Strategy Unit of the Cabinet Office, loosely indicates the kind of complexity 
capability that is needed in policy. Crucial for policy, he states, is the capability, first 
of all, „to know about this complexity‟ (Davies, 2006:102), that is, to know of the 
particular complexity. Next, and equally as important is the ability to have insight to 
respond to „it effectively and efficiently‟ (Davies, 2006:102). In pursuit of such 
knowledge and insight a question of the “how to” kind arises: how to pay attention to 
context and to what may be the particular complexity at hand before problems and 
solutions are defined, and resources are committed ( Brunner, 1991).  
Missing from among ideas about complexity capability in policy, however, is the idea 
of common sense-making as described by Peirce: the common, abductive capacity to 
complexly think and make our way, individually and together, in a world of 
complexity about which we are uncertain. To bear fruit, this embodied complexity 
capability does not require „expensive … instruments, but only careful attention to our 
everyday experiences‟ (Haack, n.d.:4). His argument is a counterargument to the idea 
that complexity engenders the necessity of opting for analytical rigour and rejecting 
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opinion, common sense, or intuition. Each has something important to offer to 
inquiry.  
Notwithstanding that the world is full of complexities, the main concern for policy 
analysts, and for the argument of this thesis, is how to know about the policy-relevant 
complexity of issues emanating from the social context. 
The literature debating the relationships between politics and policy analysis, theory 
and practice, belief and action, research and application in policy making is extensive. 
In this thesis, science, politics, and policy analysis are differentiated in simple terms. 
My aim is to convey a standard view of how these activities are defined in relation to 
each other in a context of public policy. In such a standard view, the three terms 
(science, politics, and policy analysis) may be described as follows: 
Science: the development, provision, or interpretation of scientific knowledge 
(objectively proven knowledge); information gathered in a rational, systematic, 
testable, and reproducible manner (Lackey, 2007). 
Politics: a collective, interest and value-laden process of conflict, debate, negotiation, 
deliberation, compromise, collaboration, decision and action. To cite Hannah Pitkin 
(1981:343), politics is “the activity through which relatively large and permanent 
groups of people determine what they collectively will do, settle how they will live 
together, and decide their future, to whatever extent this is within their power”. 
Policy analysis: a formal assessment of the possible options for addressing a policy 
problem, the consequences and implications, and the articulation of reasons for the 
recommended course of action in the social context (Lackey, 2007). 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the activities of science, politics, and policy analysis 
overlap. Complexity capability, characterised as knowing the particular complexity 
surrounding a policy question, is not restricted to any one sphere of activity. All three 
spheres share the predicaments of a common world marked by complexity and 
change. The question is whether traditions of systematic inquiry practiced in each 
sphere and overlapping at a nexus between each sphere, are adequate or sufficient.  
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This question, expressed in another way, is whether traditional science, with its 
criterion for analytical rigour, is capable of making a difference across all the spheres 
or whether the capability required at the nexus for seeing and becoming well enough 
acquainted with the issues that may in reality shape a complex policy problem is 
beyond the grasp of traditional science alone.  
My argument for a revalorization of opinion, alongside traditional scientific insights, 
is behind my claim that complexity capability at the nexus of science, policy, and 
politics needs to be differently enabled. In this regard, Rittel and Webber (1973) were 
early advocates for the need for so-called “new thinking” in policy contexts beyond 
the embrace of both Newtonian science and its characteristic simplifying assumptions 
and the Popperian version of “the logic of discovery”, that is hypothetico-deduction, 
that Popper argued, properly demarcates (scientific) knowledge from (unscientific) 
opinion. 
 
Figure 5: Three activities: science, politics, and policy analysis 
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New thinking 
“Wicked” problems resist analysis. To begin to remedy this situation requires a move 
from reductionist to holistic approaches. The new principles of thought evinced by 
“thinking in systems” or “thinking in complexity” are using a conception of an 
irreducible whole, such as a system, a complex, a network, or a web. These principles 
compel the development and use of methodological approaches that are incompatible 
with strict reductive, deterministic, predictive and objective science, and rational 
analysis. (See Capra, 1997; Checkland, 1981; Gershenson & Heylighen, 2005; 
Jackson, 2001). Rittel and Webber suggested that complex social problems could be 
tackled using a systems-based means of structuring discussion, debate, and argument. 
In their words: 
The systems-approach “of the first generation” is inadequate for dealing with 
wicked problems. Approaches “of the second generation” should be based on 
a model of planning as an argumentative process in the course of which an 
image of the problem and of the solution emerges gradually among the 
participants, as a product of incessant judgment, subjected to critical argument 
(Rittel & Webber, 1973:162). 
“First generation” is a reference to the “hard” positivist mode of systems thinking that 
preceded the emergence of “soft” systems thinking (Checkland, 1981). Traditional 
operations research and systems analysis are in this “hard” mode. The first generation 
of approaches proved successful within the fields of engineering and systems analysis 
but when extended to the social realm clear-cut success was elusive (Checkland, 
1981). The use of first generation approaches became a matter of concern and the 
subject of their use became a focus of research (see Checkland, 1981, who discusses 
the problem of first generation systems thinking in depth). An account of systems 
thinking is relevant at this point, in order to make better sense of what Rittel and 
Webber were arguing for. 
Systems thinking 
Systems thinkers point out that the methodologies associated with systems thinking 
were developed precisely to allow analysis of complex problems (Checkland, 1981; 
Jackson, 2001; Midgley, 2003; Ison & Stowell, 2001). There are three methodological 
streams of systems thinking involving three distinct rationales (Jackson, 2001). These 
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three methodological streams conform to the familiar modes of knowledge acquisition 
that are categorised positivist, interpretative, and critical (Checkland, 2000; Held, 
1980; Jackson, 2001). In the systems thinking literature, methods from all streams can 
be used to engender and structure discussion and debate while bearing in mind their 
different theoretical rationales and hence differentiated purpose (Checkland, 2000; 
Jackson, 2001; Lyons, 2005; Midgley, 2003). All three streams of methodologies use 
modelling techniques which draw upon system ideas. All three streams evince a 
melioristic stance and focus on improving specific real-world problem situations 
(Checkland, 1981; Jackson, 2001). In generic terms, the three methodologies referred 
to in the systems literature can be described as follows: 
“Hard” (functionalist) methodology is associated with positivism. The basic 
assumption is that systems are objective aspects of reality (the world is systemic). 
This approach involves quantitative analysis and the use of numerical models, for 
example, in the form of computer simulations, spread sheets, statistical analysis, large 
mathematical models or forecasting scenarios. The logical basis of the methodology is 
to work out the best way to achieve a goal, system design, and efficient and effective 
intervention. “Hard” systems methodology contributes to a positivist discourse of 
expertise, analytical rigour, and authoritative judgment. „Intervention is conducted on 
the basis of expert knowledge‟ (Jackson, 2001:241). 
“Soft” (interpretative) methodology is based on the assumption that the process of 
inquiry into a problematic situation can be organised as a system (inquiry is systemic). 
This approach involves qualitative analysis based on exploration and interrogation of 
people‟s perceptions. The approach involves, for example, the use of rich pictures, 
modelling by storytelling, and cognitive or dialogue mapping techniques. The logical 
basis of the methodology is to structure discussion and debate about situation 
improving changes which are feasible and desirable under changing circumstances. 
“Soft” systems methodology contributes to a discourse of shared understanding, 
consensus, participatory democracy, and learning (Checkland, 1981, 2000). 
„Intervention is conducted on the basis of stakeholder participation‟ (Jackson, 
2001:241). 
“Emancipatory” (radical) methodology is associated with critical theory. Work in the 
area of soft systems thinking has led to the development of what has become called 
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emancipatory systems thinking. Such thinking advocates the critical and 
complementary use of various systems approaches. Spearheaded by work of Werner 
Ulrich (1983), Robert Flood (1990), and Robert Flood and Michael Jackson (1991), 
this approach accommodates the knowledge-constitutive interests of Jürgen Habermas 
(1971) and the interpretive analytical orientations of Michel Foucault (1972) through 
a meta-methodology involving constant critical reflection (Laszlo & Krippner, 1998). 
The meta-methodology serves as the basis for the generation of a new methodology 
that critically applies various systems approaches encompassing “hard”, “soft”, 
“radical” and postmodern approaches to problem solving. In this approach, the 
presupposition is that not all have equal authority or power over the situation, with the 
potential for some to dominate and subordinate or marginalise the perspectives and 
interests of others. Analysis aims to reveal the pertinent issues and who is 
disadvantaged by current systemic arrangements. Modelling is used to reveal sources 
of alienation and disadvantage. The logical basis of the methodology is intervention to 
deal equitably and effectively with issues and suggest possible actions that will 
improve the position of those disadvantaged by the status quo. Emancipatory systems 
methodology contributes to a discourse of critical and social awareness, stakeholder 
participation, collaboration, and dialogue leading to radical social change. 
„Intervention is conducted in such a way that the alienated and/or disadvantaged begin 
to take responsibility for the process‟ (Jackson, 2001:241). 
Since the argument of wicked problems was first presented, further work in this area 
has led to an active interest in systems and complexity thinking combined with 
collaborative coping strategies as indicated, for example, by the Australian Public 
Service Commission‟s (2007) discussion document, Tackling Wicked Problems: A 
Public Policy Perspective. Mulgan (2001a:4) referring to the United Kingdom setting, 
noted a demand for systems thinking in government growing out of the recognition 
for „a more holistic understanding of phenomena‟. Support for systems thinking is 
evidenced by the promotion of systematic modeling in the United Kingdom 
Government report, Adding it Up (UK Cabinet Office, 2000). In an address to a 
gathering of the United Kingdom Systems Practice for Managing Complexity 
(SPMC) network (see Ison & Stowell, 2001), Mulgan (2001a) acknowledged that 
applying systems ideas was not widespread in government. In his assessment, the lack 
of widespread use of systems thinking in government could be attributed in the main 
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to the sunk costs in established ways of working; and also to concern about evidence. 
Mulgan (2001a:29) stressed the need in government for „theoretical reflections to be 
matched with rigorous applications of that theory‟. Again, methodological rigour 
matters.  
To elaborate, policy thinking in evidence mode affords primacy to one general 
methodology, that is, one set of principles of policy method for the process of policy 
development and for looking at policy impacts whether or not problems are thought 
“tame” or “wicked”. The set of principles guides analytically rigorous policy practice 
that has at its heart the hypothetico-deductive scientific method. Policy practice, in the 
words of Gary Banks (2009:9), the head of the Australian Productivity Commission: 
„test[s] a theory or proposition as to why policy action will be effective - ultimately 
promoting community wellbeing - with the theory also revealing what impacts of the 
policy should be observed if it is to succeed‟. The argument concerning wicked 
problems, however, would seem to suggest that this form of capability and expertise 
differs from and is contrary to the kind of complexity capability that is needed for 
intractable situations.  
To clarify further the problematic of “tame” (hard, positivistic) approaches to 
“wicked” (soft, intractable) problems and to draw to a close this critique of the 
evidence-based policy movement, I introduce in advance of the discussion of 
complexity thinking in the following chapter an argument drawn from the literature 
on complexity and issues of epistemology. This argument concerns the appropriate 
use of predictive modelling, especially computer modelling as the new tool for 
thought or so-called “third way” of doing science (Sanders & Mc Cabe, 2003). It is an 
argument that has relevance for policy-relevant research and analysis and has a 
bearing on my explanation of epistemological choice as a factor in both policy 
success and failure - which is the focus of my analysis of the Schiphol Airport case. 
The argument implies that when it comes to conditions of complexity, a new ethic 
conjoined with new thinking would need to be more broadly based than solely on 
deductive power and computational models, requiring a new rigour for understanding 
and innovation, not just explanation and prediction.  
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Modelling and prediction in a complex world 
Steven Bankes and Robert Lempert (2004:264-265) indicate a portrayal of rigorous 
predictive modelling (see Figure 6 below). According to Bankes and Lempert (2004), 
researchers who are aware of complexity, increasingly, are backing away from 
deductive modelling whereby the researcher starts with a model of a reality 
constructed in the first instance as intrinsically simple (see also Batty & Torrens, 
2005). Bankes and Lempert (2004:6) point out that a researcher treating such models 
as predictive may go on to commit an act of „invalid reasoning‟. The invalidity of 
reasoning arises in the act of conflating “properties true of the model” with 
“properties true of the actual system”. Donald Mikulechy (2005:343) has argued that 
a modelling relation of this type culminates in a loss of perspective since „the 
epistemology spills over into ontology‟. In other words, the complex real world 
becomes excluded to be replaced with paradigms and models (Mikulechy, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Predictive modelling 
Source: based on Bankes & Lempert (2004) 
 
Model prediction: 
Using the validated model as a prop for reasoning, 
discover properties true of the model 
Logic of prediction: 
Argue that the discovered properties are true of 
the actual system as well, based upon model 
validation 
Model validation: 
Discover a model that for the purposes it will be 
used is effectively equivalent to the system of 
interest 
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Peter Allen and Liz Varga (2007) make the same argument. Rather than gaining an 
accurate, as far as possible, reflection and correspondence with a complex real world 
situation, models move, increasingly, far from actual reality. They give the example 
of modelling an ecosystem using population dynamics. Figure 7 reproduces a diagram 
Allen and Varga (2007) use to show what happens when the computer is used as the 
new tool for thought in relation to complex phenomena, but used in the old way of 
scientific practice. Their example refers to an ecosystem model of interacting 
populations where, in the Figure, the computer manipulations of population data over 
time produce simplifications that do not reflect what happens in the real world.  
Algorithmically defined systems – a calibrated ecosystem - fed into the computer runs 
forward in time. Allen and Varga (2005:25) maintain: 
…that although the model was calibrated on what was happening at time t=0 it 
diverged from reality as time moved forward. The real ecosystem stayed 
complex, and indeed continued to adapt and change with its real environment. 
But this shows us that the mechanical representation of reality differs critically 
from that reality. Our “mechanistic epistemology” fails to represent reality!”  
‘Third way’ of doing science
P r o b l e m a t i c  o f  e v i d e n c e :  r e l i a b l e ? ,  v a l i d ? ,  c r e d i b l e ?
 
Figure 7: Modeling relation 
Source: based on Allen & Varga (2007:25) 
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On a continuum 
A duality is in play. Whereas coping with the forces of change afforded a rationale for 
analytically driven solutions in a context of complexity, the argument of “wicked” 
problems provides a rationale for the use of the “softer” processes of inquiry. More 
specifically, along with the replacement of reductionism with holism, the “softer” 
modes of systems thinking method bring subjective processes to bear on a particular 
problem; open discussion facilitates social explanation of the problem, and what 
comes to be taken as knowledge emerges from the discursive interaction of analysts, 
stakeholders or citizens, and decision makers (Checkland, 1981; Fischer, 1998). As 
reflected in the Australian Public Service Commission‟s (2007:iii) statement, 
„tackling wicked problems is an evolving art‟, this alternative way of working gives 
shape to a less formal policy practice whereby knowledge is conceived broadly and 
can be subjected to negotiation (see Deelstra, Nooteboom, Kohlmann, van den Berg 
& Innanen, 2003). Rationality is defined more in subjective and intersubjective terms 
with emphasis, for example, on insights, shared understandings, creative and 
innovative thinking, and learning.  
Overall, this chapter has suggested that evidence-based policy is a framework for 
thinking about policy and practice, which promotes a stance in which two 
epistemological poles - the evidence or high quality, reliable knowledge pole is 
juxtaposed with the opinion or low quality, unreliable knowledge pole. These poles 
define the ends of an epistemological spectrum of sources of “credible” knowledge 
expressed below in Figure 8.  
This spectrum can be viewed in terms of the relationship of knowledge and rationality 
to evidence-based policy. The means by which knowledge can be held and expressed 
ranges from the experiential, subjective opinions and judgments of citizens - the zone 
of intuition, common sense, hunches and guesses - through to the zone of scientific 
analytic rigour and reliable and valid knowledge, which is expressed in quantitative 
form, by experts and specialists. The acquisition of knowledge is characterised by a 
combination of elements that are shown in the list below the continuum in the 
diagram. In light of the use made of the conception of evidence in evidence-based 
policy, moving  from left (evidence) to right (opinion), through all the possible 
epistemological demarcations that could figure on the continuum (for example 
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positivism, interpretivism, critical theory, common sense-making), at some point on 
the spectrum how knowledge is looked at changes from “scientific” to “not scientific 
enough”. In that change, complexity and analytic capabilities are mutually implicated 
in so far as a gain to whatever degree of capacity in one brings a loss to whatever 
degree of capacity in the other. Broadly, referring to the spectrum, complexity 
capability expressed as knowing the issues surrounding a policy question in social 
context emerges to the right and analytic capability defined by positivism emerges to 
the left. 
 
 
Figure 8: Epistemological poles of credible knowledge 
It seems appropriate, and timely, at this epistemological juncture to introduce Q 
methodology in action. The process of raising and discussing policy thinking and 
complexity capability is designed to highlight the space in which, I contend, Q 
methodology can emerge as a plausible alternative to those modes of knowledge 
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favoured by evidence-based policy thinking. A view of the efficacy of Q 
methodology, even ahead of my explanation of what it is and how it works, can be 
seen in the specific case of the controversy surrounding the planning for a fifth 
runway for Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. This case serves as a clear illustration of the 
differences implicated in making choices between two epistemological alternatives.  
At the core of policy analysis is interest in the determination of a public course of 
action. How to put into effect a decided course of action is also of interest. What 
matters is that the problematical situation is improved; not exacerbated. Policy 
practitioners are taught that to practice professionally is to engage in rational, 
systematic problem-solving activity. Sound policy analysis is inextricably linked to 
the ability to frame an issue, gather, and analyse information in such a way that joins 
theory and evidence to structure a feasible and helpful response (Weimer & Vining, 
1999). Yet, as Michel van Eeten (2001:392) observes: 
Policy analysts have great difficulty handling uncertain, complex, and 
polarized issues with conventional methods. Increasingly, policy analysts and 
public managers turn to varying types of stakeholder involvement to improve 
their understanding of the dilemmas and the feasible responses. Their hope is 
that stakeholder involvement will enable them to recast the issues into a more 
amenable, policy relevant form that provides a basis for action. 
An implication of scientific paradigmatic thinking embodied in a policy analysis 
project is that explanation supplants understanding as a means of making sense of 
issues. As a consequence, the problematical nature of a policy situation can be 
exacerbated as was the case with the long-standing Amsterdam Schiphol Airport 
runway expansion controversy.  
The idea expressed by the United Nations Educational, Science and Cultural 
Organisation (2006) forum on the social science-policy nexus that only a rigorous 
analysis can provide the means necessary for the determination of sound policy 
accords with a central tenet of policy analysis. The tenet, succinctly stated, is “look 
before you leap”, that is, know what you are getting into before you commit, and 
consider the possible consequences before acting. A rigorous analysis stands as a 
procedure for explanation. Just as a rigorous analysis closes the door to prejudice, 
dogma and spurious common sense suggested by the United Nations Educational, 
Science and Cultural Organisation forum, it can also close the door on understanding; 
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on “seeing” the situation as it is. When policy situations are experienced as uncertain, 
complex, and intractable, rigorously derived explanations alone do not help. 
Explanations are assumed to convey understanding of the particular situation. 
However, it is possible to have an explanation without having an understanding 
occurring, a situation that teachers, for instance, would know. Conversely, it is 
possible to understand a situation without having an explanation that can account for 
or determine it. Being able to see what will solve the problem can happen regardless 
of explanation.  
The Schiphol Airport expansion controversy is an example of an intractable policy 
situation that was resistant to the hypothetico-deductive paradigm that governs most 
evidence-based policy analysis but was susceptible to an analysis grounded in 
understanding how stakeholders thought about the problem.  
Case description – a fifth runway for Schiphol Airport 
Controversy surrounding the fifth runway (from 1995) 
Plans for a fifth runway for Schiphol Airport were described by a journalist for FLUG 
Revue as having „always been an explosive political issue‟ (Rodenbücher, 2000:2). 
Analysis and decision making fuelled controversy in a drawn out attempt to produce a 
strategic plan for the long term development of the Airport. Controversy and political 
conflict was sustained until the problem ceased to be treated as a tame one and a 
change in practice and method enabled the problem to be approached in a “wicked” 
way (Deelstra et al., 2003; Kwakkel, 2008; Walker, 2000; van Eeten, 1999, 2001).  
The core of the expansion controversy was the effort to balance the relationship 
between the economic importance of Schiphol Airport and the environmental impact 
of increasing air traffic. The controversy emerged from the tight coupling that exists 
between growth in air traffic and detrimental environmental impacts such as noise 
pollution, gas emissions, and other attendant health and safety risks. Airports 
effectively “bring home” this tight coupling. In immediate ways, people living in the 
vicinity of an airport experience the existence of this connection understand what it 
means in their corner of the world, and respond. Settings and circumstances may vary, 
but airports around the world replicate, or are capable of replicating, the tight 
coupling that exists at the moment between civil aviation and the quality of its 
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environs. To the extent that this connection is stable and definitely known it is not 
surprising that plans for airport expansion would foster controversy; certainly if the 
airport is close to densely populated centres (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, 1998). 
In contrast, loose coupling exists between the benefits that might accrue to a national 
economy and growth in air traffic capacity. Settings and circumstance do make a 
difference with other factors susceptible to change influencing the immediate 
relationship. The nature of the connection is less emphatic, more uncertain. Equally, it 
would be reasonable to expect controversy could be fuelled should the economy not 
reflect the claims of national economic benefit made to justify a specific expansion. 
From the early 1990s, world air traffic had undergone rapid growth. Schiphol had 
evolved as a European hub airport, that is, a facility for passengers to transfer to or 
from onward flights. Due to a small domestic market, the airport strategic plan 
centered on tapping into the significantly larger transfer market as the mainstay of the 
airport‟s operations.  
Schiphol‟s original layout was four runways in a tangent so that regardless of wind 
direction at least one runway could be used for landing and take-off. Owing to its hub 
status, Schiphol Airport needed to handle incoming and outgoing air traffic 
simultaneously. With four runways Schiphol Airport operated a two-and-one system. 
First, two runways were used for landing and one for take-off, and then the pattern 
shifted to two for take-off and one for landing. However, due to North Sea weather 
conditions (westerly winds), often the airport was reduced to using only two runways 
reducing capacity and efficiency. The addition of a fifth runway, according to the 
airport authorities, would give capacity to operate three out of five runways 
simultaneously and increase air traffic from 460,000 movements annually to between 
520,000-600,000. In 2003, more than 30 years after planning started, and eight years 
after The Netherland‟s Government finally gave the go-ahead, Amsterdam Schiphol 
Airport‟s fifth runway was opened. 
The period of interest in this case is from 1995. By this time it became obvious that 
the policy process was not working smoothly or effectively: controversy continued to 
build around both the policy analysis and the way knowledge was used to inform 
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policy development. By 1995 public debate had polarised for and against further 
growth and decision-making was in an impasse (Deelstra et al., 2003; Walker, 2000; 
van Eeten, 2001). In 1995 matters came to a head when The Netherlands Parliament 
ratified the Government‟s White Paper on the future of Schiphol. The White Paper 
allowed for the construction of Schiphol‟s fifth runway with provisos. The planning 
period was 20 years (from 1995 till 2015) (Kwakkel, 2008). Known as the “double 
decision”, the plan was that an expanded runway would bring more flights and less 
noise disturbance while making an important contribution to the economy. Informing 
this belief was a model developed by The Netherlands Central Planning Bureau 
(CPB) (Walker & Marchau, 2003:3). The model assumed that the number of 
passengers passing through Schiphol was directly related to the value of The 
Netherlands Gross Domestic Product (Walker & Marchau, 2003). A constraint was 
imposed on the growth of the airport which limited the maximum volume of 
passengers and cargo per year (culminating in the maximum of 40-45 million 
passengers by 2015). Noise pollution was also subject to regulation with the 
specification of stringent noise limits. But, van Eeten (2000:44) points out, even at the 
time the plan was published it was clear that air traffic was growing faster than the 
models in use predicted (volumes in passenger and cargo had already reached the 
predicted volumes for 2004) threatening the implementation of stringent noise limits. 
At the same time the benefits of national economic growth appeared over-estimated. 
As it happened, the limits of the noise regulations were reached in 1999 (Walker & 
Marchau, 2003:3), leading to a temporary shutdown of the airport, and the maximum 
passenger limit was reached in 2005. According to Jan Kwakkel, Warren Walker, and 
Vincent Marchau (2007:39), whose interest is in the area of airport strategic planning 
and dealing with attendant uncertainties, such „demand forecasts are practically 
always wrong‟ and „often near impossible to implement‟.  
The need for the fifth runway was disputed by environmental groups and the local 
population, who had „no faith‟ (Deelstra et al., 2003:533) in the predictions, 
questioning the computer model-based analysis used to inform decision making and 
public debate. It appears that was the case from the outset, even before the predictive 
knowledge was shown to be inadequate (Deelstra et al., 2003). 
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Reanalysis  
The Netherlands Government had to reassess and redefine its civil aviation policy 
through a deliberative process with stakeholders (van Eeten, 2000; Walker, 2000). 
Hence, in 1996, the TNLI policy analysis project (Toekomstige Nederlandse 
Luchtvaart Infrastructuur or Future of Dutch Civil Aviation Infrastructure) was 
initiated. Involving three ministries (the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management; the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, and 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs), the TNLI policy project was to address the policy 
question: 
The demand for infrastructure for civil aviation transport in the Netherlands 
may continue to increase. Activities related to civil aviation have social, 
economic, safety, environmental, spatial, accessibility, and cost consequences. 
The question the nation must answer is whether or not to accommodate the 
demand in light of these consequences, and, if so, how (Walker, 2000:19). 
The TNLI project commissioned a policy analysis study by RAND Europe 
(European-American Center for Policy Analysis). RAND Europe‟s brief was firstly to 
look at future developments of demand and capacity of air transport, and secondly, to 
consider alternative infrastructure options that could be implemented. In addition, a 
cost/benefit analysis was required (Walker, 2000). RAND Europe carried out a “hard” 
systems impact assessment study, with computer-based forecasting and the creation of 
scenarios as the main analytical tools. This computer model-based policy analysis was 
carried out in conformity with conventional best practice policy analysis procedures. 
The problem to be addressed had been identified, objectives were specified, criteria 
with which to measure alternative policies were determined, options for consideration 
selected, analysed and then compared in terms of projected costs and benefits (see 
Walker, 2000; RAND Europe, 1997). Warren Walker (2000) presents the RAND 
Europe approach detailing how their conventional policy analysis, „based on the 
scientific method‟ (Walker, 2000:12), using a “hard” systems approach provided for a 
structured, rational, objective analytical process whereby policy choice „based on 
hunches and guesses‟ (Walker, 2000:11) was avoided.  
This reanalysis is the first analytical event, carried out during the period August 1995-
October 1996 (Walker, 2000). Publications by RAND Europe and Walker (co-
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authored) are drawn on for the outline that follows (RAND Europe, 1997a, RAND 
Europe, 1997b; Rahman, 1997; Walker, 2000; Walker, Harremoes, Rotmans, van der 
Sluijs, van Asselt, Janssen & Krayer von Krauss, 2003; Walker & Marchau, 2003). 
Applied systems science 
RAND Europe brought systems thinking and a model-based approach to bear on the 
Schiphol Airport expansion issue. RAND Europe‟s interpretation of the situation and 
the problem as framed drew attention to a policymaking process hamstrung by 
uncertainty because of the increasing complexity of an unpredictable, rapidly 
changing world. From their systems stance, a central question was how to deal with 
uncertainty about the future and the unanticipated changes in the world that will affect 
the system of civil aviation policymaking. They argued that the existing policy 
paradigm assumes the future can be predicted at least well enough to make successful 
policies. Yet, such an assumption is no longer credible by virtue of the fact that often 
policies prove untenable with unimagined and serious effects. As a consequence, 
predictive approaches are not appropriate. Moreover, since uncertainties continually 
exist and the future is unknowable a precise, accurate, scientifically certain 
determination of the question, “whether or not to accommodate future demand” was 
nigh-on impossible.  
Walker et al. (2004:2) observe:  
The future structural elements of the world are unknown and unknowable at 
the time of analysis – for example, which countries will be most powerful in 
2030, how will the population be distributed between cities and outlying areas, 
how will the climate change? The answers for 2030 will be known with 
certainty in 2030 – but will remain uncertain until then. 
Policies need to be adaptive, that is, devised not to be optimal for a best estimate 
future, but robust across a range of futures. Such policies are responses to changes 
over time and make explicit provision for learning. Hence, in terms of their approach, 
RAND Europe identified two objectives. The first was to do the analysis in accord 
with the logic structuring the conventional process of policy analysis: identify 
problem; specify objectives; decide on criteria with which to evaluate alternative 
options; select alternatives; analyse alternatives (using models); compare alternatives 
in terms of cost and benefits; implement chosen alternatives; monitor and evaluate 
97 
 
results. The second was to specify a framework for developing adaptive policies and 
an adaptive policymaking process for civil aviation in the Netherlands in order to deal 
with the uncertainty in analysis. 
Model-based concept of the situation 
In the RAND Europe policy analysis, analysts drew on a conceptualization of the 
policy making process that incorporates a system model in that process as depicted in 
Figure 9 below. Three elements of their policy analysis approach are highlighted: a 
system model of the system of interest (civil aviation infrastructure), context of 
complexity producing inputs to the system model, and outcomes of interest. The 
system model represents the cause-effect relationships characteristic of the system. It 
is used to focus on the response of the system to context and the system‟s 
performance, that is, the resulting values of the outcomes of interest. Outcomes of 
interest are those produced by the system that relate to the policy goals and objectives 
such as, for example, “reduce noise pollution” or “manage growth in capacity”. 
Context encompasses external forces acting on the system. There are two forms of 
external forces: First, those that are outside the control of actors in the policy domain 
and these are a source of high uncertainty. They entail, for example, the economic 
environment, developments in technology, and the preferences and behaviour of 
people. Second, there are those developments within the control of the actors but 
nevertheless affect the structure and performance of the system. Policies are of this 
latter kind. Policy changes, which take shape through the rational systematic policy 
process, are not uncertain. They are: „a set of actions taken by a government to control 
the system, to help solve problems within in or caused by it, or to help obtain benefits 
from it‟ (Walker, 2000:13). Yet, the effects of policy changes on the system are often 
highly uncertain. External forces acting on the system foster structural uncertainty.  
Structural uncertainty can be understood as a type of uncertainty in analysis. The term 
refers to the uncertainty that arises from a lack of knowledge about the present or 
future behaviour of a system that is the subject of the policy analysis. Adnan Rahman 
(1997:2) elaborates:  
Lacking knowledge about the system that we are trying to model implies that 
any one of many models might be a plausible representation of the system. We 
can lack knowledge about the current behaviour of a system (structural model 
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uncertainty), the future evolution of the system (structural scenario 
uncertainty), or both the present and future behaviour of the system.  
Structural uncertainty, then, makes for uncertainty in analysis that is „the most 
difficult to handle‟ with „the largest consequences for decision making‟ (Rahman, 
1997:3). Nor can structural uncertainty be „dealt with or reduced … by collecting 
more data‟ (Rahman, 1997:3). To deal with uncertainty in their analysis RAND 
Europe used scenarios as their main analytical tool. 
 
Figure 9: The role of the system model within the policymaking process  
Source: Walker, Harremoes, Rotmans, van der Sluijs, van Asselt, Janssen, & Krayer von 
Krauss (2003:8) 
Main analytical tool 
RAND Europe used (computer-based) scenarios to explore the effect of alternative 
policies on the preferred outcomes of interest and for examining the trade-offs among 
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the different options. Stakeholders were involved in developing the scenarios. 
Scenarios, as articulated by RAND Europe, are plausible descriptions of how the 
system and driving forces may develop. Hence, a scenario is not intended to be used 
for prediction. Each scenario is built from a set of assumptions about key relationships 
and forces – for example, changes in technology, in prices, in market structure. The 
different scenarios or “future worlds” reflect the variety of alternative circumstances 
which may occur (e.g., changes in economic, environmental, social conditions) 
leading to changes in the system, affecting the outcomes of interest. In relation to 
these scenarios, policies represent the alternative mechanisms for affecting the system 
that are under the control of the policymakers, such as changing the infrastructure, 
regulations, pricing, and so forth. The best policies will be adaptive, that is, robust 
across the range of scenarios. However, in order to be adaptive such policies can only 
come about through a change in the policy process; it will need to be adaptive too.  
Adaptive policymaking 
In RAND Europe‟s view, the policymaking process needs to confront the fact that 
policy will be adjusted as the world changes and as new information becomes 
available. A flexible and dynamic process is essential. The way to act in the 
formulation of policy is to: „take those actions now that cannot be deferred; prepare to 
take actions that may later become necessary; monitor changes in the world and take 
actions when they are needed‟ (Walker & Marchau, 2003:3). In effect, according to 
Warren Walker and Vincent Marchau (2003) the policymaking process entails the 
continual monitoring of the validity of the assumptions underlying policies as events 
unfold.  
RAND Europe‟s (1997a) conceptualisation of an adaptive policymaking framework 
involves four steps. The first step is a stage setting exercise which results in a 
definition of success and policy goals. Step two involves assembly of a basic policy 
with the necessary (initial) conditions for success. Then, in step three the rest of the 
policy is specified in terms of: 
a. Vulnerabilities: potential adverse consequences associated with the policy 
b. Mitigating and hedging actions: taken in advance to reduce risk of possible 
adverse effects 
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c. Signposts: information that should be tracked to determine whether defensive 
or corrective actions or reassessment is needed 
d. Triggers: critical values of the signpost variables that lead to implementation 
of defensive or corrective actions 
e. Defensive action: adjust the basic policy in response to triggers 
f. Corrective action: after the fact to preserve a policy‟s benefits 
g. Reassessment action: when the policy has lost validity. 
Finally, Step four is the implementation phase in which events unfold and signpost 
information is collected. Until a trigger event is reached the adaptive process is 
suspended. 
The outcome 
According to Walker (2000), the results of RAND Europe‟s analysis helped the 
policymakers to identify the infrastructure options that should be looked at more 
closely and those that should be dispensed with altogether. Subsequent attention 
focused on two infrastructure options: an artificial island in the North Sea and 
Schiphol expansion on the existing site. 
The artificial island option was attractive for it had the potential to eliminate the 
problems associated with airport noise, although construction would cause new 
environmental problems. However, this option was also very expensive. The 
expansion of Schiphol - the ostensive fuel of persistent controversy- remained a viable 
option as it required less new construction than any other option and therefore was the 
least costly of all the infrastructure options examined by RAND Europe.  
Even if it was decided to re-present the option as a “base policy” in an adaptive policy 
framework with new and refined specifications, The Netherlands Government had to 
confront the practical face of their predicament, namely, that the expansion of 
Schiphol Airport remained the option that would expose large numbers of people to 
aircraft noise and the other attendant problems associated with air traffic. The 
Netherlands Government had ample explanation of the options and the challenges 
associated with each for choosing a course of action except for their immediate 
challenge of escaping a policy impasse.  
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RAND Europe‟s interpretation of the situation and the problem as framed influenced 
their analysis of options, the particular kinds of evidence gathered, and constrained 
the identification of solutions. van Eeten was able to point out that the prevailing 
policy question which drove the RAND Europe analysis simply mirrored the debate‟s 
prior polarization with the result that the intractability of the problem was confirmed 
and controversy „only intensified and accelerated‟ (van Eeten, 2000:44). The policy 
analysts were not able to work with the full complement of information embedded in 
the complex of issues at stake and therefore were not capable of finding acceptable 
solutions. This is Brunner‟s (1991) argument about the common problem of policy 
analysis, that is, of inadvertence, a misconstrual, or overlooking some important part 
of context. The TNLI project team were compelled to gain insight into the 
controversy and thereby their own policy analysis predicament and look for leads on 
how best to proceed. 
The next development in the case involved the TNLI-project, in 1997, employing van 
Eeten who used Q methodology as an alternative way of facing the Schiphol policy 
controversy. van Eeten‟s (2000; 2001) focus was on the “policy arguments” in the 
controversy: the experiential context of the controversy and the opinions of 
stakeholders featured strongly. He wanted to know how people thought about the 
issue. The Q methodology study was informed by the idea that the initial framing of 
the problem, for/against growth, effectively mis-specified the focus of debate. As van 
Eeten construed it, the time seemed ripe for a recasting of the problem, and his 
approach was to involve stakeholders directly in that recasting (van Eeten, 2001:392). 
The following summary of this second analytical event draws from a series of 
published accounts of van Eeten‟s policy analysis study (van Eeten, 2000; 2001, 
2007). 
Narrative policy analysis 
Van Eeten (2007) brought a narrative-based approach to bear on the problem of 
determining whether or not to accommodate future growth in civil aviation. van Eeten 
locates narrative policy analysis in the post empiricist paradigm represented by the so-
called “argumentative turn” in policy. A turn, van Eeten notes, sparked by Majone‟s 
(1989) „demonstration that good policy analysis revolves around crafting an argument 
rather than applying logic and science‟ (van Eeten, 2007:251). According to van 
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Eeten, narrative policy analysis builds from the central insight that: „stories commonly 
used in describing and analysing policy issues are a force in themselves, and must be 
considered explicitly in assessing policy options‟ (van Eeten, 2007:251). Policy 
narratives are defined as: 
Those stories- scenarios and arguments – that are taken by one or more parties 
in the controversy as underwriting and stabilizing the assumptions for 
policymaking in the face of the issue‟s uncertainty, complexity or polarization 
(van Eeten, 2007:251).  
van Eeten‟s (2007) narrative stance draws attention, first, to the controversy itself and 
the policy narratives likely to have opposing implications for action, and second, to 
the methodological issue of how stakeholders‟ arguments can be identified without 
forcing a specific problem definition (van Eeten, 2007:257). van Eeten himself does 
not use the term “abduction”. Nevertheless, an interest in not forcing a specific 
problem definition encompasses the logic of abduction. 
The analysis aimed to develop a new narrative that took into account the existing 
narratives but recasted or reframed the intractable problem into a more amenable form 
for deliberation and debate. The analysis, therefore, can be understood as an attempt 
to „shift the paradigm of the problem‟ (van Eeten, 2007:255). The process of recasting 
in this narrative-based policy analysis centred on finding the “meta-narrative” – the 
narrative about the narratives. 
Means of interpretation 
Discovery of a meta-narrative provides van Eeten with the means for interpreting the 
controversy and determining how the meta-narrative recasts the issue. The analytical 
process stems from the idea that analysing relations between narratives point to a 
meta-narrative “told” by the comparison. van Eeten (2007:255-256) outlines the meta-
narrative methodology as developed by Emery Roe (1994, 3-4). Four steps are 
involved: 
Step 1 -Identify the conventional narratives that dominate the issue. These are the 
stories. 
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Step 2 -Identify the narratives that do not conform to the conventional definition. 
These are the non-stories, that is, stories that run counter to the dominant narrative. 
Step 3-Compare and contrast the two sets of narratives (stories-non stories) in order to 
generate a meta-narrative “told” by the comparison. 
Step 4 -Determine if and how the meta-narrative recasts the issue in such a way as to 
make it amenable to deliberation, analysis and policymaking. 
Bear in mind that the methodology does not require a specific method but allows for a 
variety of appropriate methods for identifying the sets of narratives. And, as van 
Eeten (2007:253) emphasises, the narrative policy analysis „starts only after the 
narratives have been (re)constructed‟. van Eeten used Q method to elicit the narratives 
for comparison.  
Main tool: Q method 
In brief and as told by van Eeten (2000, 2001), to carry out the Q methodological 
study he collected 200 statements about the expansion of the airport from media 
archives, advocacy papers, interviews, and policy papers. From this collection of 
statements, he selected a sample of 80 statements for a Q sort which he administered 
to 38 stakeholders. The stakeholders reflected the distribution of views on the issue 
and included people from the airlines, airport management, different levels and 
sectors of government, national environmental organisations, local citizens, 
environmental groups, and commercial or regional economic interest groups. The 
participants were asked to sort the 80 statements into seven groups along a continuum 
from -3 (most disagree) to +3 (most agree) with 0 indicating indifference. van Eeten 
factor analysed the 38 Q sorts by correlating them and factor analysing the correlation 
matrix. He identified four factors, A to D, containing five “policy arguments”. Factor 
B was bipolar, representing a dichotomy of views on the same cluster of statements, 
that is, views which reflected the polarised debate as it had been understood up to that 
time. The other four factors had overlapping elements. van Eeten labelled these 
arguments as listed below in Table 4: 
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Table 4: Policy arguments derived from use of Q method 
Source: van Eeten (2001:398) 
Recasting the policy agenda 
Based on his understanding of the policy arguments derived from the Q 
methodological analysis, van Eeten (2007) was able to arrange the five arguments in 
terms of stories and counter stories. Policy arguments B1 and B2 reflect the dominant 
narrative, viz., the polarised debate about deciding on growth in civil aviation. Policy 
arguments A, C, and D are the counter stories or non-stories than are subsumed by the 
dominant narratives. These are narratives that do not see the decision on growth as the 
core issue for policy. A meta-narrative encapsulates both of these contrary narratives 
at the same time, that is, “decide on growth and not decide on growth”, or expressed 
counter wise, “neither” of these two narratives.  
As van Eeten (2007:266) explains, the opposition points to a useful meta-narrative:  
Decouple the expansion decision from the issues articulated by A, C, and D. 
Give the latter their own policy agendas. This way, whatever the outcome of 
the expansion decision, the government can still make important advances 
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with regard to A, C, and D. It could, for example, begin to put in place 
“normal” operating conditions for the civil aviation sector: fuel taxes, enforce 
noise standards that actually offer legal protection to citizen, and the 
dismantling of hidden subsidies. 
In other words, van Eeten suggested that a way to proceed would be to pay attention 
to the elements of the nonpolarised factors so that a solution could be found, since the 
polarised factors had made the issue intractable. The policy arguments reached 
through the Q methodology analysis enabled understanding of how the specific 
recasting of the policy agenda would work. To clarify, Van Eeten (2007) gives an 
example: 
That of the 38 stakeholder respondents 13 had stronger affinity with 
arguments A, C or D and the proposals they represent that with arguments B1 
or B2. This means that for them it is more important that action is taken on 
these issues, than that the expansion decision goes one way or the other. 
Controversy typically signifies a situation that makes sense in a variety of ways. By 
using Q methodology van Eeten was able to make out a more intricate and nuanced 
pattern of debate or system of understandings than was previously inferred by the 
policy analysts (Addams & Proops, 2000). Although it is unclear that van Eeten‟s 
study had a direct effect on final policy or how the different arguments were actually 
used in policy discussions, by bringing the policy arguments A, C, and D into the 
debate a new agenda of issues could be used in the policy deliberation that 
commenced in 1997. The differences between the conventional policy approach to 
The Netherlands Government policy problem pursued from the outset and followed in 
the RAND Europe study, and the alternative approach that used Q methodology is 
concisely pictured in Figure 10. 
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Differences between approaches 
 
Figure 10: Differences between policy analysis approaches 
With reference to the epistemological spectrum in Figure 9 (p. 90), the two policy 
analytic events can be characterized as entailing the epistemologically constructed 
borderline between “right-sided” and “left-sided” thinking, namely: between scientific 
rationality and knowledge and social rationality and opinion. Of interest is that the 
two policy analytic events show a radical difference in how the problem that was to 
be addressed in analysis was conceived and conceptualized.  
In the standard approach the process of identifying the problem to be addressed fits a 
deductive pattern: a pre-exiting specific problem definition was used and then the 
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thinking in the “hard” positivist mode. The use of so-called “third way” science 
technology then ensued that embodied the logic of predictive modelling, albeit that 
the analysts were critically aware of the limits of such modelling but mindful that 
such models aid thinking. The RAND Europe systems analysis, which did offer an 
account of how to proceed in an uncertain policymaking environment, in evidence-
based terms provided credible knowledge. Yet, this knowledge left unresolved the 
expansion issue and impasse in decision-making. This was a result that bears out the 
argument of “wicked” problems advanced by Rittel and Webber in the 1970s, namely, 
that “wicked” problems are not amenable to standard science-based policy analytic 
methods.  
In contrast, use of Q methodology, that uncovered features of a social dynamic of 
public understanding or social rationality holding sway, can be a means to shift the 
way of knowing the issues to be addressed in analysis. In this “softer” approach the 
process of understanding the issues to be addressed fits an abductive pattern of open 
inquiry: a pre-existing theory, understanding, or problem definition was not used. In 
the paradigmatic way of the interpretive social sciences attention turned to the social 
domain in order to tap stakeholder thinking, conceptualised as narratives. The use of 
Q method then ensued, in a supplementary role, to elicit the narratives for analysis. 
This approach made a positive difference to the policy analysis situation. This too, 
was a result that bears out the argument of wicked problems, namely that wicked 
problems are amenable to “softer” methods of inquiry conducted on the basis of 
stakeholder participation and shared understandings.  
As a case study, the Schiphol policy controversy has been used to illustrate the limits 
of quantitative modelling and forecasting under conditions of uncertainty in policy 
analysis (Kwakkel et al., 2008; Walker & Marchau, 2003). The case could well be 
used as a study in disputes over values; a conventional view of what underlies policy 
intractability.  
Another way to view this case is in a context of opinion. The experts had the technical 
expertise to express convincing arguments to justify the government‟s policy position, 
but the affected population had opinion to counter those arguments. As it happened, 
the citizens were “right” in their belief that the technically sophisticated analyses were 
unable to develop reliable predictive knowledge. Their concerns and opinions pointed 
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to the socially relevant issues that needed to be discussed and responded to in analysis 
and decision making. Paying attention to this social knowledge can enable the 
analysts to provide new analytic frameworks based in opinion for an analysis of what 
not to overlook in the policy situation in which they are acting.  
Summary 
Among proponents of evidence-based policy it is argued that rational analysis and 
good evidence can „ameliorate‟ or „neutralise political obstacles‟ facing a reformist 
government (Banks, 2009:8). This evidence-based argument is that in a world of 
increasing complexity and rapid change, science (knowledge and method) is more 
likely than common sense thinking (craft method) to make the difference between 
policies that ultimately work and those that fail. Furthermore, theory matched with 
methodological rigour is seen to open the pathway to better policy analysis, better 
responsiveness, and better public services. Conversely, opinion is viewed as a 
common cause of policy failure and unintended consequences and should be properly 
subordinated in that policy process. In evidence-based policy analysis, opinion is 
marginalised in favour of evidence as credible knowledge. The justification for the 
eschewal of opinion carries with it a lingering attitude that impugns non-scientific 
thinking. 
However, arguments concerning “wicked” problems reflect a long and diverse history 
of ideas particularly in pragmatism and various other post positivist and postmodern 
epistemologies. In these world views, argument is premised on concepts of 
complexity that incorporate ideas of social rationality and human subjectivity. The 
argument of “wicked” problems articulated by Rittel and Webber (1973) is an 
assessment of why social policy problems are not amenable to standard analytical 
approaches but require the rationality of stakeholders.  
There seems to be a sort of dualism in the current policy thinking about what 
constitutes complexity capability in the prevailing evidence-based epistemology. In 
one aspect, the thinking recapitulates the US policy analysis tradition that emerged 
during the 1960s, giving attention to more and better use of science in policy analysis. 
In another aspect, however, the thinking recapitulates the post positivist thought that 
focuses on participatory, deliberative, discursive and collaborative ways of working. 
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Despite interest in the role of social rationality when it comes to tackling complex 
social problems, in evidence-based policy a primary focus is on the quality of science. 
Moreover, the assessment of quality, gauged in terms of standards of rigour of the 
methods followed is in the positivist tradition, with the result that other standard 
epistemologies that generate evidence that can account for experience are ranked 
below quantitative approaches. 
I argue that what is really in contention in complex policy contexts is epistemology, 
which can be viewed as an expression of confidence in sources of knowledge 
(individual, social, or scientific) with confidence in the positivist scientific methods 
the footing for the practice idea of complexity capability. Nevertheless, the Schiphol 
Airport controversy clearly affords the view that it is not so clear-cut that opinion 
blocks the road to policy success in circumstances of complexity and change.  
In the specific case of the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport runway expansion issue the 
efficacy of Q methodology can be seen in two ways. First, and to use a contemporary, 
if less than perfect analogy, the efficacy of Q methodology can be viewed in much the 
same way as an application (“app”) download that is installed on a computer system 
to perform a specific function. The existing capabilities of the computer system (the 
policy analysis system) are harnessed to the application (Q methodology) for a 
specific task (breaking a deadlock). Q methodology renders opinion a mechanism for 
breaking deadlocks in policy analysis. Alternatively, other applications such as post 
positivist epistemologies are harnessed to Q methodology for the same function of 
rendering opinion. In the case of the Netherlands Government, the use of Q 
methodology met a policy need, namely to access the opinion of stakeholders as a 
complement to other evidence knowledge. In other words, Q methodology can be 
seen to work because it plays an adjunct role, supplementing what can be determined 
through existing practices while remaining firmly within the evidence-based 
epistemology with its dual aspects.  
Second, the efficacy of Q methodology can be viewed in much the same way as a 
download that is installed on a computer modifies or changes the computer operating 
system (the policy analysis system) introducing new capabilities of the computer such 
as a shift from a single (evidence-based system) to a multiple operating system 
(evidence-based and opinion-based). In other words, Q methodology can be seen to 
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work because it has transformative power to create a substantial change in the method 
of doing policy-analytic work.  
Q methodology opens the possibility of a common sense-making approach in policy 
analysis work that would be to: practice abductive inquiry and harness the policy 
analysis system with its abductive capability to social rationality in order to gain, each 
time, a fresh analytical perspective from which to better analyse what to pay attention 
to and not overlook in analysis of a difficult social policy problem. This way of 
working is what I associate with the human capability for reading complexity that I 
describe in more detail with reference to cases in Chapter 4. 
Having reached a point in traversing a range of extant ideas relating to evidence-based 
policy, and the science, policy, politics nexus, this chapter has laid the foundation for 
what follows in the pursuit of an explanation as to why Q methodology, generally, has 
particular revelatory power in contexts of policy analysis – does it work because it 
plays an adjunctive role or because it plays a transformative role?  
While there are a number of possible approaches to study social constructions of an 
issue such as, for example, opinion surveys, narrative analysis, discourse analysis, soft 
systems methodology, I suggest that the use of Q methodology as shown in the 
Schiphol policy controversy introduced a fundamentally different non-positivist 
epistemological influence into the standard policy process.  
The alternative that Q methodology offers has the imprint of pragmatism which deals 
with pluralistic knowing and the possibility of effective use of opinion as social 
knowledge in a systematic way. At this stage of the discussion, two questions that 
arise are: first, what epistemological rethinking would support an opinion-based 
policy analysis practice? Second, what would be the practice idea of complexity 
capability? In Chapter 4, I address the question of an epistemology for an opinion-
based practice and describe complexity capability in terms of reading complexity, 
with a focus on the thinking that links pragmatist thought to complexity thinking. 
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Chapter 4: Complexity thinking 
 
Introduction 
Through focussing on complexity and some of the intellectual debates about what 
constitutes complexity thinking, I am seeking to foreground epistemological debates 
with the aim of an epistemological reframing of policy analytic work oriented to 
reading complexity as an idea of complexity capability. This chapter provides a link 
between the examination of the epistemic bases of evidence-based policy in the 
previous chapter and the examination of Q methodology in relation to complexity 
capability and doing policy analysis work, which will follow in the Chapter 5. Thus, 
this chapter explores further the question of complexity capability but as it is currently 
discussed as a general idea in scientific discourses.  
Increasingly, public policy practitioners are urged to apply the insights and methods 
of complexity science as they tackle difficult problems in policy areas such as health, 
environment, economics, energy, and public safety (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2009). The belief that a complexity toolkit will improve 
understanding of both policy development and public administration reflects what 
John Urry (2005) refers to as “the complexity turn” in the social and cultural sciences. 
This “complexity turn” is provoking interest in developing a new kind of social 
science and a different kind of policy understanding based in complexity theory 
(Bolton, 2010; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 2003; Meek, 2010; Morçöl, 2008; Richardson, 
2007; Walby, 2007).  
In order to follow the link from the discussion of evidence-based policy and the issue 
of complexity capability to complexity thinking and the relevance of Q methodology, 
I am going to step through a series of short summaries of the relevant intellectual 
history of ideas that make this linking possible. I focus on the epistemological 
significance of the notion of complexity, rather than on the theory and concepts of 
complexity science in its pervasive form of complex adaptive systems modelling 
(Heylighen, Cilliers & Gershenson, 2007). This means I will be dealing with 
112 
 
complexity in generic terms, that is, as characteristic of a way of thinking and manner 
of knowing that can be applied in a general way (Morin, 1992).  
In his reflections on the need for a new paradigm of complexity in From Concept of 
System to the Paradigm of Complexity, the complexity thinker and philosopher Morin 
(1992) indicates that, in order to be applied in a general fashion, complexity thinking 
does not require a scientific understanding of complex phenomena. Dealt with in this 
fashion, even a rudimentary or non-scientific concept of complexity (opposed to 
simple; made up of various interconnected or interwoven parts, patterns or elements; 
hard to understand or analyse) can be treated as a problem of knowing and of 
experience. Schindwein and Ison (2004:27) pursue this line of argument in their 
exploration of complexity as an epistemological problem for the sciences:  
... the „real-world‟ of human affairs seems to us to be different than the world 
simplified by science – we experience it as complex, or more complex than the 
world and the issues that are usually addressed by „normal science‟ and its 
methods .... we live embedded in situations of complexity. 
Schlindwein and Ison‟s (2004) view entails the basic notion that complexity can be 
understood as something met with in experience in all ways of being and doing and as 
something undergone in thinking, knowing, feeling, and acting. On this point, all 
approaches to systematic inquiry that entail belief in a complex world are implicated 
as well as approaches to professional practice whether with a single or 
interdisciplinary base. 
Philosopher and complexity thinker Isabelle Stengers (2004) suggests that notions of 
complexity challenge ways of doing science when she states: 
… the problem is no longer one of deduction but of wondering what is 
relevant and how. Scientists no longer address a system as explained by what 
they know about it, even if they know it perfectly well, because it is a model. 
Their questions imply an open situation: “What will it be able to produce?” 
“What kind of behaviour will emerge?” And the question must be asked each 
time, with each new situation” (Stengers, 2004:96). 
Stengers‟ view implies that the question of how to know complexity is less a matter of 
the notion of complexity as a specific scientific concept or theory and more an issue 
of how scientists behave in relation to what they address (Stengers, 2004). 
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Complexity thinking necessitates thinking about what you are doing as producing an 
effect in the study being undertaken.  
For my purposes, an emergent paradigm of complexity holds interest because it has a 
bearing on what is meant in relation to public policy (and public administration) when 
claims are made about new ways of thinking. For example, how might practice of 
policy analysis be envisaged and acted upon in light of the claim expressed by Irene 
Sanders and Judith McCabe (2003) in their report to the United States Department of 
Education on the topic of complexity science activity in research and educational 
institutions? 
Complexity science ... has created a major shift in how we must think about, 
organize, plan for and lead 21st century organizations. You can no longer be 
an effective leader nor build an effective organization without understanding 
the basics of complexity science and developing the skills of complexity 
thinking (Sanders & McCabe, 2003:10). 
In what follows, and with the view that a complexity paradigm is still somewhat 
elusive, rather than focusing on complexity thinking as a new development, I focus on 
a classical pragmatist-inspired method of thinking and manner of knowing which 
deals with the constitutive character of complexity met with in experience in the 
„„real-world‟ of human affairs (Schlindwein &Ison, 2004:27). 
Discussion in this chapter proceeds in two parts. In the first section, I note the 
recurrent theme of a scientific revolution putatively underway that accompanies the 
use of complexity theory in the social domain. This will include a picture that I use to 
map four generic modes of knowledge. This picture will also help later in locating the 
place of Stephenson‟s kind of science, manifest in Q methodology, in its 
epistemological sense. In the second, I highlight pragmatism with emphasis on the 
work of James as offering a classical expression of complexity thinking. I argue that 
while largely marginalised by the mid-20th century due to the influence of “analytic 
philosophy” (Bernstein, 1997), pragmatism has contemporary relevance as a 
philosophy of complexity and mode of knowledge with implications for how we 
might view complexity capability and entertain the methodological possibilities yet to 
be fully realised in policy. I then draw on classical pragmatism to develop the idea of 
reading complexity as a possible alternative practice idea of complexity capability.  
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20th century scientific revolution 
Paradigm shift 
The advent of the sciences of complexity is associated with a scientific revolution, 
new world view or paradigm shift (for example Capra, 1997; Emmeche, 2004; 
Heylighen et al., 2007). In the philosophy of science, “paradigm” is frequently used in 
the sense of a pattern of thinking, a set of background assumptions that are taken for 
granted. This use of the term “paradigm” is consistent with Thomas Kuhn‟s (1970) 
account of paradigms in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn‟s account is of 
evolutionary scientific change involving phases of crisis, revolution, paradigm shifts, 
and renewal of normal science.  
By his own account, Kuhn (1977:xix) took his concept of a scientific paradigm from 
language teaching and extended it to science. When learning an inflected language 
such as Latin students learn to conjugate verbs and decline nouns and adjectives. They 
learn, for example, to recite amo, ama, amat, amamus, amatis, amant. Students can 
then use that standard form to produce other first conjugation Latin verbs. The student 
has learnt a paradigm. In rhetoric the term is used for an illustrative parable or fable – 
a guiding metaphor (Fleener & Meritt, 2007). Use of the term “paradigm” in science, 
grammar, and rhetoric retains the term‟s general meaning of an explicative and 
exemplary pattern or model from the Greek words: paradeigma pattern; 
paradeiknunai to show, to compare.  
For Kuhn, a paradigm (also referred to by Kuhn as a “disciplinary matrix”) consists of 
a constellation of shared commitments that involve the general theoretical 
assumptions, values, instruments, and techniques that the members of a particular 
scientific community are taught to adopt. A paradigm is the reference point and sets 
the standard for the normal way in which inquiry is conducted within a given field. 
The term is also used for a set of assumptions and attitudes present in a society, in a 
culture, an organisation, and so forth (Mautner, 2000). In science, the function of a 
paradigm is to supply puzzles for scientists to solve and to provide the tools for their 
solution. 
Alexander Bird‟s (2009) entry on Kuhn in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
suggests that a crisis in science arises when confidence is lost in the ability of the 
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paradigm to solve worrying puzzles called “anomalies”. In periods of normal science 
anomalies are ignored or explained away. But, when the scientific profession finds 
that it can no longer solve its problems by known rules and procedures and avoid an 
accumulation of anomalies then the legitimacy of the existing paradigm is challenged 
and the practice of normal science is undermined. Crisis is followed by a scientific 
revolution if the existing paradigm is superseded by a rival. About such revolutions in 
science, Kuhn (1970:6) says: „They are the tradition-shattering complements to 
tradition-bound activity of normal science‟. Revolutions in science trigger changes in 
the scientific imagination, a process described by Kuhn (1970:6) as „a transformation 
of the world within which scientific work‟ is done. A paradigm shift, from which 
appears a new scientific world view, often serves as a seed for changes in society. 
Towards a paradigm of complexity 
Since the early 1980s, complexity thinkers have sought to develop a paradigm 
informed by the concept of complexity. I use as a reference point the first 
international event on the topic of complexity science held in Montpellier, France, in 
1984. Organised by the United Nations University (UNU) this symposium on Science 
and Praxis of Complexity explored the epistemic consequences of concepts such as 
non-linearity, self-organisation and emergence in systems composed of many 
interacting parts (Lee, 1993). Published in two volumes in 1985, the material from 
contributors can be read as a guide to rethinking science. Recent accounts include: 
Morin‟s (2005) transdisciplinary epistemological position aimed at overcoming the 
disjunctive logic (either/or) on which, in his view, knowledge is organised; Ilya 
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers‟ (1984) interdisciplinary account of “man‟s new 
dialogue with nature” which can be read as a manifesto for a new complexity-inspired 
philosophy of physics; Francis Heylighen, Paul Cilliers, and Carlos Gershenson‟s 
(2007) considerations of the philosophical tools for understanding and reasoning 
about complexity; Kurt Richardson and Paul Cilliers‟ (2001) and Richardson‟s (2007)  
analytical philosophy of complexity in which critical thinking and pluralism in 
analysis are taken to be of central importance; Funtowicz and Ravetz‟s (1991) notion 
of “post normal science” for problem solving under conditions of uncertainty, and 
Morçöl‟s (2005) view that complexity theory ( and cognitive science) suggest a 
phenomenological epistemology whereby the embodiment of knowledge would be 
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recognised. All share the view that the classical conception of science, which is based 
on reductionism, determinism, and objective knowledge as a reference point and path 
of knowledge, is limited or limiting in the development of knowledge. From this 
standpoint, one of the challenges of complexity lies in seeing how the classical model 
of science fits within a larger scientific worldview which is not limited to a 
„clockwork‟ mechanical universe (Fleener & Merritt, 2007).  
Eric Dent (1999) gives a pictorial representation of the differences in underlying 
assumptions between the traditional (or modernist) worldview (TWV) and emerging 
larger world view (EWV), which is reproduced in Figure 11. Dent recognises that by 
and large complexity theorists do not suggest that the traditional worldview is wrong. 
Rather, the suggestion is that elements that characterise complexity such as 
indeterminism, subjective reality, mutual causality, and holism are those that lie „out 
of range‟ (Dent, 1999:6) of classical science.  
 
 
Figure 11: Differences in worldviews  
Source: Dent (1999:9) 
Dent‟s picture of the relationship between the emerging world view and the traditional 
worldview is intended to show that the emerging worldview holds in „a larger number 
of instances‟ (Dent, 1999:7) than with of the traditional worldview. On this theme, 
complexity theorist Heylighen (1988) wrote: „science only appears capable of solving 
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problems in very specialised, restricted domains‟ while avoiding „complexity as much 
as possible‟. This notion of normal science restricting complexity, or, in Kuhnian 
terms rendering complexity an anomaly, can be found explicitly advanced in the work 
of Morin (2005).  
Morin (2005:5) identifies what he refers to as „the three principles of the rejection of 
complexity by “classical science” ‟. As articulated by Morin (2005:5), these are: 
1. The principle of universal determinism 
2. The principle of reduction, that consists in knowing any composite from only 
the knowledge of its basic constituting elements 
3. The principle of disjunction that consists in isolating and separating cognitive 
difficulties from one another, leading to the separation between disciplines, 
which have become hermetic from each other. 
In Morin‟s view, an isomorphism is at play. In combination, these principles affect the 
organisation of knowledge reflected in the disciplinary nature of research. Alfonso 
Montuori (2008: xxvii), in his review of Morin‟s work, provides a summary of 
Morin‟s thesis of isomorphism as follows: 
Reductive/analytic approaches to issues are unable to account for and give 
sufficient understanding of complex, interconnected phenomena. Reductive 
approaches isolate phenomena from their environment and operate with a 
disjunctive logic of either/or. 
This way of thinking is manifest in the organisation of knowledge in 
universities where knowledge is broken down in ever smaller disciplines and 
specialisations, with increasingly impermeable boundaries. 
Many movements that define themselves in opposition to Newtonian/positivist 
science and reject „parts‟ in favour of „wholes‟, „analysis‟ in favour of 
„synthesis‟, and „control‟ in favour of „emergence‟, are themselves a product 
of disjunctive thinking. 
Again, Montuori (2008) further suggests disjunctive thinking can be represented in 
the following oppositions that indicate what classical scientific thought accepts and at 
the same time what classical science dissociates from: 
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Objective knowledge of objects in the exterior world, rather than subjective 
knowledge of interior moods, opinions, experiences and so on 
Quantification and therefore „objective‟ data that could be measured as 
opposed to qualitative data that is „subjective‟ and cannot be measured 
Reductionism, or a focus on parts rather than wholes (holism) 
Determinism, or finding laws of cause and effect that determine events as 
opposed to chance events that cannot be predicted by laws (contingency) 
Certainty, rather than „relative‟ knowledge 
Universal knowledge (applicable anywhere and everywhere) rather than 
particular, local knowledge (applicable only to certain specific settings) 
One right way of looking at a situation, rather than a multiplicity of 
perspectives, and the search for that one right way 
Either/or thinking, borrowed from Aristotle, which rejects any form of 
ambiguity or paradox. 
Among complexity thinkers such as Morin and others who do not uphold disjunctive 
thinking, the belief is that a new paradigm of complexity is needed to transcend both 
positivist and postpostivist/postmodernist approaches to science since each, as 
“movements of opposition”, cannot be relied upon for understanding complex 
phenomena in a sufficiently coherent fashion. This belief has led to a view that 
knowing complexity should be seen as a transdisciplinary effort. 
A transdisciplinary effort 
According to Morin (2005), each movement of opposition as a product of disjunctive 
thinking, „remains within the epistemology of classical science‟. Accompanying this 
perspective, then, is an effort to find a middle or “third” way of inquiry based on an 
impulse to integrate developments in science from across the disciplines. As 
Heylighen et al., (2006:1) suggest: 
The science of complexity is based on a new way of thinking that stands in 
sharp contrast to the philosophy underlying Newtonian science, which is based 
on reductionism, determinism, and objective knowledge ... Determinism was 
challenged by quantum mechanics and chaos theory. Systems theory replaced 
reductionism by a scientifically based holism. Cybernetics and postmodern 
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social science showed that knowledge is intrinsically subjective. These 
developments are being integrated under the header of “complexity science”.  
In addressing this push to integrate developments in the sciences, Morin argues that 
the disjunctive principle of knowledge, that is, of „separation (between objects, 
between disciplines, between notions, between subject and object of knowledge)‟ 
(Morin, 2005:11), should be substituted by a principle that „maintains the distinction, 
but that tries to establish the relation‟ (Morin, 2005:11). This would necessitate a 
logical complexity: „we should link concepts which normally repel each other 
logically, like unity and diversity‟ (Morin, 2005:13). In this way, Morin‟s argument 
pre-supposes the need for an integrative or conjunctive principle of knowledge that 
serves to complexify (connecting and contextualising) knowledge instead of 
separating and isolating in the effort to know. It is an argument for transdisciplinarity, 
that is, the integration of knowledge across disciplines: the physical sciences, social 
sciences, and the humanities (Capra, 1997; Niekerk & Buhl, 2004). 
Transdisciplinarity moves beyond interdisciplinarity, which involves using the 
methods of one discipline to inform another, by drawing on multiple disciplines while 
at the same time, according to Montuori (2008:xxi): „challenging the disciplinary 
organization of knowledge‟ (see also, Klein, 2004). It is an argument that intends 
linkages to wider knowledge networks: „[the conjunctive principle] not only concerns 
all fields, but also relates to our knowledge as human beings, individuals, persons, and 
citizens‟ (Morin, 2005:25). In this respect, the argument for transdisplinarity 
recognises that complex social problems to be solved do not originate with science, 
that is, in the paradigmatic fashion described by Kuhn: „They are external 
developments in Lebenswelt, the living world‟ (Klein, 2004:4). Julie Klein (2004:4-5), 
drawing on Schön (1983, 1995), goes on to say that such complex problems are: 
„without a discipline‟; in the „indeterminate zones of practice‟ and the „swamp‟ of 
„nonrigorous inquiry‟. These are problems that involve the skills of dialogue, 
interaction, and negotiation as integral parts of complexity-based inquiry (see also, 
Emmeche, 2004). 
The literature would suggest that a complexity movement (or “complexity turn”) is 
developing and gaining in vigour - a view, for instance, which informs the work of the 
Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (1996) which 
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has advocated breaking down the division between natural and social sciences 
through seeing both as characterised by complexity. However, it would be premature 
to assert that the practice of “normal” science is being undermined and superseded by 
a rival paradigm of complexity. On this point, for example, Claus Emmeche 
(2004:25), in his discussion of the significance of complexity, says the discourse of a 
new complexity paradigm of science replacing the former mode of thinking „may 
derive from storytelling mediated by science writers than from concrete studies of 
science at the workbench‟.  
Away from a paradigm of complexity? 
Richardson and Cilliers (2001), based on their study of complexity literature in 
relation to the science of complex systems, and later, Richardson (2007), argues that 
different schools of complexity thinking are developing. These two authors identify 
three potential schools, which, to a large extent, are synonymous with the three 
methodological streams of systems thinking mentioned previously in Chapter 3, 
namely: the neo-reductionist or “hard” school of complexity science; the metaphorical 
or “soft” school; and the complexity thinking or critical-pluralist school of 
complexity.  
Firstly, the neo-reductionism school relies on the accelerating advances in computer 
technology for the study of complexity, especially complex systems. This use of 
research models in the form of „bottom-up agent-based modelling‟ has been described 
as a completely new way of practising science (Emmerche, 2004; Sanders & McCabe, 
2004). As noted in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
paper, Applications of Complexity Science for Public Policy, such modelling means 
that scientists are enabled: 
... to create large numbers of virtual system components and set them to 
interact with each other in simulated worlds. By varying the parameters of 
these simulations, researchers can explore the spectrum of collective 
behaviours, validate theoretical models, and compare the virtual systems with 
their real-world counterparts (OECD, 2009:2). 
Secondly, the so-named metaphorical school, which reflects applications of 
complexity theory to the social sciences, uses complexity theory „with its associated 
language‟ (Richardson 2007:192) (for example complex adaptive systems, 
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emergence, co-evolution, self-organisation) as a lens to see the complexity inherent in 
what they address. As Sylvia Walby (2007) mentions, in the social sciences, 
interpretations and use of complexity theory in social theory have varied. For 
example, Walby (2007:457) cites the following: David Byrne (1998) who interprets 
complexity theory as a defence of realism; Cilliers (1998) who posits that complexity 
theory advances postmodernism; and Brian Wynne‟s (2005) argument that 
complexity theory challenges both the reductionism and the denial of uncertainty 
among science policy makers. The consequences of the use made of complexity 
concepts for social theory have been debated. Attempts have been made to correct for 
the uncritical importation of ideas via metaphor. These attempts have been out of a 
concern that much of complexity theory is based on mathematics of complexity, not 
on empirical inquiries into social change and thereby may not be directly applicable to 
the social world (Capra, 1997; Mainzer, 2004; Richardson, 2007; Walby, 2004).  
Thirdly, the critical-pluralism school adheres to the view that in order to know 
complexity an inquirer need not use the tools that have been developed by the 
complexity science community; that all tools for thought have the potential to provide 
insights concerning complex systems, albeit each with its own limitations. The critical 
element, then, is to develop a „critical attitude‟ (Richardson, 2007:212) toward all 
instruments of understanding and use tools with a concern for their limitations. In this 
way, complexity thinking involves the inquirer in a continual rethinking of what they 
are doing, grounded in the complexity perspective of an open, ever changing, and 
evolving reality.  
With respect to these three schools of complexity, Richardson (2007), among others, 
points out that the tendency is towards neo-reductionism and away from softer 
approaches. Such a tendency undermines the notion that a revolution in science in its 
truest sense (Kuhnian sense) is fully underway. Rather than a shift to a new paradigm 
of complexity, the complexity field may simply be shifting focus from linear to non-
linear models. As Richardson (2007:215) puts it: 
Despite all the iconoclastic rhetoric about reshaping our worldview ... many 
complexity theorists of this [neo-reductionist] variety have actually inherited 
many of the assumptions of their more traditional scientific predecessors by 
simply changing the focus from one sort of model to another ... Rather than 
using the linear models associated with classical reductionism, a different sort 
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of model - nonlinear models - have become the focus. Supposedly, bad models 
have been replaced with good models.” 
On this point, Stengers (2004:98) sounds a note of warning. In her critique of the neo-
reductionist proclivity for using computer simulations (models of complex systems) 
she argues that the positivist inclination to „restrict‟ complexity remains strong. The 
rethinking of “doing” applies to the choice of the right tool for the right situation 
(Stengers, 2004). According to Stengers (2004:97), tools of inquiry are not „ready-
made instruments‟; and no tool confers „the power of judging‟. In other words, she 
says, tools „oblige‟ the inquirer „to think and wonder‟ (Stengers, 2004:97). About the 
so-called “third” way of doing science, Stengers (2004:98) warns: That there is „a 
strong temptation to use the new models as a kind of universal key, able to serve 
whatever purpose we like‟ and that „what makes the models and their use potentially 
dangerous is the claim that the business of science is to explain away what is only 
subjective opinion and illusion‟. Stengers concludes with the question: „How are we 
to avoid taking a simulation as a scientific theory, eliminating what the model had no 
need to take into account?‟ 
In short, Stengers‟ argument is for a change in the characterisation of what is relevant 
in the relationship between the inquirer and what they address. In her view, to have 
cognisance of complexity an inquirer would be well advised to break the scientific 
habits of reductive acts and deduction (Stengers, 2004). She talks about a need in 
science to further develop skills of interrogation, which she describes as an aptitude, 
for example, of thinking and „wondering what is relevant and how... each time, with 
each new situation‟ (Stengers, 2004:96). Stengers (2004:98) proposes the type of 
questions that matter for a science of complexity, and, she insists, that have always 
mattered in each field of inquiry: How to learn? How to pay attention? How to 
acquire new ways of thinking? How to concentrate or explore other kinds of 
experiences? Those who inquire into complexity need to know how to question in an 
open situation of inquiry which does not become reduced to „a certain number of 
principles of action and ways of operating‟ (Stengers, 2004:95-96). 
To conclude this part of the discussion I have produced a diagrammatic summary of 
these epistemological shifts (see Figure 12). In doing so, I am bringing to the fore a 
variant of complexity thinking which in the literature is not explicitly discussed as 
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such, although it is alluded to by some writers (for example Prigogine & Stengers, 
1984). I am referring to classical pragmatism. 
Epistemological shifts 
From the beginning of the 20th century, through to the present in the 21st century, a 
period of more or less 100 years, there have been a number of significant 
epistemological shifts that have led to the contemporary scientific knowledge system 
becoming more, not less, organised, which is to say, more complex. Here, I use the 
analogy of a river system. River systems can be differentiated from each other by the 
pattern of water in the river channels. On the surface, the epistemological shifts in the 
last 100 years resemble a dendritic pattern. That is the main channel decomposing into 
multiple split streams separated from each other by land forms. However, to make the 
analogy, consider science or systematic inquiry as a main channel of knowledge, 
evolving over time, with a distributary network of diverging modes of knowledge 
(multiple streams).  
Divergent modes of knowledge arise from differences of kind in science, that is, from 
different approaches to systematic inquiry. The separation of ways involves: the 
presupposed principles on which a science is based; what is paid attention to and 
concentrated on; what is ignored, ideas that are rejected, or considerations that are 
missing, as well as heuristics of choice (for example computer simulations, models, 
ideal types, conceptual devices). Currently, scientists, social scientists and policy 
practitioners inhabit a world, in which post positivist and postmodernist views of 
science compete with the on-going salience of positivism (“modernist” view of 
science). This development can be mapped as in the diagram shown in Figure 12. 
Again, as noted above, this diagram gives a rough depiction of the kind of 
epistemological rethinking of “normal” scientific inquiry that has occurred. 
What this diagram shows is that in the 20th century a positivist epistemology, derived 
from the work of Comte, among others, and the basis of classical science, emerged as 
a dominant path of knowledge which set the standard for the normal way in which 
inquiry in general is conducted. During the century various expressions of scientific 
praxis also emerged to challenge this positivist science, including pragmatism and, 
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later, quantum science, as well as a marked growth in the number of disciplines, 
especially in the social sciences. 
 
Quantum mechanics
Postpositivism
Critical theory
Postpositivism
Complexity theory
Quantum science
Postivism
Pragmatism
Pragmatism
Positivism
Positivism
                               Interpretive
                                 
                                Integrative
                             
Reductive 
                       Abductive
Positivism
19th Century                              20th Century 21
st Century
Simple Complex
 
Figure 12: Epistemological shifts and modes of knowledge 
It should be noted that a knowledge system such as it is figured above, also has 
„hidden continuities‟ (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984:309). While at first glance there 
appears to be a pattern of increasing fragmentation or differentiation in the knowledge 
system which shows up in the development of epistemic rifts between the social 
sciences and the natural sciences over the course of the 20th century, there is at the 
same time a pattern of developing confluences in the system. As given in Prigogine & 
Stengers (1984:309), these confluences or hidden continuities involve „difficult 
questions rejected by many as illegitimate or false but that keep coming back 
generation after generation - questions such as the dynamics of complex systems …‟ 
and about which science has devoted some but not the most effort.  
In the way in which I am framing this argument, what is relevant is a series of splits 
producing multiple modes of knowledge that have developed from this positivist 
stream. In Figure 12, as an example, what is significant is the pattern of bifurcation 
which I show leads to at least four distinct generic modes of knowledge. I label these 
four generic modes in the diagram as: 
125 
 
 
 interpretative (research strategies associated with post positivism and post 
modernism) 
 integrative (research strategies associated with new sciences of complexity) 
 reductive (research strategies associated with positivism) 
 abductive (research strategies associated with pragmatism).  
My argument concerns the saliency of pragmatism as a non-positivist philosophy of 
inquiry. In brief, the classical pragmatists (for example Peirce, James, and Dewey), 
before the advent of the so-called “new” sciences, paid attention not only to 
complexity and a real or living world subject to change and variation but also to the 
human experience and ultimate mode of knowing in relation to complexity.  
Pragmatism: a classical expression of complexity thinking  
According to Richard Bernstein (1997:390), pragmatism had waned as an influential 
movement in America by the mid-20th century, to be superseded by analytic 
philosophy with a „positivistic temper‟. As a consequence, and though there were 
those who sought to keep the pragmatic tradition alive, from the post-World War Two 
period onwards, there was „a forgetfulness‟ (Bernstein, 1997:390) of the pragmatic 
legacy. Although only a few complexity thinkers explicitly acknowledge a direct 
indebtedness to the classical pragmatists (for example Prigogine & Stengers, 
1984:302-303), many of the constitutive elements sought in a new paradigm of 
complexity and spoken about in the contemporary discourse (for example Morin, 
1992; 2005) originated in classical pragmatist thought, particularly in the work of 
Peirce and James. 
Accompanying their rejection of the idea of a “clockwork” universe, Peirce and James 
were interested in relations and believed in synechistic pluralism. Synechistic 
pluralism, which has a direct bearing on the question of how to envisage and contend 
with a real world that is inevitably complex and subject to change and variation, is an 
idea that challenges the Cartesian theory of knowledge (Haack, 1975). Peirce‟s way of 
putting it was to say that Cartesian philosophy „performs its analyses with an axe; 
leaving, as the ultimate elements, unrelated chunks of being (Haack, 2005:240). As 
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Henry Levinson (1996:x) states in his introduction to A Pluralistic Universe, 
“unrelated chunks of being” encompass things like „minds, meanings, intentions, and 
purposes‟. Leaving such things unrelated suggests „only truncated intelligence‟ with 
no room „for things that let people care‟ (Levinson, 1996:x). 
In the next section, I concentrate on the pragmatist idea of complexity thinking as 
expressed in the writings of James. James taught experimental psychology at Harvard 
University (1875-1907). He considered psychology a natural science concerned with 
the study of the causes, conditions, and immediate consequences of states of 
consciousness in human beings (James, 1890b). While it is not within the scope of 
this thesis to delve in any depth into James‟ ideas about psychology, it is important to 
note that he had come to believe that subjective reality was researchable at a time 
when his contemporaries (experimental psychologists) held to the view that 
psychologists could not observe or study personal states of consciousness or 
subjective life (Hunt, 2007). The ideas that James (in McDermott, 1977) advanced 
include: 
 experience is cognitive, that is, a mode of knowing  
 consciousness is a process, function, or an activity, not a thing 
 consciousness is personal and has changing and continuous states  
 consciousness has a fringe as well as a focus and thus able to grasp a flowing 
stream of impressions at the periphery of attention 
 consciousness includes the apprehension of relations as well as elements, of 
„transitive‟ as well as of „substantive‟ states, that is, the distinction between 
knowing as in transit and on its own way and the same knowing verified and 
completed 
 the activity of consciousness is selective, that is, consciousness welcomes, 
rejects and chooses from among the objects presented 
 we think of certain things as me and mine; these feelings and the acts 
associated are the „empirical self‟  
 „the empirical self‟ can be investigated by introspection (“looking into our 
own minds and reporting what we there discover”) and observation 
 the function of personal consciousness is knowing‟ 
 our thoughts are mental modes of adaptation to reality; our thoughts are real. 
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James contended that the universe comes in one edition, the one we experience 
(James, in McDermott, 1977:457). James‟ philosophy ties psychology (theories of 
consciousness), synechistic pluralism, and pragmatism together under the banner of 
radical empiricism (James, 1912). In James‟ philosophical system, subjectivity, 
relations, experience, communication, human ability to contend with events as they 
arise and, as I intend to illustrate, abduction, all have importance for human knowing. 
As far as I know from my own selective reading, James does not appear to have used 
the term “abduction”. As I understand it, the concept Peirce expressed by abduction 
was invoked by James in his use of the concept “concatenation” – that is, things being 
linked together. The idea of concatenated knowing that James refers to implies the 
interconnectedness and reticulated nature of knowledge. 
The Jamesian variant of complexity thinking can be aligned with the contemporary 
version advanced, for instance, by Morin. In my view, however, what is missing from 
contemporary ideas of complexity thinking is the role of abduction, as a capacity of 
human thought or operation of knowing, fit for figuring out how to act under 
conditions of complexity. The preceding comments require clarification. I begin by 
stepping very briefly through what is meant by radical empiricism, synechistic 
pluralism, and the relevance of abduction as a mode of knowing in relation to 
experiences of complexity. 
Radical empiricism 
According to John McDermott (1977:xli) radical empiricism was James‟ effort to 
describe the process of knowing: a „process which takes place inside the relational 
field of concrete experience‟. In James‟ view, „knowledge of sensible realities ... 
comes to life inside the tissue of experience. It is made; and made by relations that 
unroll themselves in time‟ (James in McDermott: 1977:201). A postulate, a statement 
of fact, and a generalised conclusion comprise the central meaning of radical 
empiricism. James‟ ( in McDermott, 1977:136) doctrine of radical empiricism runs as 
follows.  
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The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among 
philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience ... 
The statement of fact is that the relations between things, conjunctive as well 
as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither 
more so nor less so, than the things themselves. 
The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold 
together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. 
The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-
empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or 
continuous structure. 
In other words, a logic of relations runs throughout radical empiricism which provides 
a case against the Cartesian or dichotomous theory of knowledge. In radical 
empiricism, the relationship between the world of objects and the world of 
consciousness is not taken as a dualism of subject and object, of matter and thought, 
or of thought and actuality. Though able to be distinguished - object from subject, 
thought from matter – the world of objects (the physical, “outer” world) and the world 
of consciousness (the psychical, “inner” world of mind) are continuous: „... there is no 
reason to attribute to them an essential difference of nature. Thought and actuality are 
made of one and the same stuff, the stuff of experience in general‟ (James, in Mc 
Dermott, 1977:187). James‟ account of relations encompasses the notion of 
“supervenience”.  
Supervenience is an important concept in classical pragmatic complexity thinking. It 
helps us make sense of radical empiricism, synechistic pluralism, and the pragmatic 
method of inquiry advanced by Peirce and used by James. Strictly speaking, 
supervenience is not about integration but interaction, change taking place, mutual 
implication, and emergent consequences - that is, things happening.  
The concept of supervenience 
In recent philosophy of mind and consciousness studies, the concept of supervenience 
has been a major topic of interest and debate (Horgan, 1993). Briefly, the term comes 
from the Latin “super”, meaning on, above, or additional; and from the Latin verb 
“venire”, meaning to come. In common use, supervenience signifies coming or 
occurring as something novel, additional, or unexpected. As an example of 
supervenience, used in this non-technical sense and applied to an event in daily life, 
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consider the case of people tramping in a National Park but not fully equipped for any 
eventuality. The weather turns bad and hypothermia supervenes (comes). The 
occurrence of hypothermia is in some way dependent on, determined by, or 
supervenient on the trampers‟ preparedness for being in the environs and, in turn, the 
changes taking place in the weather. In the discourse of daily life, the phenomenon of 
supervenience is implicated in statements such as “the next thing we knew”, “the 
problem is what happens next?” or “there were unintended consequences”. 
In the sciences, the term “supervenience” has a technical meaning that concerns a 
relation of dependency between two sets of properties or facts (Hare, 1984; Horgan, 
1993). The Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind (online) gives this definition of 
supervenience in connection with the mind/body problem in philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics (“M” representing mental respects and “P” physical respects): 
A set of properties or facts M supervenes on a set of properties or facts P if 
and only if there can be no changes or differences in M without there being 
changes or differences in P.  
 
Figure 13: Concept of supervenience 
More simply stated, supervenience means: „there cannot be an M-difference without a 
P-difference‟ (Mc Laughin & Bennett, 2010). And, in slogan form: “the difference a 
difference makes”. Used in its technical sense, the concept of supervenience comes 
across as, if not synonymous with, then connoting other specialist technical concepts, 
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for example: co-evolution, co-variation, transitive, structural coupling, and 
emergence
6
.  
James wrote repeatedly on the theme of supervenience in connection with radical 
empiricism and the relationship of human interests. For instance, he asserts:  
There can be no difference that doesn‟t make a difference – no difference in 
abstract truth which does not express itself in a difference of concrete fact, and 
of conduct consequent upon the fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, 
somewhere, and somewhen (James, in McDermott, 1977:349). 
In experience, in other words, thought, actuality, and conduct are a supervenient 
relation. A change taking place (a difference) will effect a turn in experience – in 
thought, of fact, and in conduct. In Jamesian philosophy, experience becomes a 
methodological postulate expressed as follows: 
Nothing shall be admitted as fact ... except what can be experienced at some 
definite time by some experient; and for every feature of fact ever so 
experienced, a definite place must be found somewhere in the final system of 
reality. In other words: Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, 
and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real (James, in 
McDermott, 1977:279). 
Here, James alludes to the belief that while relations can be overlooked, denied, or 
ignored, they cannot be suppressed. James (in McDermott, 1977:279) also linked the 
pragmatic method (Peirce‟s pragmatic maxim), to supervenient relations: „The 
pragmatic method starts from the postulate that there is no difference of truth that 
doesn‟t make a difference of fact somewhere.‟ By “truth”, James means „practical 
truth‟, in other words experience, which gives „something to act on‟ (James, in Mc 
Dermott, 1977:178).  
In James‟ view, then, supervenience is a phenomenon that matters in human 
experience and in the process of knowing, particularly how to know for action: 
„Whence do we know activity?‟ (James, in Mc Dermott, 1977:279) or from where do 
we know how to act? In short, the Jamesian answer is experience and from an 
awareness of what pragmatic consequences (a reference to the pragmatic maxim) an 
                                               
6 There are much more complicated technical statements of supervenience than the one I have just 
given – see, for example, the entry by McLaughlin and Bennett (2010) in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philososphy. 
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opinion would carry or what particular differences in any one‟s experience an opinion 
would make if acted upon. The concept of supervenience underlies synechistic 
pluralism and the use by James of the concept of concatenation. 
Synechistic pluralism 
Synechistic pluralism can be understood as a „doctrine of connections‟ (McDermott, 
1977:xxxvi). Synechism or continuity, from the Greek synergos – working together, 
was a term used by Peirce. He used this term to describe his whole system of 
philosophy (Haack, 2005). His interest in how things work together shows, for 
instance, in his idea of scientific method whereby abduction, deduction, and induction 
synechistically conjoin. “Concatenation” (meaning linked together, from the Latin 
word for chain), is a similar concept. Concatenation was used by James as a core 
principle of his philosophy of inquiry and characterisation of a pluralistic universe. 
For James, concatenation signified a type of union (not an integration) or, as he had a 
way of putting it, “eaches hanging together” in a „union of concatenation‟ (James, in 
Mc Dermott, 1977: 413), but not like a chain. James preferred instead to use the 
metaphor of a rope „of which each fibre, discontinuous, cross-wise‟ can be conceived 
„as an absolutely single fact‟, but followed in the longitudinal direction „they are 
many‟ (James, in Mc Dermott, 1977:411). In A Pluralistic Universe, James iterates 
his conception of concatenation in contrast to the monism (of his day): 
Our „multiverse‟ still makes a „universe‟; for every part, tho it may not be in 
actual or immediate connexion, is nevertheless in some possible or mediated 
connexion, with every part however remote, through the fact that each part 
hangs together with its very next neighbours in inextricable interfusion. The 
type of union, it is true, is different here from the monistic type of all-heit 
[oneness]. It is not a universal co-implication or integration of all things 
durcheinander [in confusion]. It is what I call the strung-along type, the type 
of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation. If you prefer greek words, you may 
call it the synechistic type (James, in Mc Dermott,1977:808). 
In other words, James conceives of complexity in unity: „the manyness in oneness that 
indubitably characterises the world we inhabit‟ (James, 1909). For James, “oneness” 
and “manyness” are on a par, neither more essential than the other. The recognition of 
this fact of experience, he says, „is what distinguishes the empiricism which I call 
„radical‟, from the bugaboo empiricism of the traditional rationalist critics, which 
(rightly or wrongly) is accused of chopping up experience into atomistic sensations 
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...‟ (James, in McDermott, 1977:808). Thus, the term “concatenation” is important for 
understanding the type of pluralism advanced by James and which he fully embeds in 
radical empiricism.  
Synechistic pluralism, which James (in McDermott, 1977:258) describes as „between 
pluralism and monism‟ is an answer to the question of whether reality exists 
distributively or collectively, or, as he says, whether reality exists „in the shape of 
eaches, everys, anys, eithers? Or only in the shape of all or whole?‟ Noting that 
„pluralism stands for the distributive, monism for the collective form of being‟ 
(James, in McDermott, 1977:259), James tells us that synechistic pluralism stands for 
the legitimacy of the notion, and in reality as we daily experience it, that: 
The world is One ... just so far as we experience it to be concatenated. One by 
as many definite conjunctions as appear. But then also not One by just as 
many definite disjunctions as we find ... It is neither a universe pure and 
simple nor a multiverse pure and simple (James, in McDermott, 1997:412) 
The result, he maintains, is „innumerable little hangings-together of the world‟s parts 
within the larger hangings-together, little worlds, not only of discourse but of 
operation, within the wider universe‟ (James, in McDermott, 1977: 408). Here, James 
is telling us that synechistic pluralism provides a systematic point of view and that 
from this systems perspective all „these definite networks actually and practically 
exist‟ (James, in McDermott, 1977:408). James (in McDermott, 1977:408) concludes 
by saying: „Enormous as is the amount of disconnexion among things ... everything 
that exits is influenced in some way by something else, if you can only pick the way 
out rightly‟.  
James then goes on to mention the sort of concatenation or union that obtains among 
things. James‟s view is that the generic unity in things matters. He writes: „Things 
exist in kinds, there are many specimens in each kind, and what the „kind‟ implies for 
one specimen, it implies also for every other specimen of that kind‟ (James, in 
McDermott, 1977:409). Hence, beings, thinkables, experiences, situations, issues and 
concerns, for example, in practical life can be considered in this way. Were this not 
the case, according to James (in McDermott, 1977:409), logic would be „useless‟. 
Otherwise, „with no two things alike in the world‟ we couldn‟t reason from our past 
experiences to our future ones‟, nor could we make generalised conjectures (James, in 
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McDermott, 1977:409). In short, then, a synechistic-pluralist would envisage a 
plurality of coordinate things, of „reticulated or concatenated forms‟ (James, in 
McDermott, 1977:408), similar parts, and involving many varieties, grades and scales. 
Under other terms of contemporary complexity discourse, a synechistic pluralist 
would envisage: systems, patterns that connect, relations, webs, or networks.  
In sum, the basic reality of the pragmatist approach is complexity, the conception of 
which entails ideas of supervenience, synechism and concatenation. The key idea of 
continuity, applies to the process of knowing and developing knowledge. In other 
words, we can talk of “concatenated knowing” or “knowing together” in a variety of 
ways and as something occurring at different levels: at the level of personal 
consciousness and at the level among individuals. Talk of concatenated knowing 
brings us to the relevance of abduction as a mode of knowing in relation to 
experiences of complexity. 
The relevance of abduction 
Peirce‟s logic of abduction intersects with James‟ concatenated knowing. A form of 
concatenated knowing relates to the knower acting in a wider world. The assumption 
is that in process of knowing, there is continuity between what is intended, what is 
occurring, and how to act next. As espoused by James, our self, or subjective life, or 
personal point of view, involves complex experiences, which are the base of human 
thought, the function of which is knowing. Pragmatically stated by James (in Mc 
Dermott, 1977:348), the significance of thought lies in „what conduct it is fitted to 
produce‟. Knowing, then, culminates in action; either action thought possible or 
concrete action. What matters is that how we (each or together) ultimately act is well-
conceived. Personal consciousness and operation of thought are also a form of 
concatenated knowing at a different scale. At the level of personal states of 
consciousness the concatenation involves continuity in acts of cognition which 
include perceiving, remembering, imagining, conceiving, judging, reasoning, and 
feeling. James makes the point that „however complex the object may be, the thought 
of it is one undivided state of consciousness‟, a single (but concatenated) „pulse of 
subjectivity‟ or state of mind.  
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Defined in terms of Peircean logic and as pointed out by Haack (n.d. :6), abduction 
„posits continuities‟ (e.g., as previously discussed in Chapter 2 (p. 43): „It may be the 
case in reality that these beans are from this bag‟). In Jamesian psychology, abduction 
can be regarded as having the status of a state of consciousness - abductivity. Briefly, 
to illustrate this we can look at three examples of abduction/abductivity that come 
from everyday handling of experiences. Each is an example of knowing as a process 
that takes place inside the relational field of concrete experience and of continuity in 
the process of knowing - what is intended, what is occurring, how to act and in the 
everyday process of intending, occurring , and acting people are responding to 
complexity.  
All three examples, crossing a busy road, the Helen Keller story, and the agrarian 
practice of Andean potato farmers share the theme of knowing of an ordinary and 
common kind, which Peirce called abduction. All three cases are examples of how 
abduction/abductivity prepares well-conceived action (the principle of pragmatism) 
relevant to a specific practical situation which, from the point of view of the knower, 
entails a degree of uncertainty. Abduction/abductivity occurs somehow because we 
want to act, whether as a pedestrian checking out if it is safe to cross a busy road, as a 
young woman trying to figure out how to learn words, as potato farmers in the Andes 
(or as a policy analyst furnishing advice on difficult or intractable policy issues) 
(Haack, 2005) All three examples show human complexity capability that I call 
“reading complexity”. 
Reading complexity in an everyday sense  
Reading complexity is predicated on two notions: that encounters with complexity are 
familiar experiences in everyday life and fields of practice, and that complexity is 
something intelligible. 
Crossing an uncontrolled busy road 
Consider that you are intent on crossing a particular road as you have done many 
times before. This road is a major route into the central business district and so there 
is a continual flow of traffic (motorbikes, cyclists, buses, cars, and trucks). As you do 
on each occasion, you stop and look before you attempt to cross because you know 
you are likely to get hit if you do not. Having an explanation that accounts for the 
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flow of traffic - it is rush hour - does not change your quandary which is how to get 
across the flow of traffic to the other side, safely. Each time you come to cross the 
road you are interacting with a dynamic environment, face a new reality, experience a 
moment of uncertainty, and rely on your own nous for getting safely across the road. 
On each occasion of crossing comes a moment when you realise it is safe for you to 
cross.  
Significantly, your success on each occasion does not involve attempts by you to exert 
control over the flow of traffic but on the contrary involves you taking into account 
how the traffic acts - the motorbikes, cyclists, buses, cars, and trucks. Your success 
arises from your ability to determine your own behaviour in connection with the 
traffic event occurring and leave the traffic well alone. In determining your behaviour, 
and not the behaviour of the traffic, you nevertheless change your circumstance, 
achieve your intent and thereby resolve your quandary, and move on. And, it is likely, 
without unintended consequences. Evidently, you have engaged in an operation of 
knowing that is not, as the saying goes, “rocket science”, but suited for understanding 
how to act in a complex situation which involves you in a dynamic and uncertain 
circumstance.  
Helen Keller story 
Helen Keller‟s specific need and intent was to learn words, which she could not do. 
Her tutor, Anne Sullivan, began to spell into Helen‟s hand the names of various 
objects. This was done for a long period, and met with incomprehension on Helen‟s 
part. Again, in Helen‟s case, an explanation did not suffice for understanding what the 
spelling was about (see Davis, 1972:144-146). Shown in Figure 14 is the process of 
knowing by which Helen Keller came to solve the enigma of spelling.  
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Anne taught Helen how to spell words 
with her hands . This was done for a long 
period, and met with incomprehension on 
Helen’s part. The trouble was that Helen 
had no idea of the concept ‘word’; what it 
meant.
Finally, one day Anne spelled the word
W-A-T-E-R  into Helen’s hand while both 
of their hands were under the water 
flowing out of a pump. In a flash of insight 
Helen saw what all of this spelling was 
about. 
Immediately she ran about grasping 
objects and pounding on objects not 
ceasing till its name had been spelled into 
her hand. Apparently, that day, Helen 
learnt 30 words.
What intent- learn words
Yet ,experiencing 
complexity
What is happening
Given in experience
How to act
Manifestation of abductivity
 
Figure 14: Reading complexity in an everyday sense 
Helen abductively conceptualises the method by which she can learn words and acts 
accordingly. Implicit in the Helen Keller story is a reminder that our innate capacity 
to know “stuff” is not a mere adjunct to tools of inquiry. The use of innate abilities is 
itself a method for knowing, with or without tools. This is the point Stenger‟s 
(2004:96) makes in her warning about not taking for granted the inquirer who has to 
„wonder what is relevant and how each time, with each new situation‟.  
Helen Keller‟s behaviour is illustrative of „a concrete bit of personal experience‟ 
(James, in McDermott, 1977:768) of complexity involving subjective concatenated 
knowing: a relation between self and the external world and the cognitive operation of 
abduction. It is a relation connecting real events (e.g., experiencing complexity) with 
real events (i.e., what is happening and the activity of thought). 
Agrarian practice of Andean potato farmers 
Changing patterns of temperature, humidity, air pressure, wind and precipitation 
produce weather: the dynamic state of the atmosphere at any one place at any time. 
Weather manifests different aspects under certain conditions. Weather is a concrete 
example of complexity; of a natural phenomenon that behaves complexly (Nicolis & 
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Prigogine, 1989). The creation of scientifically-based forecasts is made possible by 
use of sophisticated computer programmes and satellite technology. Computer 
simulation of the weather relies on forecast models to provide predictions on 
atmospheric variables such as temperature, pressure, wind and rainfall. A weather 
forecaster examines how the features predicted by the computer will interact to 
produce the day‟s weather. The task is data intensive. Official forecasts, as 
meteorologist and eminent chaos theorist Edward Lorenz (1993:77) reminds, are 
sometimes „just plain wrong‟. Forecast accuracy is a matter of degree and 100 percent 
accuracy elusive. The creation of official forecasts with a degree of accuracy is time 
limited, usually to about a week. And it is certainly outside the scope of practice of 
meteorology to read the sky and warn of weather months ahead. Even so, as this next 
story shows, it is possible to take a common sense-making approach, read the sky, and 
forecast what the weather would bring in certain conditions months later. 
Weather forecasting based on scientific methods is commonly thought to be a vast 
improvement on the quaint superstitions and “mumbo jumbo” of common sense 
methods that result in rituals, or the observation of phenomena ostensibly extraneous 
to weather like the moon or stars, and weather rhymes such as “red sky at night” - all 
of which are features of the agrarian practice of potato farmers in the Andes of Peru 
and Bolivia investigated by Benjamin Orlove, John Chiang and Mark Cane (2000, 
2002). 
During the festival of San Juan in late June each year, local farmers go to the top of 
the nearest mountain and look for the Pleiades star cluster in the constellation Taurus. 
They believe that the appearance of the stars can be used to forecast summer rainfall 
four months ahead and the size of the autumn harvest. Their common sense rule-of-
thumb or principle for prediction is expressed in lore along the lines of: „if they 
[Pleiades] come out at their biggest, this year we‟ll have plenty; but if they come out 
at their smallest, we‟re in for a very hard time‟ (Orlove et al., 2002:435). Their 
predictions determine the planting dates of potatoes. If poor rains are predicted 
planting is postponed by 4-6 weeks (Orlove et al., 2002). According to Orlove et al. 
(2000, 2002) the Andean potato farmers‟ forecasting method works with a marked 
degree of reliability that exceeds modern scientific forecasting practice.  
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The implication, in this story of encounters with complexity, is that there are people 
who are not scientists, who do not necessarily “get it wrong”, and people who are 
scientists, who do not necessarily “get it right”. What the Andean potato farmers 
study does not address is the question of how come the farmers, the non-scientists, 
actually „got it right‟. Nor does the study ponder why science, as yet, cannot match 
the farmers‟ practice, even though meteorology and climatology are sciences of 
complexity.  
Rather than addressing the complexity manifest in weather with a model, the common 
sense-making approach shown by the Andean farmers addresses, first-hand, the 
complexity manifest in their situation. The common sense saying, “if they [Pleiades] 
come out at their biggest, this year we‟ll have plenty; but if they come out at their 
smallest, we‟re in for a very hard time”, indicates that Andean farmers posited a 
connection between what they observed and experienced on the ground, what they 
observed and experienced in relation to the night sky, and their intent. The particular 
lore relates: what to look out for in the night sky (stars big or small), occasion (June) 
and significance (good harvest or poor). The lore captures the insight which enables 
people to foresee how they would behave (not the weather) in light of the pattern 
bearing on their circumstance. Salient patterns that are realized can be viewed as a 
paradigmatic way of comprehending complexity.  
Another look at the Andean farmers‟ situation as described by Orlove et al. (2002) 
reveals a continuity comprising: space-place, time, seasons, weather, growth of crops, 
as well as the farmers‟ purpose and behaviour: 
The Indian villagers there must live within the tight constraints imposed by the 
elevation and climate and by the basic requirements of the crop. There is a 
distinct growing season during rainy months of the year, usually from October 
through March. These are also the warmest months and have the longest days, 
so they are the best for crops. However, potatoes have stringent requirements. 
If soil moisture remains too low after the tubers are planted, they will not 
produce strong shoots. If the ground freezes, the plants will be damaged. The 
farmers, well aware of the need for proper soil moisture and air temperature, 
aim to plant their potatoes right at the start of the rainy season, so that they 
will be assured of an adequately long period with appropriate conditions 
(Orlove et al., 2002:429). 
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Experience of scant rain and attendant consequences is in stark contrast to the form of 
experience from abundant rains, even though both are forms belonging to one larger 
or general pattern.  
Centuries later, descendants know the patterning: know what to look for; know what 
they would expect given certain conditions as opposed to “know what will happen”, 
and can adapt their behaviour accordingly. What remains unknown until they observe 
the stars, of course, is the form of patterning that will actually become the case, or 
even, if the forms of patterning persist. For descendants, the common sense-making 
lore summarizing the initial reading of complexity by their ancestors, gives the salient 
facts about what is relevant and to be taken account of, and what is likely to ensue, by 
which they can act with likely success.  
In giving an account of their research, Orlove et al. (2002) indicate the kinds of 
questions that motivated their cross-disciplinary study. How could credence possibly 
be given to the Andean farmers‟ behaviour? How could the appearance of stars 
possibly be connected with rainfall? Does this traditional method do the farmers any 
good? Especially, when the Andean farmers‟ belief, which they have acted on for 
centuries, “seemed as implausible as foretelling the outcome of a battle by examining 
the intestines of a sacrificed bull” (Orlove et al., 2002:428). Eventually, a scientific 
explanation was determined that revealed even more complexity at play. In short, the 
poor visibility of Pleiades in June is caused by an increase in high altitude cloud, 
invisible to the eye, but indicative of an El Nino year which is usually linked to 
reduced rainfall during the growing season months later (Orlove et al., 2000:68). Note 
that this explanatory finding, while of great interest to the scientific community, is 
essentially irrelevant in practical terms to the on-going lives of the villagers. 
Each of the three cases demonstrates that people have a capacity for complexity 
thinking generally. The three specific cases are a demonstration of complexity 
thinking in the most basic sense described by Peirce and James and underscore their 
classical pragmatist perspective that such thinking is about the way „we do think‟, not 
„what we ought to think‟ (James, in McDermott, 1977:385). A non-holistic but 
synechistic approach, which involves paying attention to what obtains in experience, 
concatenated knowing (what is intended, what is occurring, how to act) and abduction 
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(understood as the positing of continuities), constitutes a way we can think and know 
complexity for action (see Figure 15). 
 
Concatenated knowledge
Concatenated knowing
What is the intent – What is occurring – How to act
Abduction / Abductivity
 
Figure 15: Concatenated knowledge - a capacity for reading complexity 
Thus, the concept of complexity capability in policy analytic work can be re-framed 
and re-developed in the context of complexity thinking as described in terms of 
classical pragmatism. Rather than a focus on developing new ways of thinking by 
understanding the basics of complexity science, a possible alternative is to develop a 
practice of synechistic, concatenated knowing that utilizes human capability to read 
complexity. The implications of complexity capability re-framed in classical 
pragmatist terms for policy analytic work include the imperative to look at 
concatenated knowing at a different scale, namely at a social level.  
In this next section I complete my examination of pragmatism as a classical 
expression of complexity thinking with consideration given to the kind of complexity 
that reading complexity in the social domain would entail in light of the 
epistemological argument of “wicked” problems, namely, that knowledge policy 
makers need is to be found in social processes and the rationality of stakeholders and 
citizens (Rittel & Webber, 1973).  
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Reading complexity: opinion-based policy analysis  
There are other systems of knowledge concatenation besides what is intended, what is 
occurring, how to act. In addition to complexity thinking as a general capacity that 
human beings share, James‟ account of systems of knowledge concatenation includes 
a wider system of intellectual pluralism which can be regarded as a knowledge system 
of subjectivity. Such a system yields a complex reality in which policy analysts (and 
politicians and public administrators) are implicated even when engaged in objective 
practice. About this form of knowledge concatenation, James (in McDermott, 
1977:264-265) wrote: 
… everything in the world might be known by somebody, yet not everything 
by the same knower, or in one single cognitive act, - much as all mankind is 
knit in one network of acquaintance, A knowing B, B knowing C, Y knowing 
Z, and Z possibly knowing A again, without the possibility of anyone knowing 
everybody at once. This „concatenated‟ knowing, going from next to next, … 
makes a coherent type of universe in which the widest knower that exists may 
yet remain ignorant of much that is known to others. 
The point of view of a many, of autonomous knowers “hanging together” or 
“knowing together” in a knowledge system (a network) of subjectivity, connotes a 
wide field of experience and knowing. James talked of a „forest of human 
experiences‟. Subjective reality that is constituted at the individual level is a 
constellation of points of view or a complex of opinion at different scales of social life 
(see Figure 16). In the terminology of our day, rather than refer to synechistic, 
concatenated subjectivity we might refer to social subjectivity, social experiences, 
intersubjectivity, or public opinion.  
In such a knowledge system of subjectivity in which the psychology of the individual 
„can never be omitted or suppressed‟ (James in McDermott, 1977:768) individual 
elements of experience and knowing manifest multiple iterations of common ways of 
knowing rooted in multiple “concrete bits of personal experience”. Processes of social 
rationality encompass, then, multiple repetitions of looking at issues but with 
variation in individual discovery and meaning. As talked about by James (in 
McDermott, 1997:768) subjective reality, that is, „our very experience itself‟ as „felt 
or thought of‟, affects what eventuates in social contexts.  
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Further, James (in McDermott, 1997: 432) stressed the importance of communication 
for knowing. He (in McDermott, 1977:435) urged: „we must talk consistently just as 
we must think consistently‟, „for both in talk and thought we deal with kinds‟. James 
(in McDermott, 1977:435) insists that all human thinking „gets discursified‟, „verbally 
built out‟ and „made available for everyone‟. Moreover, he argues, we may be co-
conscious and not know it, that is, our experiences may be „ “with” each other in 
various external ways‟. In other words, “the point of view of a many” formulation of 
concatenated knowing suggests that a pattern of opinion lies hidden within the 
subjective system. This implies, in general terms, that an explicatory and exemplary 
pattern of experience is present but not easily observed. From a policy standpoint, this 
would-be existent pattern can be viewed as a “situational paradigm” indicating a 
working context that implicates policy analysis. If this situational paradigm could be 
known then policy analysts might use that knowledge to arrive at a realistic 
conceptualization of what to pay attention to and not explain away as “anomalies” in 
the real world of human affairs. 
 
Social processes & the rationality of citizens have the 
basic characteristic of subjectivity 
form
Public   scale
Individual  scale
Group  scale
A point of view of a many A point of viewA point of view of a few
 
Figure 16: A knowledge system of subjectivity 
To take concatenated knowing at this level seriously, the level of a point of view of a 
many that according to James, in his day, was „sneered at as unscientific‟ (James, in 
McDermott, 1977:768), for James meant that it is possible to work things out 
together.  
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Assuming that subjective relations are real, that social processes have the basic 
characteristic of subjectivity, and that opinion can be defined to incorporate the social 
rationality available in individual experience, it may be that what occurs as a complex 
of opinion likely to hang together about specific matters of social wellbeing, or social 
concerns and issues, constitutes what is to be taken account of in a reading complexity 
policy practice; just as the traffic is to be taken account of in the act of crossing the 
road, or the patterns of brightness apparent in the stars are heeded in the act of 
planting the staple crop in the Andes. If this assumption holds, then, few if any 
attempts to understand complex problems of social policy are likely to succeed 
without, in some way or another, making use of subjectivity in the conceptualization 
of such issues. This epistemological claim implicates reading complexity as an 
approach to knowledge about social subjectivity for an analysis of what to pay 
attention to and not overlook in regard to a particular issue.  
If I tease this out a little more, I could represent my discussion of a reading 
complexity practice in a comparative table. As I have already discussed, Dent‟s 
(1999) portrayal of differences in worldviews associates modernist methods of 
science with limited complexity capability. In general, those elements such as 
subjective reality, mutual causality, indeterminism, and holism that from a scientific 
perspective characterise complexity are elements typically ignored within the 
paradigm of analytical rigour. Policy analytic methods that share the commitments 
(theoretical, instruments, and techniques) of modernist science are thus implicated in 
a paradigmatic process, in Kuhnian terms, of an accumulation of anomalies. 
Confinement to one standard form of practice - evidence-based policy analysis - is not 
an easy path to new understandings.  
In Table 5 I have suggested, in broad terms, a list of some commitments that describe 
what might a practice of reading complexity entail that is different from an evidence-
based policy analysis practice. This revalorisation of opinion in policy advice in 
complex and intractable situations, predicated on linkages between pragmatism and 
complexity thinking, is an argument for choice in how to practice science according to 
the cases of policy analytic work that arise.  
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Reading complexity opinion-based 
policy analysis
Standard evidence-based policy 
analysis practice
Scientific Common sense
Positivism
Deductive
Justification
Traditional (objective reality)
Reliance on pre-existing theoretical 
perspectives, conceptual frameworks 
and understandings
Limited to what flows from objective, 
deterministic, reductive and 
disjunctive thinking
Classical pragmatism
Abductive
Discovery
Emerging (subjective reality)
Reliance on open thinking independent 
of pre-existing theoretical perspectives, 
conceptual frameworks and 
understandings
 Enhanced by (the complements) of 
subjective, abductive and conjunctive 
thinking
Mode of 
rationality
Epistemological 
footing
i t l i l 
f ti
Logic
Epistemological 
context
i t l i l 
t t
World view
Manner of 
knowing
r f 
i
Complexity 
capability
 
Table 5: Differences between evidence-based and reading complexity policy analysis practice 
Evidence-based and opinion-based are not mutually exclusive practices. Drawing on a 
play of words from Haack (2005), policy analysts could rely on both scientific and 
common sense modes of rationality, replacing „cynicism‟ about our natural 
capabilities and the value of opinion with „synechism‟ and the idea that understanding 
complexity is „possible for us‟ (Haack, 2005:242) when we rely on an adaptive mind 
that „stands related‟ (Smith, 1965:105) to a purposeful life in a complex and changing 
world. The implication of replacing cynicism with synechism is that confidence and 
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the opportunity to develop skills in reading complexity activity based in the classical 
pragmatism mode of science (abduction-deduction-induction), would be required. 
Missing from the list of commitments is a methodology that can be applied to reading 
complexity as an epistemological capability. Without the recognition of a set of 
specified procedures through which reading complexity can take place confidence is 
an unlikely prospect. In this regard, Q methodology may be an invaluable help as I 
shall go on to discuss in Chapter 5.  
In closing this part of my discussion I make one last point concerning how classical 
pragmatism relates to the new sciences based on my selective reading of the new 
science literature. 
Classical pragmatism and new science 
Classical pragmatism is not usually said to be the precursor of the new thinking: this 
generative capacity is rather attributed to quantum, chaos, and complexity theories, 
which signify a fundamental change taking place in our understanding of the world 
and the way we know it (Morçol, 2000). Yet, much of classical pragmatist thought 
pertains to the emerging perspective or sciences of complexity. The classical 
pragmatist doctrine of relations advanced by Peirce and then James lies at core of 
these new sciences as indicated below.  
Heisenberg, writing in 1958, gives his account of quantum theory in Physics and 
Philosophy. He makes clear that the Copenhagen Interpretation accepts a world of 
concatenation that „does not allow a completely objective description of nature‟ 
(Heisenberg, 1999:107). He states:  
… one sees that one has now divided the world not into different groups of 
objects but into different groups of connections … What can be distinguished 
is the kind of connection which is primarily important in a certain 
phenomenon … The world thus appears as a complicated tissue of events, in 
which connections of different kinds alternate or overlap or combine and 
thereby determine the texture of the whole (Heisenberg, 1999:107). 
Henry Stapp (1971:1313), a physicist who has written on the topic of the web 
philosophy of quantum science points out that the Copenhagen Interpretation of 
quantum theory is „completely pragmatic‟. One of its starting points is that „the 
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objects of everyday experience exist roughly the way suggested by common sense‟ 
(Stapp, 1971:1313). Also accepted is that the idea, for example, of a table existing 
alone in the universe has an „air of unrealness about it‟ (Stapp, 1971:1313). A real 
table, as Stapp (1971:1313) goes on to say: 
… is constructed by certain workmen acting with certain tools on trees from a 
certain forest. It rests in a certain place, e.g., in my study, and has certain other 
objects arranged about it, e.g., my chair and me … Any conception of the table 
that isolates it from its past, its environment, or its future, is an idealization the 
limits of validity of which are not immediately known … At the atomic and 
elementary-particle level, the idea of independent entities dissolves; the most 
elementary things have meaning only in terms of their effects on other things. 
In quantum theory and in classical pragmatism the world is seen to have a 
concatenated structure. The idea of supervenient relations pertains in both 
epistemological frames as does James‟ conclusion, as previously cited, that 
„everything that exists is influenced in some way by something else, if you can only 
pick the way out rightly‟. 
More latterly, Capra (1997, 2002), who was trained as a particle physicist, advances 
and extends the web philosophy for understanding complex adaptive living systems 
and social reality. Capra (2002:xii) has sought to provide a unified view of „mind, 
matter, and life‟ for the purpose of approaching „some of the critical issues of our 
time‟, which certainly qualifies as a pragmatic undertaking. He attempts to present 
what a unified scientific view of social reality would entail for becoming conversant 
with complex social phenomena, that is, what would constitute a scientific complex 
perception of social reality. According to Capra (2002), such a scientific perception of 
social reality would necessitate, along with seeing „networks and networks nested 
within larger networks‟ the taking account of relations between form, processes, 
meaning, and matter. His framework, which he develops in detail using complexity 
theory, the cognitive sciences, and insights from the natural and social sciences, is 
essentially epistemological. It deals with the integration of knowledge about life. In 
this respect, Capra‟s framework is in keeping with the transdiciplinary school of 
complexity thinking.  
The important difference between Capra‟s version of complexity thinking and the 
classical pragmatist version lies in the classical pragmatist distinction between “what 
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to think” and “how to think”. The former means to think in terms of complexity 
theory, concepts, and methods and address issues on the basis of scientific 
explanations of complexity. It is a form of objective complexity thinking. The latter 
means to think abductively and in terms of “what you are doing” in relation to “what 
is occurring” and address issues on the basis of well-conceived action. It is the latter 
version of complexity thinking which I associate with classical pragmatism. 
Summary 
In this chapter I examined the idea of complexity capability from a complexity 
thinking perspective. There have been suggestions made in the complexity literature 
as to what form a new paradigm of complexity could take. My discussion centred on 
classical pragmatism as offering a set of different commitments and a way to 
conceptualise opinion in relation to the development of knowledge that might better 
meet the demands of a “complexity project” in the policy sphere in contrast to the 
rationality project associated with modernist science.  
A fundamental issue I have associated with the quest by policy analysts for 
complexity capability and new ways of thinking is that of knowing what mode of 
knowing may make a difference in what eventuates from the policy process: knowing 
complexity theory, or a synechistic, concatenated knowing? As I argued, an 
epistemological basis for an opinion-based policy practice, described as “reading 
complexity” that relies on a characteristic of common sense-making way of thinking, 
namely, abduction can be found in classical pragmatism. In light of this, and in 
response to the research questions that concern the efficacy of Q methodology in 
relation to policy analytic work, in Chapter 5 I inquire into “Q thinking” and the kind 
of science advanced by Stephenson for its potential to enable a reading complexity 
practice.  
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Chapter 5: Q thinking 
 
Introduction 
Stephenson‟s science of subjectivity has been used to research difficult public policy 
issues and help find solutions to intractable policy problems (Brown, Durning & 
Seldon, 2007). The Schiphol Airport policy controversy is one illustration of Q 
methodology being used to assist the search for solutions to a specific difficult policy 
issue. Through the use of this research tool, not only was previously unavailable 
policy relevant knowledge provided from the Q methodological study but a realistic 
overall picture of a body of policy arguments made it possible to define the problem 
in tractable ways and commence fresh deliberations on the issue of airport expansion.  
The value of Stephenson‟s science of subjectivity tends to be assessed on the basis of 
its technique, the means by which data are collected, and method, the means by which 
the collected data is analysed (Brown, 2011c). To recap, in simple terms, Q 
methodology technique and method involve: 
... statements of opinion (Q sample) that an individual rank-orders in terms of 
some condition of instruction - e.g., from “most agree” (+5) to “most 
disagree” (-5). The items so arrayed comprise what is called a Q sort. Q sorts 
obtained from several persons are normally correlated and factor-analyzed ... 
(Brown, 1980:6). 
By contrast, however, the value of the thinking behind the research procedures tends 
rather to be overlooked. While not attempting full coverage of the founding concepts 
of Q methodology, in this chapter I consider Stephenson‟s kind of science and the “Q 
thinking” that goes with it. Of interest is the extent to which Stephenson‟s insights 
contribute to a potential epistemological reframing that is different from 
interpretative, or reductive, or integrative modes of science. The chapter highlights 
that Q methodology as distinct from Q method has an epistemological claim in the 
revalorization of opinion. My primary interest is in how Stephenson‟s kind of science 
offers the potential to read complexity in the social policy context, especially where 
explanation may not suffice for understanding what an actual policy situation is all 
about.  
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Since Stephenson first proposed Q methodology and then advanced the thought 
underlying Q methodology and its application in his book The Study of Behaviour 
(1953), several key works in Q methodology have been published that, to a greater or 
lesser extent, give an extended treatment of technique, method, and applications. 
Among these, Steven Brown‟s (1980) Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q 
methodology in political science features as a primary work that provides detailed 
treatment of the philosophy, methodological issues, method and technique. Bruce 
McKeown‟s and Dan Thomas‟ (1988), Q Methodology, offers an introductory primer 
to prepare those unfamiliar with the methodology for engaging with the more 
substantial literature covering theoretical, philosophical, and methodological debates, 
critiques, clarifications, and applications. This work has been followed up with the 
publication in the journal, Operant Subjectivity, of a simplified introduction to the 
procedures and technical aspects of Q methodology by Brown (1993:91-138) in A 
Primer on Q Methodology. In this primer, Brown looks also at different conceptions 
of the methodology. 
Since the mid-1980s, the number of papers and chapters on Q technique and 
methodology has increased as the applications of Q methodology in systematic 
studies of a wide range of subject matters have increased in psychology, political 
science, communication and media studies, the environmental sciences, the health 
sciences, and the behavioral sciences more generally as evinced in the bibliographical 
updates made available through the journal Operant Subjectivity. These documents 
and chapters typically provide introductory summaries of the basics of Q method. 
Recent accounts include: the chapter on Q methodology in Handbook of Research 
Methods in Public Administration by Steven Brown, Dan Durning, and Sally Seldon 
(2007); the document Q methodology: A Sneak Preview by Job van Excel and Gjalt de 
Graaf (2005); an introduction to the methodology by Jonathan Donner (2001) in 
Social Analysis: Selected Tools and Techniques, and Helen Addams‟ (2000) chapter 
on Q methodology in Social Discourse and Environmental Policy.  
The use of Q methodology in the context of public policy has resulted in an 
expanding body of work. Brown, Durning, and Seldon (2007:745-754) have 
categorised, with a bibliographical guide, the use of Q methodology by policy 
analysts and researchers under a series of headings and subheadings to indicate a 
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research agenda in the various fields of public administration, public management, 
public policy, and evaluation. In the field of public policy, Q methodology has been 
used in studies to: research influences on decisions that were made in the past (e.g., 
Donahue, 2004; van Excel, de Graaf & Rietveld, 2004; Webler, Tuler, Shockey, Stern 
& Beattie, 2003); understand better the perspectives of stakeholders and decision 
makers on decisions that will be made in the future (e.g., Steelman & Maguire, 1999; 
Wolf, 2004; Woolley & McGinnis, 2000); provide a mechanism for marginalised or 
powerless groups to make their views known (e.g., Brown, 2005; Combes, Hardy & 
Buchan, 2004); facilitate the search for compromise solutions to difficult policy issues 
(e.g., Dayton, 2000; Focht, 2002; Maxwell, 2000). 
Discussion proceeds in four parts. In the first part, concern is with three focal 
elements: the idea of a science of subjectivity, the rationale for an abductory 
methodology, and the general idea of knowledge which Stephenson advanced. I note 
that to my knowledge, Stephenson does not directly present Q methodology in terms 
of a theory of knowledge per se. He does, however, outline a general theory for 
subjective communicability (Stephenson, 1980b). Rooted in reclamation by 
Stephenson of the old concept of “conscire” as against the modern notion of 
“consciousness”, I suggest that this theory of communicability, equally, may be read 
as a theory of knowledge, that is, „the conscire approach‟ (Stephenson, 1980b:23) to 
theory and research for addressing problems from a subjective standpoint. A 
description of basic elements of Q method, with reference to the Sickness and 
Invalids‟ Benefit policy project case, comprises the third part and leads to a 
consideration of the proposition of the epistemological status of Q methodology and 
its transformative power in the fourth part. 
Subjective science 
Q methodology was first proposed at a time when science in general (positivism), 
including psychology, was reluctant to deal with „matters of opinion‟ (Stephenson, 
1986:39), discounting subjectivity as „contrary to objective science‟ and its 
investigative procedures until, at least, the advent of quantum physics. In the context 
of physics, Heisenberg (1999), among other quantum scientists, argued that scientific 
descriptions are not independent of the observer and the process of knowing. He said: 
„we have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed 
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to our method of questioning‟ (Heisenberg, 1999:58). This is the view which Stengers 
(2004) invokes in her claim that, for inquiry into complexity, the need in science is to 
further develop skills of interrogation. According to Capra (1997:40), this recognition 
of methods of questioning can be understood as: „a shift from objective to “epistemic” 
science; to a framework in which epistemology – “the method of questioning” – 
becomes an integral part of scientific theories‟. This view is a basic premise of the 
transdisciplinary stream of complexity thinking as evinced, for instance, in the works 
of Capra (1997, 2002) and has already been discussed in Chapter 4. 
Brown (2011b) reminds us that the writings of Stephenson focus on „the science of 
subjectivity‟ with references to specific Q studies to emphasise understanding what 
you are doing in the way of a subjective science. Irvin Goldman (1999:589) and later 
Michael Stricklin (2004/2005:87) suggest that in the human and social sciences 
Stephenson articulated an alternative framework of questioning and knowledge that 
ran counter to certain mainstream presumptions about what a science-based 
epistemology does and does not include.  
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Stephenson did not subscribe to Newtonian 
deductivism, determinism, or to disjunctive approaches marked by „mind-body 
dualism‟ (Delprato & Brown, 2002:146) (see also Good, 2010; Stephenson, 
1988/1989). Nor did Stephenson attribute an essential difference of nature to objective 
and subjective. In Stephenson‟s view, objective and subjective are, to borrow a 
Jamesian phrase, „of one and the same stuff‟ (James, in Mc Dermott, 1977:187). In 
other words, objectivity and subjectivity are understood as behaviour in general: 
„whether subjective to a person or objective to others‟ (Stephenson, 1953:23). For 
Stephenson, methodologically, the difference between objective and subjective is a 
matter of self-reference. To clarify, an example of the distinction is given in 
Stephenson (1995/1996:4): 
To sit down in front of TV, and to view for an hour, are statements of fact, as 
objectively regarded: they are testable without self-reference – anyone, in 
principle, can prove or disprove the matters. But when the viewer says “I 
immerse myself in that world”, and “when it‟s over I‟m just myself again,” the 
statements are intrinsically self-referent, and incapable of proof or disproof by 
traditional scientific rules. 
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The use by Stephenson of the term “concrete” is relevant here. Broadly, by “concrete” 
is meant „confrontables‟, that is, „spatiotemporal things and events‟ as against 
„hypothetical entities‟ (Delprato & Brown, 2002:144). The point of view of a person, 
their beliefs, feelings, ideas, opinions, and so forth are all communicable (Stephenson, 
1969). In this regard, what people have to say for themselves, or „may say about this-
or-that as matters of their opinion‟ (Stephenson, 1969:69) are concrete or confrontable 
subjective behaviours. Thus, the term “behaviour” is important for understanding the 
type of science advanced by Stephenson and which he fully embeds in Q method - as 
will be shown subsequently. In addition, a basic tenet of Q methodology is that 
„subjectivity arises from persons and not groups‟ (Smith, 2001:334). Stephenson 
(1953, 1978) calls attention to subjectivity as the point of view or opinion of a total 
thinking, feeling, and behaving person in changing interactions from situation to 
situation (see Smith, 2001). 
An experimental psychologist who initially trained as a physicist in the positivist 
tradition, and was forced, as he put it, „to think of methodologies‟ (Stephenson, 
1993/1994:3), Stephenson (1986:39) developed Q methodology with the idea in mind 
that „problems in nature can be examined subjectively‟ (Stephenson, 1986:39). In 
other words, Stephenson had in mind a general subjective science to complement 
objective science. In thinking through the idea of Q methodology as science, I 
identified that there were at least four possible kinds of science that could come into 
play. These four kinds are represented in Table 6 below. 
In looking at this schema of science I have put together, of these four forms that a 
general science might take, which I label (below), the second, “objective-subjective” 
is how Stephenson envisaged Q methodology. In other words, he devised a way to 
work with objective facts, beginning with the empirical fact that people have 
opinions, under experimental conditions, from a subjective standpoint. It follows that 
in order to understand Q methodology it does not suffice to think of it in the limited 
sense of “the study of subjectivity”. Granted, such a science is used for the study of 
subjectivity (attitudes, values, beliefs, ideas, perceptions, judgements, feelings, 
meanings and so forth), but the possibilities expand in terms of subject matter insofar 
as the scope of subjective science is immensely wide, in principle if not in fact. All 
kinds of things, including, for instance, the problems of the public that manifest in the 
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context of experience are open to systematic subjective study with the use of objective 
material.  
 
Kind of science Working with... 
Subjective-subjective Subjective material examined 
subjectively 
Objective-subjective Objective material examined subjectively  
Subjective-objective Subjective material examined objectively 
Objective-objective Objective material examined objectively 
 
Table 6: Four possible kinds of science 
In order to appreciate the systematic nature of Stephenson‟s subjective science it is 
worth noting that among all the sciences, quantum methodology of science is likely to 
be the closest in form to Q methodology. Stephenson (e.g., 1983, 1988/1989, 
1995/1996) elaborates this view in his writings. He tells us that Q methodology has a 
„foundation in quantum theory‟, in the „mathematical similarity between factor 
analysis and quantum mechanics‟ (Stephenson, 1995/1996:1). It is not the intention of 
this thesis to engage with the (advanced) mathematical similarity between Q 
methodology-based factor analysis and quantum mechanics. However, the similarity 
between doing a Q methodology experiment and a quantum-type experiment is of 
interest here.  
Much like quantum science 
The similarity is shown in specific relation to the Copenhagen Interpretation of 
quantum mechanics and the set-up of the quantum “double-slit” experiment involving 
light. Light (photons, or atoms, or electrons) is shone on a screen with two slits in it 
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that allow light to pass through to a second screen that results in a pattern made by the 
light as it passes through the experiment (see Figure 17).  
 
 
Figure 17: The Copenhagen explanation   
Source Al-Khalili (2003: 135) 
This key experiment involving the behaviour of light has led to different and 
conflicting interpretations of quantum mechanics in the attempt to understand and 
give a convincing explanation of why quantum scientists get the experimental results 
they do. Yet, physicists use quantum mechanics without a settled explanation for why 
it works (Al-Khalili, 2003; Gribbin, 1996). A way to envisage doing a Q methodology 
experiment is to think of the Q experiment as a kind of prope-quantum experiment 
(prope - Latin for “beside” or “near”) involving a subjective system and not light, that 
is, a quantum system. 
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In simple terms, the diagram in Figure 17 shows the quantum experimental situation 
according to the Copenhagen Interpretation. It shows a light source, and the projection 
of light onto the screen (the measurement) which reveals the pattern made by the light 
(the result of the measurement). The diagram depicts a curtain (“the quantum 
curtain”) obscuring what goes on between the light source and the pattern that is made 
by the light passing through the experiment (Al- Khalili, 2003:135). The Copenhagen 
Interpretation does not give an unambiguous and clear cut explanation of the 
behaviour of light behind the curtain as much as offer an interpretation of what 
quantum theory means (Gribbin, 1996).  
Basically, the Copenhagen Interpretation tells us that since we cannot know what goes 
on behind “the quantum curtain” without affecting the results we can only talk about 
what we can see. What we can see is the interference pattern on the screen (the 
measurement). As expressed by Jim Al-Khalili (2003:138-139) ideas that comprise 
the Copenhagen Interpretation include: 
We can never describe a quantum system independently of a measuring 
apparatus. It is meaningless to ask about the state of the system in the absence 
of the measuring device, since we can only ever learn something about the 
system if we take it in conjunction with the device we use to look at it. 
The role of the observer is central. Since the observer is free to choose what 
type of measurement to make (the position or momentum of a particle) then 
the quantum entity cannot be said to have these properties until we look. The 
quantum entity remains suspended in a superposition
7
 until we decide what we 
wish to measure. In this way, certain properties of the quantum system are 
only endowed with reality at the moment of measurement.  
The act of measurement brings about a sudden jump in the state of the 
measured system from a combination of potential properties to one actual 
outcome. 
All that can be commented upon are the results of measurements. 
In short: „All that can be said is that an experiment is set up in a certain way, and 
certain measurements are made, then you will see certain results‟ (Gribbin, 1996:14; 
                                               
7 The idea of superposition is a general property of waves. An illustration of superposition given by Al-
Khalili (2003:81) is as follows: “If two stones are dropped in a pond close to each other the ripples will 
spread out and meet, forming a superposition that has a pattern very different to the two sets of 
concentric waves, due to interference. 
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Gribbin references this statement as Bohr‟s summation of the Copenhagen view). 
Here is a good place to note that this statement resembles Peirce‟s pragmatic maxim, 
viz., „If I act in manner x, then I will have experiences of the sort y‟ or „If I want to 
experience y, then I will act in manner x‟ (Moore, 1961). Furthermore, the logic of the 
statement attributed to Bohr approximates, for instance, the logic intrinsic to the 
farming practice of the Andean potato farmers, which I (re)express here as: if the 
constellation Pleiades appears in a certain way, and certain observations are made, 
then we will act in manner x in order to experience y. Again, as far as I know, 
abduction is not referred to in accounts of quantum methodology of science (e.g., 
Heisenberg‟s (1999), Physics and Philosophy). Nevertheless, the Copenhagen 
Interpretation points to an abductive discovery practice at play in the development of 
quantum mechanics. In quantum physics, the quest for the best explanation of the 
underlying structure of quantum phenomenon continues. 
The double slit effect in the Q experiment is formed by the person (source) making 
choices among alternatives under specified conditions (“most agree”/ “most 
disagree”). The outcome of the Q experiment is a Q sort (the measurement) that 
results in a pattern in the form of a distributed set of numbered statements rendered by 
the behaviour of a total thinking, feeling, and behaving person. In the case of Q 
methodological studies where multiple persons are asked to operate under the same 
condition of instruction, each person‟s participation replicates the same experiment 
with an outcome „which is in no way dependent upon the outcome of the other 
experiments‟ (Brown, 1995:2). The results of these measurements are submitted to 
correlation and factor analysis so that the researchers can see the structure or form or 
pattern of subjectivity that is a function of the experimental setting which involves a 
condition of instruction and the participant‟s lived life (Delprato & Brown, 2002). In 
this regard, subjectivity has an indeterminate aspect: „We know in advance neither 
how many factors there will be nor what structure they will reveal‟ (Brown, 
1993:135). The individuals provide the factors - their „perspectives of existence‟ 
(Stephenson, 1986:47) as against the perspective of the researcher in hypothetico-
deductive mode.  
In the Q experiment, the equivalent of “the quantum curtain” relates to the idea of 
consciousness or the nature of mind or cognition and the process of knowing. Q 
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methodology is not concerned with what goes on in the mind of the individual as such 
and so replaces notions of „consciousness‟ (Stephenson, 1995/1996:5) with the idea of 
communicability. As Stephenson (1995/1996:2) suggests: „whatever went on in the 
“mind” of the individual is captured directly by the Q sorts and measured instantly‟. 
The measurements are made by the Q sorters themselves about their own point of 
view and involve means of human expression: „... it is axiomatic that only the person, 
himself, can measure his own subjectivity‟ (Stephenson, 1981:47).  
Thus, it is possible to understand Q methodology experiments in terms similar to the 
ideas of the Copenhagen Interpretation, replacing “quantum system” with “subjective 
system” and measurement “devices” with each person‟s own operant subjectivity. By 
“operant” is meant „naturally occurring‟ (Stephenson, 1981:3) in the particular 
situation. To borrow Brown‟s (1980:6) way of putting it, a person‟s behaviour 
indicates „what is operant in their case‟, that is, their „conception of the way things 
stand‟ (Brown, 1980:6) vis-a-vis the subject matter. The factors are „naturally 
occurring confrontable events‟ as opposed to „hypothetical entities‟; „objective for the 
persons who render them‟ and for the researcher who interprets (Delprato & Brown, 
2002:144). This notion of operantcy introduces a significant epistemological 
implication insofar as it is a common denominator for a variety of related points of 
view understood as behaviour in general. In effect, what this means is that the 
objective/subjective dichotomy as a methodology of science construct is replaced with 
the concept of operant subjectivity.  
Essentially, a Q methodology investigation centres on the way in which subjectivity 
of the individual and together with other individuals „hangs together‟ about the 
subject matter of interest (Stephenson, 1956:11). Stephenson tells us that revealed 
structures are the „nexus for the meaning of the situation‟ (Stephenson, 1981:47), that 
is, what the situation means to the researcher and to the participant. Participants and 
the researcher „reach their own “understandings”, their own interpretations‟ 
(Stephenson, 1980b:33). On this connection, it follows that in the method‟s practice 
of science the researcher can participate in the Q experiment that they set up. By way 
of researcher participation, Q methodology confronts head on the issue for science of 
bias. 
158 
 
The question of bias (the distortion of findings) is central to the validity and reliability 
of findings. Robust science eschews bias. In Stephenson‟s subjective science, 
researcher participation is countenanced because it allows the researcher to see „their 
own perspective on the same matters via the same procedures‟ and in „the same 
observational filed‟ (Brown, 1993:124). In other words, the researcher can perform a 
Q sort and replicate the experiment. By being a participant it is possible for the 
researcher, and anyone else who might care to look, to see where they are located in 
terms of the factors that reveal the underlying structure of points of view and 
concomitant conceptualisations. The question “why care to look?” is answered by 
Brown (1993:124) who points out that in all likelihood it is from „that perspective‟ 
that interpretation of factors will be rendered. 
Q methodology‟s likeness to quantum science makes the point that Q methodology 
differs in quite fundamental ways from other approaches to subjectivity and the study 
of opinion. These differences stem from Q method‟s origins in psychometrics 
involving factor analysis and the method‟s function as a practice of science. 
Criticisms of Q methodology can be traced to the method‟s origins (Brown, 1972). 
Origins 
Q methodology has its beginning in psychology and a re-think of classical factor 
theory (Stephenson, 1953; 1969; 1990b, 1993/1994). Classical factor theory refers to 
factor theory created by Charles Spearman (1904) (Stephenson, 1988/1989). Factor 
analysis is defined generally as a set of statistical techniques the aim of which is to 
simplify complex sets of data - a process that is best understood as an act of 
condensing - as an aid in conceptualisation (Gorsuch, 1974; Kline, 1994). As 
Stephenson (1977:8-9) put it, citing Sir Cyril Burt (1940), factor analysis „merely 
enables us...to hold together in thought a definite but complex pattern of 
characteristics‟. In his book, Applied Factor Analysis, Rudolph Rummel (1970:22) 
describes a prime use of factor analysis as a research technique in terms of: „a screen 
through which data is sifted to bare underlying structure‟ with the aim to „net 
unknown patterns of phenomena in the hope of making a catch of unsuspected 
influences at work in a domain‟. Factor analysis in general has a history as a useful 
social science technique for studying situations and states of complexity (Stephenson, 
1977).  
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Traditional factor analysis belongs in the category of R methodology. Broadly 
conceived, R methodology, which is rooted in positivism and hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning, refers to the statistical methods used for scientific research in the social 
sciences (Brown, 1972; Brown, Durning & Seldon, 2007; Brown & Robyn, 2004). R 
methods are „typified by survey techniques, Likert scales, and other devices that seek 
to measure a person‟s opinion‟ (Robbins & Krueger, 2000:637). In psychology in the 
1930s and 1940s, R methodology was used for studies of personality traits 
(Stephenson, 1956). In the field of politics, with the advent of modern opinion polling 
in the 1930s (Gallup poll), R methodology became the dominant survey and public 
opinion research paradigm (Fitzgerald, 2008).  
In a Letter to the Editor, Nature, 1935, Stephenson announced a new factor technique 
that differed from that of the traditional R methodology technique of factor analysis in 
which a population of n individuals is measured in m tests. He posited that n different 
tests (measurable material) were to be measured by m individuals. In other words: 
„Individuals were not to receive scores on objective tests ... but were to assign scores 
by comparing the “tests” with one another‟ (Brown, 1978:2). The „meta theory of Q 
factors‟ is how persons see things and how „this or that matters‟ to them (Stephenson, 
1969:80). This innovation involving factor technique provoked „a good deal of 
controversy‟ (Brown, 1972:57) which eventually died away but left „Q methodology, 
method, and Q-sort technique‟ (Brown, 1972:60) cast to the margins of “normal” 
science understanding of what logical inquiry is about (Brown, 2004; Smith, 2001).  
As Brown (2011a) notes there is a common perception among critics that Q 
methodology is „irregular‟ or not “regular” enough, particularly in its statistical 
technical aspects, which is a legacy of the original controversy. Brown (1972) gives a 
detailed and comprehensive account of the statistical technical aspects at issue which 
centred on correlation theory and the status of the Q data matrix in relation to the R 
data matrix. Brown (1972:58) notes: „To this day, it is widely believed that Q entails 
the correlating and factoring by rows the self-same matrix of data that in R is 
correlated and factored by columns‟. Stephenson argued that this view of the Q data 
matrix, which was advanced by proponents of R methodology, was mistaken. For 
Stephenson, as Brown (1972:58) states: 
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… the correlation of columns in R analysis and the correlations of rows in Q 
analysis were incommensurate because they were to be based initially on two 
different matrices of data, and not because of any differences in statistical 
mechanics. 
What Stephenson meant by those two matrices of data being incommensurable has to 
do with what is being measured, what is operational, the logical basis of the inquiry 
and what deductive and testing possibilities stem from factors that are reached (Brown 
& Robyn, 2004; Stephenson, 1956). In his paper Methodology of trait analysis, 
Stephenson (1956) provides an account of the differences between Q and R 
methodologies in those terms (see also Brown & Robyn, 2004). Stephenson‟s paper, 
which can be read as offering a theory of data, is a methodological critique of a paper 
by Raymond Cattell (1947) reporting on a study of personality traits organised around 
R method factor analysis.  
As Stephenson (1956:5) tells us, in Cattell‟s study concern was with: „students (X‟s), 
who assess their fellows (Y‟s) for the temperamental traits of the latter‟. In terms of 
what is measured and the source of operations, Stephenson‟s analysis of the Cattell‟s 
study can be summarised as follows: 
The factors are … referred to the Y‟s, the subjects under observation, by the 
X‟. This, I propose, is an operational mistake. The operations are not those of 
the Y-population, but of the X‟s (Stephenson, 1956:6). 
In short, Stephenson‟s methodological analysis of the Cattell study suggests that the R 
method factors, rather than convey elements of temperament of the assessed (Y‟s) 
convey the assessors (X‟s) „modes of regard‟ (Stephenson, 1956:5-8). In the process, 
R method factor analysis reduced the diversity and complex traits for study into a set 
of „unrelated‟ and „unrelatable‟ (Stephenson, 1956:6) fragments lifted from the „so-
called objective‟ frame of reference of the X‟s to constitute “tempermental traits”. 
Hence, in the context of psychology, Stephenson advances the argument given in 
physics: „what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of 
questioning‟ (Heisenberg, 1999:58).  
Stephenson‟s analysis of Cattell‟s study is not a repudiation of R method: „This is not 
to say that one learns nothing about the Y‟s in this way‟ (Stephenson, 1956:16). For 
Stephenson, R methodology, referred to as a „mode of regarding others‟, is simply an 
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inappropriate „scientific system‟ (Stephenson, 1956:16) to learn about human 
subjectivity. The differences between Q method and R method factor analysis 
manifest in what the factors reached mean in the scientific system. In Q method the 
factors reached provide a deductive framework that can lead to empirical tests by 
whatever methods may be sought (Stephenson, 1956). They are a starting point for 
inquiry centred on identifying the subjectivity of selected persons in regard to a 
particular issue, based on abductive logic as distinct from the hypothetico-deductive 
scientific system of the logical positivists (Stephenson, 1956).  
Stephenson (1964a; 1964b) went on to propose that Q method, with its abductive 
logic, could be used for the measurement of public opinion and be applied to 
„complex controversy‟ (Stephenson, 1964b:265). As he said:  
It is suggested that the method is basic to political science, and that, applied to 
controversial complexes, it could replace a great deal of current effort to 
measure public opinion by large sampling procedures (Stephenson, 
1964b:275). 
Twenty-four years after Stephenson‟s suggestion that Q method could be basic in 
political science, a paper by Dryzek (1988) in The Journal of Politics appeared with 
the title: The mismeasure of political man. This paper can be read as advancing in 
politics the kind of analysis of R methodology given by Stephenson in 1956 (see also 
Dryzek, 1990, chapters 8 and 9). In his criticism of opinion surveys used to 
investigate public opinion, rather than refer to “modes of regard”, Dryzek (1988:710) 
refers instead to „the discourse implicit in a scientific instrument‟  
Dryzek‟s analysis introduces a postmodern rejection of positivism constituted in 
political discourse analysis and (among others) the works of Foucault in which the 
„hegemonic power of dominant discourses‟ is emphasised (Dryzek, Clark & 
McKenzie, 1989:503). Dryzek (1988:713) argues that the familiar survey discourse 
and extensive use of opinion surveys contributes to „the legitimation of the prevailing 
political order and, conversely, stands in the way of a more discursive and 
participatory politics‟, not least of all because survey methodology embodies an 
encounter „which is thoroughly structured and dominated by the survey designer‟.  
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I note that in The mismeasure of political man Dryzek (1988:707-708) expresses a 
caveat of the work, viz., it does not: „detail any alternative method for empirical 
scrutiny of political man‟. However, he does suggest: „approaches that take the 
subjectivity of interviewees seriously… such as Q methodology‟ (Dryzek, 1988:708) 
would be a candidate. It follows that Dryzek is acknowledged for having linked Q 
methodology to discourse analysis (Brown, 1993:127, see also Dryzek, Clark & 
McKenzie, 1989).  
Q methodology and discourse analysis 
Q methodology is increasingly viewed as a form of discourse analysis that provides a 
greater recognition of socio-political attitudes than the findings of conventional polls 
and surveys (Addams and Proops, 2000). As Stephenson‟s methodology „extends out‟ 
from its origins into „a range of social science applications‟ (Addams & Proops, 
2000:ix) its efficacy tends to be viewed in instrumental terms. The efficacy of Q 
method and technique as a device for accessing subjectivity carries with it the 
implication that this device is “theory-neutral”, enabling adjunctive use. However, 
such a view runs the risk, as John Dryzek, Margaret Clark & Garry McKenzie (1989: 
502) say, of an „impoverished‟ and „truncated‟ version of Q methodology, in which Q 
methodology‟s own discourse embodied in Q method and technique can „fade from 
the its users‟ consciousness‟ (Dryzek, 1988:708). 
Jason Glynos, David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Ewen Speed (2009) offer a review 
of six key approaches to discourse analysis. Their analysis of the varieties and 
methods of discourse analysis includes Q methodology as one of the six key 
approaches - also included are political discourse theory, rhetorical political analysis, 
discourse historical analysis, interpretative policy analysis, and discursive 
psychology. Glynos et al., (2009:5) note that discourse has taken on a range of 
meanings: „… from natural language, speech, and writing, to almost anything that acts 
as a carrier of signification, including social and political practices, to discourse as an 
ontological horizon‟. As given in Glynos et al. (2009:8), „each discourse rests on 
certain assumptions, judgements, and contentions that provide the basic terms for 
analysis, debate, agreement and disagreement about an object‟. Discourse analytical 
approaches share Q methodology‟s concern with meaning and subjectivity, though 
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there are differences in how each approach conceptualises subjectivity (Glynos et al., 
2009).  
Dryzek, Clark, and McKenzie (1989) provide an account of a difference in meaning 
of subjectivity between political discourse analysis and Q methodology. The account 
given is in the context of a study the authors undertook looking at the relation of 
understandings, beliefs, and values of subjects to structures of international interaction 
and issues of Antarctica (Dryzek, Clark & McKenzie, 1989). The authors used Q 
methodology as the means of investigation. They state that Q methodology‟s 
contribution: „… stems from the fact that Q apprehends concourses through reference 
to their language‟ (Dryzek, Clark & McKenzie, 1989:502).  
Loosely expressed, the difference in the conceptualisation of subjectivity is rooted in 
the emphasis in discourse analysis on language and discursive processes that structure 
meaning and identity, and in Q methodology, on self-referential behaviour and shared 
knowledge. In regards to subjectivity, the authors make clear that their discourse 
analysis approach does not grant „ontological priority to individuals‟ but instead to 
language: „language is prior to subjectivity‟ (Dryzek, Clark & McKenzie, 1989:503). 
The authors cite Foucault (1980) in order to clarify further the difference they 
recognise between discourse analysis and Q methodology. According to Dryzek, 
Clark and McKenzie (1989:503), Foucault argues: „subjects are to a great extent the 
creation of the particular discourses – about mental health, sex, crime, religion, and so 
forth – within which they move‟. In Q methodology, however, the idea is that 
discourses are in part the creation of subjects who share knowledge with self-
reference (Stephenson, 1980). The authors agree with Foucault and recognise, as they 
said: 
… that individual subjectivity is partly the creation of the operant structure of 
the concourses in which the individual moves. And so that operant structure 
has an ontological standing on par with the subjects participating in the 
concourse (Dryzek, Clark & McKenzie, 1989:503). 
The difference in conceptualisations of subjectivity can lead to different meanings. In 
the context of their study, Dryzek, Clark and McKenzie (1989:503) give an example 
of what individual subjectivity created by a discourse means:  
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… when a country such as India becomes interested in the issue of Antarctica, 
the relevant Indian officials do not introduce any novel or independent 
perspectives on the issues; instead, they craft an identity within the constraints 
of the possibilities made available by the operant structure of the Antarctic 
concourse. 
In Q methodology, the conceiving of new ideas is intrinsic to individual subjectivity. 
While it may be possible that individual identity can be constituted by the operant 
structure of a concourse, Q methodology places emphasis on the possibilities of 
individual subjectivity, made available to others through communicative behaviour, 
introducing novel or independent perspectives on issues, which may or may not be 
shared by others. It is understandable that the concept of concourse comes to the fore 
in discourse analysis since it refers to an assemblage of statements of opinion. 
However, in Stephenson‟s system of science concourse functions as a statistical 
concept. In Q methodology, rather than concourse the concept of “conscire” would 
translate better into the idea of having ontological standing on par with the subjects.  
Dryzek, Clarke, and McKenzie (1989:503) recognise in Q methodology a „well-
developed paradigm for the study of human subjectivity‟ compatible with the aims of 
discourse analysis. Moreover, they suggest that this compatibility does not mean that 
Q methodology „should be viewed as a mere adjunct of formal theory‟ in which 
subjectivity is missing, used by analysts to correct „a blindspot‟ in their mode of 
analysis (Dryzek, Clarke and McKenzie, 1989:502). Q methodology can “stand 
alone” as an analytic strategy. 
In the literature on Q methodology are ample examples of empirical studies, on 
specific topics, in diverse fields (for example, media studies, political science, health, 
conflict resolution and environmental studies) utilising the methodology to good 
effect (see Brown, 2003). Through its record of demonstrated use, it is difficult to 
claim that Q methodology lacks dependable revelatory power. However, the literature 
equally shows that Q methodology has a history of marginalisation seemingly 
inconsistent with its track record (Brown, 2004).  
Noel Smith (2001) in his book, Current Systems in Psychology, devotes a chapter to Q 
methodology. He expresses the view that Q methodology „was a revolution that 
psychology was not ready for‟, and adds that Stephenson‟s approach has „outlived 
most of its critics but without being widely adopted‟ (Smith, 2001:322), at least in the 
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field of psychology where from the start the mainstream of the discipline evinced 
little enthusiasm for Stephenson‟s ideas (see also Brown, 2004; Good, 2010). It is 
perhaps not surprising that for a sustained period Q methodology was largely ignored, 
much like pragmatism, as room was made for the new positivist philosophies that 
came to dominate, for many hotly debated reasons, academic interest through the 
course of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, with emphasis on the testing of theories and 
not the question of „how did you first find your theory?‟ (see Popper, 1960:29). 
The substantive concern in this next section is with the thinking embodied in Q 
methodology in respect of its abductive logic and its theory of knowledge. 
Pragmatism, abduction, Q methodology link reaffirmed 
Q methodology is a method of science that is observational, experimental, interactive 
and interrogative. Use is made of methods of experiment and observation but not the 
method of a priori reasoning. In Q methodology, the basic concern is with eliciting 
the „factualities‟ (Stephenson, 1998:85) of „complex subjectivity‟ (Stephenson, 
1985:43) in terms of its basic structure in space and time. The technique can be 
described as projective in terms of the behaviour of the participants and the method as 
abductive in terms of the behaviour of the researcher (Stephenson, 1977, 1961a).  
Stephenson (1977:13) recognised that abduction, as had been enunciated by Peirce, 
afforded the study of „complex states and situations‟. In addition, Stephenson 
(1961b:13) appreciated that factor analysis provided „the first concrete 
exemplification‟ of Peirce‟s logic of abduction insofar as „factorists ... found their 
factors first, and then sought to explain them‟ (Stephenson, 1977:12). But, as 
Stephenson (1977:12) wrote: „it was another matter to explain the factor so reached‟. 
He adds, „What the factor analysis achieved was to indicate, substantially, which of 
some initial postulates, or concepts, or “constructs” were applicable‟ to the matters at 
issue in the concrete situation (Stephenson, 1977:12). The word “applicable” can be 
read as a synonym for operant. In other words, factor analysis indicates which 
conceptions of “the way things stand” are actual in the particular situation.  
As an example of an abductory methodology of science, in Q methodology emphasis 
in practice is on discovering what was previously unknown or unsuspected about a 
complex situation. Stephenson (1977:12) tells us, that rather than beginning with 
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theories and concepts, providing operational definitions for these, and testing them, as 
is the case with R methodology, the concern in Q methodology is with facts about 
human behaviour which „cannot be predicted or deduced‟ (Stephenson, 1961b:9). 
Consistent with the logic of abduction, explanation can only be given „after the facts 
have been observed‟ (Stephenson, 1961b:12), and then, the way is open for exploring 
matters further: „deductions drawn, and methods sought for putting these to empirical 
test‟ (Stephenson, 1956:7).  
Hence, the import of the comment attributed to Stephenson: „I‟m just a social scientist 
who lets neither psychology nor sociology nor statistics get in the way of insights into 
the complex matters at issue‟. Stephenson, as Brown (1995:3) points out, was not 
„anti-science‟ but „was critical of science for excluding subjectivity.‟ Stephenson does 
not mean that he rejected the sciences of psychology, sociology, or statistics. Rather, 
he alludes to his acceptance of abduction as a logic of indeterminacy and open inquiry 
and rejection of hypothetico-deductivism and closed inquiry for Q methodological 
studies (Stephenson, 1988/1989). Thus in Q methodology, technique and method are 
instrumental to a scientific practice held primarily as an act of discovery of 
hypotheses to explain facts (Stephenson, 1961a). 
The explicit use of abduction exemplifies a break with „the scientific habits of 
reductive acts and deduction‟ (Stengers, 2004:96) which, as mentioned earlier, some 
current complexity thinkers have argued is a fundamental necessity for an effective 
study of complexity.  
In this next section, I look more closely at the general idea of knowledge that along 
with the logic of abduction is placed at the heart of Q methodology. 
Conscire theory of knowledge 
The concept 
Drawing on C. S. Lewis‟s (1967) Studies in Words, in Consciring: A General Theory 
for Subjective Communicability,  Stephenson (1980b) outlines a brief genealogy of 
conscience and consciousness; two words with the same Latin root as conscire. 
“Conscire” means: 
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I share (with someone or with myself) the knowledge that ... or, simply, I 
know together with ... (someone) (Stephenson, 1980b:7).  
Here, I draw from Smith‟s (2001:330-331) brief summary of what Stephenson has to 
say about the shifts in meaning from a once general-purpose term for “knowing” to 
the now differentiated meanings of “conscious of something” (of fact, of external 
circumstances) and of private or subjective knowledge. Conscire gained the 
connotation of “be privy to”, of a shared secret or a conspiracy. In its root meaning, 
the noun “conscience” refers to this connotation of conscire. In the seventeenth 
century, the birth of modern science, Rene Descartes made “consciousness” (a private 
knowledge) a synonym for consciring. Hence, consciousness became the secrecy, and 
for modern science the thing or experience that science has yet to explain (See Capra, 
2002).  
With some light shed on the genealogy of conscience and consciousness, Stephenson 
applies the concept of conscire to all knowledge as a basic premise of Q methodology. 
He writes: „We shall bring all knowledge under the one rubric of communicability, 
conceived as conscire, “shared knowledge”‟ (Stephenson, 1980b:7). From this central 
premise stems the postulate of communicability in Q methodology, expressed by 
Stephenson (1980b:15) as follows: „... all, and we mean all, subjectivity is rooted in 
conscire, in the common knowledge, the sharable knowledge known to everyone in a 
culture‟. 
The epistemological thinking behind this postulate is attributed by Stephenson 
(1995/1996) to Niels Bohr and the influence of the work of James on Bohr‟s ideas. 
Stephenson refers to Bohr‟s (1950) paper On the Notions of Causality and 
Complementarity, and to James‟ (1891) text The Principles of Psychology. Bohr 
proposed a “new” epistemology in which, according to Stephenson (1995/1996:8), 
„subjectivity is real, a fact, the essence of reality.‟ Stephenson (1995/1996:9), then 
notes that in Bohr‟s view this new epistemology, which allowed us „to see that all 
experience in science, philosophy, art or whatever‟, in order to be useful to society, 
„... must be capable of being communicated by human means of expression...‟ 
(Stephenson, 1995/1996:9, citing Holton, 1973:136). 
From the text it is unclear whether Bohr‟s view connecting the so-called new 
epistemology to “all experience in science, philosophy, and art” extends to encompass 
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“or whatever” or whether this catch-all term has been added by Stephenson. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of understanding Q methodology, the catch-all phrase of 
“or whatever” is significant. How Stephenson defines and elaborates “whatever” is 
touched on next.  
Common knowledge 
Stephenson‟s writings indicate that he adhered to a view that modern science could-
but-does not represent the “Long Arm of Common Sense” (a phrase attributed to 
Gustav Bergmann in Haack, 2005:247). Such a view is conveyed, for example, in: 
Foundations of Communication Theory (1969); Concourse Theory of Communication 
(1978); Conscience and Consciousness (1980a), Consciring: A General Theory for 
Subjective Communicability (1980b), and the series Protoconcursus: The Concourse 
Theory of Communication (1986). These texts by Stephenson make a sustained 
critique of modern science. In this critique, Stephenson mounts a challenge to any 
science that would exclude the domain of subjectivity from the scope of scientific 
knowledge. He makes a compelling case for the view that the dominant approaches 
may have scant knowledge of the familiar things around us. It is a perspective 
strongly reminiscent of systems of knowledge concatenation advanced by James: the 
widest knower that exists may yet remain ignorant of much that is known to others.  
In Stephenson‟s (1980b:14) terms, on this point:  
With modern science, steps were taken to replace common sense by objective 
fact, but the resulting knowledge is not common knowledge. It is special 
knowledge ... Meanwhile, we are left with no scientific knowledge about the 
familiar things everywhere around us.  
In other words, even though scientific knowledge is intended to be about reality, 
however conceived, the so called “special” sciences have divorced themselves from 
sharable knowledge, the common knowledge, about the world as it is given in 
concrete human experience. Stephenson (1961a:3) alerts us to the nature of what is 
“given” when he writes: „and what is given are pots and pans, Toms and Harrys, ideas 
and feelings of people, and the like‟ (Stephenson, 1961a:3). In these plain terms 
Stephenson is indicating that we are all proponents of knowledge (see Stephenson, 
1986). In introducing Conscience and Consciousness, Brown (1980) provides a 
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succinct statement of Stephenson‟s argument. It is significant that sharable knowledge 
is about familiar things and events „as opposed to the expert‟s knowledge of the 
uncommon, the latter being unsharable except following formal learning‟ (Brown, 
1980:73). In the way Wolf (2007:88) puts it in her introduction to Stephenson‟s text, 
Consciring: A General Theory for Subjective Communicability, his approach „sets 
“sharing knowledge” against modern science‟, that is, Stephenson engages in an 
epistemological rethinking of Cartesian knowledge. 
In his reclamation, Stephenson elaborates consciring, in which everyday experience is 
in view, as a human behaviour with intrinsic features of subjectivity, communication, 
and complexity. Subjectivity is an intrinsic feature of consciring since it is a person 
and not a group who is sharing knowledge, either with other persons or to themselves: 
„It is “me” who enters into shareable knowledge with self-reference‟ (Stephenson, 
1980a:78). „It is me who is speaking my own mind‟ (Stephenson, 1969:73). 
According to Stephenson (1969:69) the act of subjective communication mediates 
„between different points of view (or so called „minds‟), or between different aspects 
of a person‟s own point of view („mind‟)‟. In this way, consciring elicits complexity. 
Consciring generates a network of communications among individuals which connect 
our experience of everyday events, issues, concerns and their intelligibility. 
Bearing in mind that consciring is not simply talk, but a process of knowing, of 
conceiving ideas (transitory thought), and of individuals speaking their own mind, 
from consciring a body of opinion emerges about a topic, a situation, or an event. For 
Stephenson (1969:70), this is the domain of subjective science: „The concern, 
therefore, is with informal or other forms of conversational possibilities, looked at 
from the subjective standpoint of the individual.‟ He adds, „... the subjective 
communication possibilities of a person can be regarded as at the interface between 
different aspects of self and the non-subjective world of events and objects outside the 
person‟ (Stephenson, 1969:70). Thus, with Q methodology we can inquire into 
consciring and the common knowledge embodied in a system of subjective social 
rationality using the material of shared knowledge, namely self-referent statements of 
opinion (Stephenson, 1969:73).  
In sum, Stephenson‟s use of the concept of conscire invokes the point of view of a 
many formulation of concatenate knowing articulated by James; the view that 
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knowing is a characteristic of life and everyday reality, and that all human thought 
gets verbally built out and made available for everyone, making it possible to work 
things out together. Viewed as a general theory of knowledge, Stephenson‟s 
interpretation of conscire is not only reminiscent of the pragmatist tradition of 
complexity thinking but is also similar to the more recent philosophical theorisations 
of transdisciplinarity. For example, Stephenson‟s view touches on the idea mentioned 
by Klein (2004:4-5) that complex social problems do not originate with science, but 
are „external developments in Lebenswelt, the living world‟. In these terms, Q 
methodology represents a general method for undertaking systematic inquiry in this 
complex social context for the purpose of comprehending as Wolf (2007:88) puts it: 
„social truths and thereby contribute most centrally to the knowledge society needs‟. 
Such comprehension relies on tapping the subjective structures or pattern of opinion 
for complex situations.  
The concept of concourse 
The theory of subjective communicability, which I have treated as the conscire theory 
of knowledge, leads to the concept of “concourse” from the Latin concursus meaning 
“a running together”, as the basis upon which to determine structures of subjectivity. 
Given in Stephenson (1986:52), the concept of concourse corresponds to Martin 
Brouwer‟s (1967) „mycelium model for mass communication‟. Brouwer‟s mycelium 
model concerns „the ramifying networks of public conversation (the common 
conversation of people in a culture)‟ (Stephenson, 1969:68-69). About Brouwer‟s 
mycelium model Stephenson (1980:52) noted:  
… what people are talking about informally, or could talk about to others or to 
themselves, objectively regarded, looks like a highly complex, chaotic, tangled 
skein of innumerable criss-crossing networks between people. 
As Stephenson (1978:25) makes clear, concourse is a „statistical conception‟ of the 
material of shared knowledge, that is, the self-referent statements of opinion about a 
situation. As given in Stephenson (1986:37):  
A universe of statements for any situation or context is called a concourse, and 
refers to conversational and not merely informational possibilities, and is 
arrived at empirically for every concept, every declarative statement, every 
wish, and every object in nature when viewed subjectively, etc. 
171 
 
In Concourse Theory of Communication, Stephenson (1978:23-25) posits his concept 
of concourse in terms of eight assumptions and postulates, which, in an abridged 
form, are as follows (see Operant Subjectivity, 1986, 9(2)): 
Subjective communication is grounded in statistical quantities of „statements‟ 
about a situation. 
Each „statement‟ of a concourse is equiprobable and equipotential a priori. 
All „statements‟ of a concourse have self-referent possibilities. 
Concourses concern meanings, not facts. 
All subjective communication is reducible to concourses, whether in the 
sciences, the arts, or any other domain. 
That complex subjective situations are so reduced is not to be taken as a 
reductionist assumption. 
The number of concourses is infinite. 
Concourses are empirically grounded. 
Concourses can be assembled „from face -to-face conversations, from writings, from 
any situation or course‟ (Stephenson, 1978:23), in which communicability/consciring 
is involved. It is on the basis of this concept of concourse that Q method proceeds. 
It is possible to view Q method in Stephenson‟s system of science as a method of 
doing questioning, thinking, and knowing that may serve as a paradigmatic case 
demonstrating complexity thinking. The summary that follows conveys a standard 
account of Q method without an in-depth theoretical, technical, and statistical 
treatment. My aim at this point is to highlight the transformative aspect of the 
methodology with some more light shed on how it is possible for Q method to be used 
adjunctively or transformatively.  
Q method  
To ground the account of Q method, I draw on the small Q methodological study of 
the points of view of Sickness and Invalids‟ Benefit clients on the topics of: well-
being, employment, and independence. This study was undertaken by the New 
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Zealand Ministry of Social Development‟s Centre for Social Research and Evaluation 
in conjunction with the School of Government of Victoria University of Wellington in 
2004. This research project was part of the New Zealand Ministry of Social 
Development‟s policy work programme looking at a wide range of issues concerning 
welfare benefit design and delivery. The particular policy issue related to the growth 
in numbers of the working-age population receiving Sickness Benefit or Invalids‟ 
Benefit. The numbers of people in receipt of incapacity benefits had doubled over the 
decade 1992-2002. In this regard, New Zealand‟s experience was not unique. Since 
the 1970s, other developed countries also showed a persistent rise in the proportion of 
the working age population claiming incapacity benefits (Peace, Wolf, Crack, 
Hutchinson & Roorda, 2004).  
Since at least 1995, successive New Zealand governments have set about trying to 
move people “off benefit” and “into paid work” out of a concern about both the 
economic costs and the costs to social wellbeing. So far, despite a series of 
government initiatives since the mid-1990s, the problem being addressed and talked 
about by public officials as “welfare dependency”, has proven to be “wicked, that is, 
difficult to solve and a highly contentious public policy issue.  
The idea of welfare dependency is a long-standing analytic discourse that has 
informed policy analysis on welfare reform in a number of states including New 
Zealand (Fraser & Gordon, 1994). My point is not to rehearse this analysis but point 
to the possibility that policy analysis based on the argument of welfare dependency 
continues in the vein of standard positivist evidentiary and justificatory analysis 
whereby a pre-existing discourse frames the problem and ideas of what would act on 
the problem.  
In 2003, the New Zealand Ministry of Social Development embarked on a work 
programme of research projects into drivers behind the growth in Sickness Benefit 
and Invalids‟ Benefit client numbers, with policy attention paid to those in long-term 
receipt of such benefits (Lunt, 2006). Against this background, the Q methodological 
study had two aims. One aim was to develop a complex picture of clients‟ views and 
the other aim was to assess the extent to which clients‟ views highlight insights that 
are relevant to the policy analysis concerned with the question of welfare system 
design (Peace, Wolf, Crack, Hutchinson & Roorda, 2004:1).  
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The Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study, like the van Eeten Schiphol Airport 
study, followed the procedures of Q method rigorously. The difference between the 
Schiphol case and the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study is that van Eeten 
brought a narrative-based approach to the particular “wicked” problem and used Q 
method to capture the narratives, whereas in the case of the Sickness Benefit and 
Invalids‟ Benefit project, the researchers consciously exploited Q methodology as a 
stand-alone research strategy for their project. Rather than have a pre-existing 
analytical framework for doing policy thinking, the researchers were tapping social 
rationality, the system of subjectivity, knowing, and opinion, for a conceptual frame - 
one that captured complexity.  
Basic procedure 
The basic procedure of Q method can be thought of as three phases of an 
experimental research design comprising preparation, measurement, and analysis and 
interpretation.  
 
 
Figure 18: Basic procedure of Q method 
Source: adapted from Amin (2000:411) 
PREPARATION 
•Research question 
•Collection of opinions: CONCOURSE 
•Create a sample of statements: Q SAMPLE 
•Select study participants: P SAMPLE 
MEASUREMENT 
•Study participants asked to rank order statements: CONDITION of INSTRUCTION 
•Study participants rank order statements from their own point of view: Q SORT 
ANALYSIS & 
INTERPRETATION 
•Statistical analysis of the Q sorts: FACTOR ANAYSIS 
•Interpretation of the operant Q factors: ABDUCTIVE LOGIC 
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These three phases involve eight major steps centred on identifying the concourse, 
creating a sample of the concourse, selecting the people to carry out the Q sort (P 
sample), administrating the Q sort, statistical analysis of the sorts, and interpretation 
of the Q factors (Brown, Durning & Seldon, 2008). A summary of the major steps 
derived mainly from Brown (1993, 91-129), Brown et al., (2007:722-724), and Helen 
Addams (2000:14-40) runs as follows: 
1) Preparation: 
Identifying the concourse:  
Any topic of interest to people in general or to individuals in specific roles generates 
conversation. This conversation occurs in ordinary language, and it may appear in 
discussions or arguments, in e-mails and blogs, in newspapers, magazines, books, and 
in other forms of communication. The researcher identifies to the extent possible the 
communication on the topic of interest, usually in the form of statements or pictorial, 
photographic, or musical artefacts. This can be done, for example, by interviewing 
people likely to be engaged in communicating about the topic; and or from collecting 
statements from written sources. Since concourses are infinite in extent and number, 
in order to sample you have to have an “estimation” of the concourse. Depending on 
the topic, the researcher will collect dozens to hundreds of expressions of opinions, 
assertions, and arguments related to the topic (Brown et al, 2007). This “big set” of 
statements or artefacts, which is then reduced to the actual Q-set, does not comprise 
the concourse so much as estimate it (see Wolf & Stainton, 2011). 
In the case of the Sickness and Invalids‟ Benefit study, researchers used a range of 
sources of commentary on the topic of well-being, employment and independence 
(policy documents, political manifestos, focus groups and telephone interviews with 
clients and former clients, published studies, and media reports) to identify and 
estimate the concourse of interest. Approximately 400 statements about well-being, 
employment, and independence as expressed by, or about, Sickness Benefit and 
Invalids‟ Benefit clients were compiled (Peace et al., 2004:7). 
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Sampling the concourse:  
After the concourse has been documented, the researcher draws a representative 
sample from it. This representative sample can best be thought of as a specimen of the 
concourse, that is, a small sample of the whole set of statements rather than a sample 
which is representative of proportions of the population from which it is drawn 
(“kinds” rather than “proportions”). The goal of the researcher is to capture the full 
diversity and complexity of the different views contained within the concourse. 
Typically, the researcher is guided in the selection of a sample by a framework that 
has been formulated to model dimensions that may be considered important elements 
of the topic. Stephenson (1993/1994:7-11) gives an account of the thinking and how 
practically to go about the formulation of such a framework based on the research 
method of Ronald A. Fisher (1935) who developed sample theory. The sample must 
include enough statements to fully represent the diversity of the concourse, but not 
have so many statements that it cannot be used effectively in the sorts to be 
administered. Depending on the topic, 20-50 statements are usually sufficient (Brown 
et al., 2007). 
In the case of the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study, 43 statements were 
selected to represent the full range of ideas evident in the initial set of statements. The 
sampling framework formulated by the researchers to ensure that in the process of 
reducing the size of the initial set of statements, significant orientations that were 
present were not lost, consisted of two related dimensions: “main themes at issue” in 
the concourse and “instrumentality”. The researchers determined five themes against 
which the 400 statements in the concourse could be arraigned to determine which 
statements most clearly represented the themes: 
1. How the benefit system responds to or interacts with clients. 
2. How society responds to or interacts with clients. 
3. What the benefit system does that affects wellbeing, employment, and 
independence. 
4. What affects wellbeing, employment, independence that does not derive from 
the benefit system. 
5. Employment issues. 
176 
 
The second dimension of instrumentality was to ensure that statements were 
representative of each theme. This dimension had two levels, “instrumental” and 
“non-instrumental” (Peace et al., 2004:8). The instrumental elements included those 
things that emanated from the individuals themselves. The non-instrumental elements 
were those that were imposed externally. Researchers also examined the statements 
for a balance between „negatively and positively cast views‟ (Peace, et al., 2004:8). 
Selecting the sorters:  
The selection of the people to complete a Q sort is termed the “P sample”. If the study 
focuses on a topic of concern largely to a specific part of a community or 
organisation, every person of interest can be included. For example, in Donner‟s 
(2001:24) illustration of the use of Q method the topic of concern was the position 
and strategic priorities of the Social Development Family (SDV) within The World 
Bank and involved SDV managers. Alternatively, if the study addresses a broader 
topic affecting a larger group of people and interests (for example, the van Eeten 
study), the selection of participants should be designed to make sure that the full but 
not necessarily representative range of opinions and positions is represented in the P 
sample (Brown et al., 2007). 
In the case of the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study, 20 participants were 
recruited for the study – all were receiving either the Sickness or Invalids‟ Benefit and 
all declared an interest in being in part-time or full-time work. The recruitment was 
done by way of: an invitation posted to an online forum on disability issues; 
approaches to local advocacy groups; distributed information on participation to 
clients that fitted the research requirements; snowballing (contacting with participants 
once they were recruited); and word-of-mouth amongst personal contacts (Peace, et 
al., 2004:25). 
2) Measurement: 
Q sorting:  
A Q sort results when the researcher asks a selected person to place the statements 
comprising the Q sample in rank order. In this way, Q sorters are responding to the 
concourse and “filling in” or claiming their view. The researcher provides: 
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a) A Q sort deck, which consists of all Q sample statements written on separate 
cards that have been randomly numbered. 
b) Instructions on how the cards should be ranked; the sorter may be asked to 
place the cards along a continuum (for example beginning with -4 and ending 
in +4 with 0 as a mid-point) following a quasi-normal distribution. 
c) Instructions on the conditions governing the sort; for example the sorter may 
be asked to rank the statements according to „most agree‟ and „most disagree‟. 
 
Most 
strongly 
disagree 
 
Most 
strongly 
agree 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
         
(2)        (2) 
 (3)      (3)  
         
  (5)    (5)   
         
   (7)  (7)    
         
   (9)    
 
Rank order 
value 
Statement 
numbers 
 
Number of 
statements 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Q sorting structure for 43 statements 
Source: Adapted from Peace, Wolf, Crack, Hutchinson, & Roorda (2004:31) 
In the case of the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study, participants were 
asked to array the numbered statement cards on the sort deck in front of them from -4 
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to +4 and then copy the number of each statement onto the provided record sheet in 
the order laid out on the table. The record sheet showed the quasi-normal distribution 
with the rating scale for the 43 statements. A completed sort would be filled in on a 
template that is demonstrated in Figure 19 above. The condition of instruction, in the 
Sickness and Invalids‟ Benefit study, was to sort on the basis of whether they „agree 
or disagree with the ideas expressed more strongly than the other statements based 
upon their own views or understanding‟ (Peace et al., 2004:30). 
3) Analysis and Interpretation: 
Analyzing the Q sorts:  
The researcher analyses the Q sorts with the aid of three sets of statistical procedures: 
correlation, factor analysis, and the computation of factor scores.  
It should be noted that factor analysis, the goal of which is to identify a limited 
number of independent factors that adequately account for the observed correlations, 
has a reputation for being a daunting statistical procedure due to the „intricate‟ (Kline, 
1994:1) nature of the mathematics. Specific statistical software is available to 
generate the tables of statistical information needed for the analysis and interpretation 
of factors. Thus, Brown (1993:110) points out that for non-mathematicians it is not a 
necessity to understand factor analysis in all of its mathematical detail, although a 
minimal understanding is required, for example: understanding of the goals and steps 
in a factor analysis process, an awareness of alternative factor-analytic procedures in 
order to make choices in the process of analysis that are appropriate to the nature of 
the study being undertaken, as well as sufficient understanding to make sense of the 
tables of data generated by the software. To this end I have graphically outlined the 
key statistical procedures involved in the Q method factor analysis (see Figure 20). 
Software packages for Q method such as PCQ or PQMethod (freeware) are available 
through the Q methodology website
8
.  
                                               
8 http://www.qmethod.org 
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Procedures of factor analysis
Factor analysis 
determines how 
many different 
expressed views are 
in evidence
Interpretation of 
factors
Findings; distinct 
points of view 
Correlation matrix 
between Q sorts
Factor loading 
matrix with X a 
defining Q sort
Factor arrays (Q 
sort for each 
statement)
Shows: degrees of similarity 
or dissimilarity
Use: allows factor analysis 
based on how Q sorts bunch 
together (factors)
Shows: extent to which each 
Q sort is associated with each 
factor (i.e. “load’ 
significantly or 
insignificantly on the factor
Use: to identify the number 
of factors for interpretation 
and the Q sorts to aid in 
interpreting the factors
Shows: factors exemplified 
by a composite Q sort (i.e. 
weighted average rank 
ordering of the statements 
used in individual Q sorts
Use: the basis for 
interpretation of the factors 
with focus on distinguishing 
statements associated with 
each factor
 
Figure 20: Statistical procedures of factor analysis 
Factor analysis is applied to correlations between variables. In Q methodology factor 
analysis the participants‟ expressed points of view are being correlated and 
subsequently factored. Q sorts that are highly correlated with one another but 
uncorrelated with others may be considered to have a “family” resemblance or in 
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Jamesian terms, “be of a kind” (Brown, 1993). Q-based factor analysis is designed to 
simplify correlation matrices and reveal how many different factors or points of view 
there are, with those persons sharing a common view defining the same factor. As 
Brown (1993:111) emphasizes, the number of factors is: „wholly dependent on how 
the Q sorters actually performed‟ and not on how many Q sorts were performed.  
A factor loading that is indicative of a significant (meaningful) relationship between 
the study participant‟s Q sort and the factor type is determined for each Q sort, with -1 
indicating complete disagreement, +1 full agreement, and 0 indicating no relationship 
between the study participant‟s Q sort and the factor type. These loadings tell the 
researcher whether a Q sort can aid in interpreting the factor or not (Addams, 2000).  
It is assumed in factor analysis generally that initial factors will be rotated in order to 
achieve a “cleaner” definition of each factor, that is, the aim is to obtain a “simple 
structure” to aid examination of each factor in its structure and relevance to the 
purpose of the study. In statistical terms: „it is “simple” since each variable loads on 
as few factors as possible” (Gorusch, 1974:164). The most common method is the 
varimax method of orthogonal rotation which results in uncorrelated factors (attempts 
to minimise the number of variables with high loadings on each factor) (Addams, 
2000).  
In Q methodology, a common method is to carry out rotations guided by abductory 
means through the use of the centroid method of analysis coupled with judgmental 
rotation rather than by programmed standardized methods (e.g. varimax). This 
abductory approach entails drawing on „impressions and any other bits of information 
at the researcher‟s disposal‟ (Brown, 1993), in conjunction with the theoretical 
concerns of the researcher. On this point, Brown (1993:116) observes:  
There is an infinite number of ways in which the factors can be rotated (the 
varimax procedure is but one of these), and the investigator probes this space 
in terms of preconceived ideas, vague notions, and prior knowledge about the 
subject matter, but with due regard also for any obvious contours in the data 
themselves. 
The choice of abductory method relies on graphic representations of unrotated factors 
whereby factors are plotted two by two, for example factor A against factor B, factor 
A against factor C, and so forth using the factor loadings for each Q sort as the 
181 
 
coordinates for the plots. In this way the researcher can see the appearance of patterns 
in the data; how Q sorts „blob‟ and „bunch together‟ (Stephenson, 1977) aiding 
thoughts about what to home in on as relevant, important, novel, and meaningful in 
the data. In other words, abductory rotation affords the power of judging spoken of by 
Stengers (2004) in her critique of neo-reductionist approaches whereby she argues 
against propensities to rely on ready-made instruments in lieu of exercising researcher 
skills of interrogation. After rotation, whether carried out visually (graphically) in the 
abductory mode or on the basis of the statistically derived varimax method, the 
presence of several independent (orthogonal) factors is evidence of distinct points of 
view.  
In the case of the Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study, the researchers 
retained five factors for detailed interpretation as the table in Figure 21 shows.  
 
Figure 21: Factor loading table with defining Q sorts in bold   
Source: Peace, Wolf, Crack, Hutchinson, & Roorda (2004:9) 
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Interpreting the factors 
The next step is to identify the distinguishing characteristics of each factor as an aid to 
conceptualising the points of view in evidence. In this regard, it is important to note 
that in Q methodology, interpretations are based on factor arrays and factor scores and 
not the factor loadings. Thus, the final step in the analysis of Q sorts leading to 
interpretation is to produce factor arrays by calculating factor scores. A factor score is 
the score gained by each statement in the Q sample as a weighted average of the 
scores given that statement by the Q sorts associated with the factor (Brown, 
1993:117). What is sought is a composite Q sort that exemplifies the factor and is 
arrayed in the original Q sorting structure (see Brown, 1993; also, Addams, 2000; 
Gorusch, 1974).  
Bearing in mind Stephenson‟s description of revealed factor structures as the „nexus 
for the meaning of the situation‟ (Stephenson, 1981:47), on the one side of 
interpretation are the understandings possessed by the sorters and on the other side are 
the insights into those understandings obtained by the researcher through the process 
of factor interpretations. They may not necessarily be the same insights. In other 
words, the participant and researcher have claim to „a point of view in a concourse‟ 
(Wolf, 2004:161). For the researcher, it is important to remember that in Q 
methodology interpretation is not about cause and effect explanations: 
… Q methodologists do not follow the strategy of mechanistic science that 
involves reaching conclusions about hypothetical causal agents. Instead, the 
task of Q methodological research is to interpret factors in their own right and 
this means in terms of the sorter‟s lived experience. There is no search for 
causes-in-themselves (Brown, 2002:145, citing Stephenson, 1982).  
According to Stephenson (1980b:13), interpretation is a matter of „comprehending a 
continuum of consistent feeling from one end of the factor array to the other.‟ Wolf 
(2004:158) notes it is this continuum of feeling that the researcher tries „to grasp as 
understanding‟. In this way, the interpretation of the identified factors is a matter of 
abductive logic (Brown et al., 2007). Addams (2000:32) notes, for instance, that 
interpretation proceeds by „continuously putting up possible explanations for the 
factor array until the best explanation is developed‟. This is done by examining the 
array of scores for each factor to discern the overall pattern of thought reflected in the 
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interrelationships (consensual/divergent/neutral) of statements in the array, including 
how these compare (how they differ and how they are similar) with other factors in 
evidence (Brown et al., 2007; McKeown & Thomas, 1988). The researcher, then, is 
actively positing continuities, that is, abducing. By convention, the researcher presents 
descriptions of the structure of thought that exists for each factor, illustrated with 
selected statements and factor scores (Brown, et al., 2007).  
Descriptive labels are attributed to each of the factors to reflect the dominant 
characteristic that runs through the conjunction of views. In the process of labelling 
what the factors show, attention is given also to the relevance of the pattern to the 
hypothesis-forming, that is, abductive function of Q methodology - what the different 
views point to in terms of new propositions, concepts, or hypotheses, and further 
research or courses of action. It is important to note that the findings should not be 
taken as somehow representative of the individuals who completed the Q sorts. 
Rather, the factors in evidence are arrived at through the behaviours of the study 
participants, illuminating structures, relations, or patterns or configurations of 
subjectivity in the concourse (Peace et al., 2004; see also Wolf, 2004). 
In the case of Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study, the factor analysis and 
interpretation brought to light facts about an overall pattern of subjectivity rendered 
and shown to condense in a complex of five factors. An indicative and not the whole 
description provided by the researchers is given here of the five factors labelled as: 
“entitled to support”; “ready for work”; “victim of stigma”; “pragmatically hopeful”; 
and “grateful for the benefit system”. Figure 22 shows the graphic used by the 
researchers, which underscores the point that these distinct factors sourced from the 
processes and subjectivity involved in social rationality are complex in the sense that 
individual Q sorts “hang together” as a factor and the factors, “modes of regard”, hang 
together about the topic of clients‟ experience of the benefit system in a policy context 
of independence and employment. 
In this picture, given is a differentiated picture of „the knowing‟ about „the way things 
stand‟ vis-à-vis the question (in this case) of client‟s experience of the benefit system 
in a policy context of independence and employment. 
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Figure 22: A complex of views on issues to be aware of in welfare design 
Source: Peace, Wolf, Crack, Hutchinson, & Roorda (2004:11) 
The use of findings 
Peace et al., (2004:18) note that most observers would expect to find at least two 
distinct points of view. One of the expected views would mirror the basic premises of 
government‟s policy, in which wellbeing is associated with paid work and economic 
independence. The other point of view would mirror a benefit client sense that their 
wellbeing can be achieved when there is access to adequate support that meets 
people‟s needs and allows them to get on with their lives free from undue coercion to 
get back to work. Peace et al., (2004:18), observe: „Both these views circulate at the 
benefit system/client interface but their veracity is never tested‟. In their study, the 
researchers reported that while none of the factors were completely novel or 
unanticipated the distinguishing features of each factor revealed a more complex and 
nuanced interplay of concerns which cut across a propensity to see stereotypical 
polarities in Sickness Benefits and Invalids‟ Benefit population - for instance, „those 
who are willing to work versus those who are reluctant to work‟ (Peace et al., 
2004:21).  
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But Q methodology is not merely about demonstrating that patterns reached in 
subjectivity exist (Stephenson, 1980). It is important to emphasise, following Peirce, 
James, and Stephenson that abductive inquiry is ultimately about the use of acquired 
understanding in terms of meaning in a continuous process of inquiry. This 
continuous process of inquiry involves practices of abductive, deductive, and 
inductive inference. As Stephenson (1956:9) suggests, it is from the factors reached, 
that „the deductive and testing possibilities stem‟. The factors provide a deductive 
framework, a fresh analytical perspective, on the basis of which the policy analysis 
can advance „with hypotheses that lead to new test conditions‟ (Stephenson, 1956:8). 
This in essence, is what a complexity reading is all about. 
In this regard, Q method can be used to plan a programme of policy research, 
evaluation, and analysis of a “wicked” problem based in opinion and, if carried 
through, culminating in tests of proof. The complex of factors, not simply each factor 
taken in isolation, has relevance for a complexity reading. It would involve the 
complex of factors as the measure of policy to be developed just as, for example, the 
complex of traffic is the measure of how to act when crossing the road. 
The Sickness Benefit and Invalids‟ Benefit study offered little in the way of surprises, 
but offered the potential to see the issue of well-being, employment, and 
independence in a new analytical perspective with leads on what to pay attention to 
and not overlook in policy analysis. I note, too, that the transformative potential of Q 
methodology was not fully realized. The findings of this study were not used in the 
formal policy analysis. Thus, the opportunity to explore the potential in policy 
analysis of the different practice of science based in the logic of abduction afforded by 
Stephenson‟s methodology and introduce a change in analytic perspective rooted in 
social rationality did not arise. The researchers, enabled by Q methodology, engaged 
in subjective science up to the point of providing a deductive framework sourced from 
opinion, but not to the point in analysis of actual hypothetical treatment of the factor 
complex leading to testable propositions. Thus, although the study used Q 
methodology as a stand-alone strategy the innovative potential embodied by 
Stephenson‟s system of science with its statistical, philosophy of science, and 
psychological principles, was missed.  
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On this point, I now turn to take stock of Q methodology in terms of its 
epistemological status.  
Epistemological status 
As Maureen Brown (2008:311) notes, Q methodology: 
... can be viewed as a positivist method because it relies on quantitative tools 
to extract knowledge. Yet, it can also be viewed as an interpretivist method 
because it allows the subject to set the boundaries according to his/her 
viewpoint of the relevant issues. It is also constructivist in that it allows inter-
subjective analysis. Finally it is appealing to critical postmodernists in that it is 
often used to expose underlying hidden contradictions for the purposes of 
change. 
Q methodology lends itself for different reasons to each of the main epistemological 
paradigms of positivism, interpretivism and critical postmodernism, and also to 
transdisciplinary approaches. It would be a mistake to regard Q methodology as 
subsumed by any of these dominant approaches to knowledge. In the literature, it is 
clear that the relationship of Q methodology to alternative epistemologies is an on-
going debate among proponents of Q methodology (See Hurd & Brown, 2004/2005), 
likely in part because Q methodology stands poised between paradigmatic positions 
as Brown (2008) indicates.  
Furthermore, not all applications deploy Q methodology as a stand-alone strategy for 
research or policy analysis. Different models of using Q method have led to some 
confusion about what Q methodology entails (Brown, 2007). In studies that use Q 
methodology for adjunctive rather than transformative reasons it is to be expected that 
the selection of Q methodology for a subjective approach to research and analysis is 
justified on the grounds of the researcher‟s primary theoretical frame, for example 
discourse analysis as in the case of Dryzek, Clark and McKenzie (1989), or 
constructivism in human geography as in the case of Robbins and Krueger (2000). 
The focus of justification is generally on Q method and statistical technique. This 
limited focus means that accounts of Q methodology are prone to losing sight of the 
system of science, with its abductive logic and different practice of science, as a core 
difference of Q methodology from other approaches to knowledge. This view of 
science gives Q methodology special epistemological status that makes practical 
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analysis of complex issues based in opinion possible. Q methodology allows 
abductive study of subjective phenomena using objective material to provide 
knowledge. 
Q methodology is a practice of science developed not to replace or repudiate objective 
methods of science. As a way of studying subjectivity and a way of tapping subjective 
reality, Q methodology serves as a path of knowledge for a wide range of problems. 
The methodology‟s coherent set of principles marks off Q methodology as a kind of 
new science of complexity in the epistemological stream of pragmatism; a stream 
with emphasis on a way to think, not on a way to know.  
In terms of the epistemological stream of pragmatism, Q methodology is an 
illustration of the explicit mobilization of abductivity as the central research process. 
Q methodology‟s departure from Cartesian theory of knowledge invokes the 
complexity thinking of pragmatism centered on subjective life and processes of 
concatenated and synechistic knowing - a working together through interaction. The 
Q methodology view studies subjectivity by way of self-referential communicability 
based in consciring. Consciring is a knowing, communicative, interactive, and 
signifying act of human behaviour.  
In Q methodology, insofar as opinions are shared with others, issues of subjective 
concern are „not synonymous with individuality‟ (Stephenson, 1979:28). In Q 
methodology is the recognition that subjective reality has complex form and structure, 
an “inner complexity” constituted at the individual level yet involving patterns of 
relations at a variety of scales and levels and of more than one kind, which factor 
analysis lays bare. Together, these views have resonance with the notion of systems of 
subjectivity spoken about by James: the point of view of a many involving, always, an 
individual knower and relations among individual knowers. 
Q methodology mobilizes subjectivity, relations, experience, communication, and 
human behavior as specific operations in the investigative process. As an abductive 
form of science, Q methodology reinforces a unity of knowledge in which fact and 
opinion, objective and subjective, and social and individual are no longer 
diametrically oppositional terms. Significantly, the methodology seeks to elicit 
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insights from common sense-making able to be used as a source for conceptual 
frameworks in policy analysis, evaluation, and research. 
Stephenson‟s science has many of the features sought after in the transdisciplinary 
stream of complexity thinking which are acted upon in a subjective science that does 
not adhere to the modernist notion of scientific rationality. In this way, Stephenson‟s 
science of subjectivity meets the criteria of a new science for work in the zone of 
complexity as depicted in Dent‟s (1999) diagram (see Figure 11) - the zone of 
subjective reality, indeterminism, mutual causality, and holism. Q methodology, by 
virtue of the centrality of the logic of abduction, is also an illustration of conjunctive 
thinking replacing disjunctive thinking as has been called for by some complexity 
theorists (e.g., Capra, 2002; Morin, 2005; Montuori, 2008). 
Overall, through Q methodology Stephenson advances a way for policy analysts to 
acquire the knowledge spoken about by Rittel and Webber (1973) as necessary when 
faced with a “wicked” problem: in social processes and the rationality of stakeholders 
and citizens. Under Q methodology, this knowledge can be found in people‟s 
consciring conjoined with the abductory, interactive behavior of the inquirer. Thus, in 
regards to understanding how Q methodology opens a new epistemological space in 
policy analysis, the key is to understand how Q methodology, with its abductive logic 
and focus on accessing subjectivity, works as a stand-alone research strategy.  
Summary 
In this chapter I have argued that Q methodology has an epistemological claim in the 
revalorization of opinion. The claim is a case for a different form of science. One that 
is part of a synechistic, concatenated and scientifically rational process premised on 
abduction, deduction, and induction. Further, this “new” science of subjectivity, 
founded in classical pragmatism, enables the possibility of a reading complexity 
opinion-based policy analysis that may endow the existing policy system with 
transformative capabilities, that is, the kind of complexity capability to change 
patterns of intractability in analysis associated with “wicked” problems. I have argued 
that this transformative power stems primarily from the abductive logic and theory of 
knowledge at the core of Q methodology that affords interactive open inquiry and 
new thinking.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
The central claim of this thesis is that opinion may play an important role in policy 
analysis in contexts of complex, intractable situations. Existing knowledge was drawn 
on in several inquiries and the thesis worked from this combined knowledge base to 
consider the claim about the role of opinion in policy analysis and advice. The set of 
propositions are what account for and allow for the assessment of what the claim 
involves and relates to the epistemological efficacy of Q methodology. Overall, the 
argument of the thesis revalorises the idea that opinion matters in policy analysis.  
Reading complexity is my elaboration of the claim as a difference of practice and part 
of that elaboration is that a new epistemological space opens in policy analysis. Q 
methodology is the means by which that new space can be accessed and reading 
complexity can take place. This epistemological space is marked out by classical 
pragmatism. 
I can now elaborate reading complexity as the main contribution of this thesis by 
summarising what I did and why in the process of this study. 
Summary 
Theoretical point 
Reading complexity in social policy contexts: the value of Q methodology is a 
theoretical piece of work. For an understanding of the character of this thesis much 
depends on understanding pragmatic inquiry derived from Peirce and his method. His 
method allows for a theoretical treatment of a question and discussion. Peirce referred 
to such theoretical treatment as abduction. Abduction leads to and culminates in 
propositions that can be put to empirical test by methods sought for doing this. So, 
this thesis is an abductive work that is open to hypothetical discussion and the 
possibility of further inquiry. 
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Starting point 
My starting point was based on the Schiphol Airport expansion policy issue which 
had a history of public controversy. This was a seemingly “unresolvable conflict” the 
cause of which has been identified in the literature as a combination of: sustained 
conceptualisation of the policy problem, viz., how to accommodate aviation growth of 
the airport while avoiding negative effects on the environment, and 
investigation/analysis through the use of conventional methods giving rise to 
intractable analysis (Kroesen & Bröer, 2009). I sought to investigate the efficacy of Q 
methodology in this specific case. 
Research questions 
Does Q methodology have potential because it meets a policy need, namely to 
make opinion available as a complement to other evidence knowledge and 
thus adds to understanding problems and solutions while remaining firmly 
within the prevailing evidence based epistemology – in other words does Q 
methodology have an adjunctive power and simply adds to what can be 
determined through existing practices embedded in policy analysis?  
Or  
Does Q methodology have potential because it opens up a new 
epistemological space for doing policy analysis, in which case, could it be 
claimed that Q methodology has transformative power to create a more 
sustained policy-analytic change? 
These research questions stem from the use of Q methodology in van Eeten‟s policy 
analysis, which was adjunctive, and from an extensive reading of Stephenson‟s works 
conjoined with an equally extensive reading of Peirce, and then James. In those 
readings, the status of Q methodology as a stand-alone research/analysis strategy 
comes to the fore. To answer those research questions I formulated a set of nine 
propositions based on the primacy of an investigation that had an epistemological 
theme to it.  
Arguments for the use of Q methodology in social science suffer from a relative lack 
of epistemological emphasis in defending or justifying use made of the methodology. 
This thesis recognises the epistemological position of Q methodology as a way of 
providing knowledge based in the abductive study of subjective phenomena using 
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objective material from which deductions can be drawn and put to test. The thesis 
goes on to examine each of the nine propositions through a series of discussions.  
Discussions 
The thesis has a discussion of why evidence-based policy analysis often fails when it 
is used to address “wicked” problems. This discussion is in the main a review of a 
body of literature that critiques conventional analysis for its failure on epistemological 
and practical levels. This literature suggests the positivist character of policy analysis 
and its methods create major limitations in the analysis of difficult, intractable, and 
complex policy issues.  
Discussion links “wicked” problems to complexity thinking, and introduces the idea 
of “reading complexity” as necessary to analyse these “wicked” problems. This idea 
suggests that policy analysts need ways to understand complex issues not accessible 
through evidence-based policy analysis. An explanation is given based in Peirce‟s and 
James‟ theories of pragmatism, and ideas of synechism, concatenation, and 
supervenience as a way to understand complexity in human experience and the 
requirements for “reading” such complexity. 
In discussion, an explanation of abductive logic and why this mode of thinking is an 
element of “reading complexity” based on ideas of complexity capability, common 
sense-making, and consciring is provided. Ways in which the concept of abduction 
relates to the concept of opinion in a practice of science and practices of everyday life 
are explored. Abduction as a common subjective mode of thinking has a knowledge-
extending function in the investigative procedures of Stephenson‟s subjective science. 
In addition, the thesis critiques the rejection of “opinion” in evidence-based policy 
analysis, and explains why, within Peirce‟s pragmatic frame, opinion is essential for 
“reading complexity” because of its importance in an abductive approach to the 
analysis of difficult problems.  
Discussion makes a connection between Peirce‟s abduction, pragmatism, and 
Stephenson‟s theory of knowledge. It examines how Q methodology, with its 
abductive logic and focus on individual subjectivity, provides a “stand-alone” method 
to read complexity in a way that is not possible with more familiar methods of social 
science based on deductive or inductive logic. Q methodology provides a means to 
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identify opinion and social subjectivity (e.g. public opinion) in relation to a particular 
issue. And, as the van Eeten case study shows, knowledge about social rationality 
concerning a “wicked” problem can contribute to new ways of thinking about the 
issue that can help bring about negotiated change.  
That “there is an epistemological basis to the adjunctive and transformative capacity 
of Q methodology in the revalorization of opinion for policy purposes” frames the 
conclusion of this thesis. Q methodology can operate either at an adjunctive level of 
instrumental data, rendering opinion a mechanism for breaking deadlocks or at a 
transformative level that opens up a new epistemological space for doing policy 
analysis work that is opinion-based. Q methodology‟s adjunctive capacity is that it 
can be harnessed to existing standard evidenced-based policy analysis capabilities for 
data gathering. Q methodology‟s transformative capacity is that it can change analytic 
practice of policy analysis based in hypothetico-deductive logic to an abductive 
practice of analysis, introducing new capabilities of policy analysis when required. 
Main contribution and concluding comments 
The idea of “reading complexity” and Q methodology as a means of reading 
complexity that policy analysts may use to address analysis constitutes the main 
contribution that this thesis makes to knowledge. It allows a reconceptualization of 
what may be required in policy analysis to respond to complex social problems in new 
ways. In practical terms, “reading complexity” and Q methodology as the means for 
doing this affords the possibility to plan a continuous and coherent program of policy 
research, analysis, and evaluation based in opinion and a reading of what to pay 
attention to and not overlook in analysis.  
My purpose in exploring Q methodology, opinion, and complexity thinking in the 
context of policy analysis was driven by a sense of the limitations of standard 
evidence-based policy analysis practice. Professor Meredith Edwards is the current 
Director of the National Institute for Governance at the University of Canberra. She 
has been both policy analyst and researcher. In Edwards (2004) discussion of social 
science research and public policy (see Social Science Research and Public Policy: 
Narrowing the Divide), although focused on the role of research in the policy process, 
her comments on the character of policy environments are useful here for their 
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articulation of the larger point of discussion in this thesis that concerns complexity 
capability in the policy process. Without going into Edward‟s discussion in any depth, 
a comment is restated here: 
Policy environments are full of complexities, usually involving a diverse range 
of players coming from different perspectives and spawning a host of 
unexpected events. It is, therefore, very unlikely that circumstances would 
permit anything approaching classical rationality in the decision-making 
process (Edwards, 2004:7). 
In making this comment, Edwards is alerting the social scientist to the nature of 
policy reality and at the same time confirms that among policy analysts it is 
acknowledged that the classical rational schema of policy development is an ideal not 
achieved in practice. The policy environment Edwards describes is the same form of 
environment described by James as the “the zone of formative processes” from which 
we can see “social twists” or unintended consequences and “wicked” problems in the 
making – that is, a zone of supervening relations in which, and in respect of human 
affairs, it matters “what comes together”. 
In this thesis I have argued that in evidence-based policy analysis there is a retreat 
from those complexities of the real world. On the one hand complexities are spoken 
about in terms of disrupting the rational order and process of policy making and 
concomitant elements of good policy analysis while on the other hand, in spite of the 
complexities that thwart such rationality, effort is put into a good policy process 
grounded in conventional, positivist scientific rationality, special skills, knowledge 
and perspectives. Notwithstanding the importance of expert/special knowledge and 
expert interpretations of evidence from a wide range of social science research in 
policy, it is still not clear what might be a viable alternative to classical rationality vis-
a-vis the complexity of actual policy situations as described by Edwards, and for use 
in tackling complex, “wicked” problems in policy analysis. 
We need an alternative way of thinking for making sense of the pervading context of 
complexity in which policy comes to be developed, conjoined with an approach by 
which we can navigate the complexity that scholars and practitioners recognize as the 
multiple points of view, with overlapping differences and similarities, of politicians, 
experts, public servants, interest groups, and citizens. Moreover, and as far as 
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possible, navigate and negotiate without the policy that comes to be developed being 
“simply askew” of this experiential context and the facts of complexity (Fraser, 1997). 
The crux of my argument is that the difficulties of the policy environment and of 
policy analysis in that environment do not mean policy practitioners should always 
fall back on objective science as a template for reliable knowledge. Stephenson‟s kind 
of science and Q methodology may offer a way out of a long-standing and intractable 
analytic impasse, the making of which is an epistemological argument of what counts 
as knowledge that has held sway since at least the 1930s. In order for a policy 
community to engage with these ideas will not be a simple task and will require 
confidence expressed as supportive infrastructure to enable the development of new 
methods and epistemological understandings in policy analysis. 
Finally, the argument that there is a new epistemological space that could be opened 
up in the policy context provides an opportunity for policy analysts and for others 
with an epistemological interest to decide the degree and extent of what has been 
opened up, if the argument is sustained. The articulation of Q methodology‟s manner 
of contribution to policy analysis and advice advanced in both its adjunctive and 
transformative terms provides a rationale for Q methodology in policy toolkits for use 
in research, analysis, and evaluation. 
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